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Abstract  
This thesis integrates social capital and institutional theories with corporate governance 
insights to explore the impact of managerial political ties on access to finance, cost of debt 
and institutional risk exposure. Drawing on an extensive and rigorous assessment of the 
literature, using a unique set of survey data from 179 firms operating in Ghana, and 
employing robust analytical techniques, this thesis comprises three interrelated empirical 
studies which make significant contributions to knowledge. 
The first empirical study examines the impact of political ties on access to finance and cost of 
debt. It shows that political ties are positively related to interest rates charged by commercial 
banks. This positive relationship is weakened by managerial financial ties, and strengthened 
by borrowing from privately owned banks and the appointment of Big Four audit firms. 
Altogether, the findings reveal that while political ties enhance access to finance, they 
increase the cost of debt. They suggest that institutional lapses in emerging countries increase 
lenders’ perceptions of corporate governance erosion in politically connected firms, hence the 
high interest rates these firms are charged when they borrow. 
The second empirical study investigates the effect of political ties on institutional risk 
exposure. The findings show that political ties do not reduce risk exposure. The findings also 
show that while industry regulation and public affairs functions affect the strength of the 
relationship between political ties and institutional risk exposure, corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) does not. In sum, the findings suggest that the conjectured efficacy of 
political ties in risk reduction is illusive. The third empirical study explores mediation in the 
political ties-cost of debt relationship. The findings reveal a negative impact of political ties 
on corporate governance, and show that political ties increase cost of debt by reducing 
financial reporting quality and increasing the risk exposure of firms. 
Through the three empirical studies, this thesis contributes to Corporate Political Activity 
(CPA) literature, social capital theory and institutional theory. It accentuates the contingent 
value of political ties and addresses the salient and overlooked “how” question in CPA 
research. It also fills the lack of insight into the complementarity between CPA and CSR. On 
the social capital and institutional fronts, this thesis deepens insight into the interactive effects 
of different types of social capital and highlights how institutional development and 
organizational legitimacy moderate the value of network ties in emerging countries. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Organizational theorists have argued that managerial actions are hugely embedded in 
networking relationships (Granovetter, 1985). These relationships create social capital, a 
valuable resource useful for leveraging or exploiting other resources (Li and Zhang, 2007) 
and for enhancing firm performance (Acquaah, 2007). The term “social capital” refers to the 
sum of resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or organization as a result of 
the development and maintenance of personal and social networking relationships 
(Granovetter, 1973; Granovetter, 1985; Lin, 2001). The central proposition of social capital 
theory suggests that networking relationships have a significant positive impact not only on 
individuals, but also on firms (Coleman, 1988b; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998a; Moran, 2005). 
Building on this proposition, researchers have argued that the business and political 
connections of managers have implications for firm performance (Peng and Luo, 2000; 
Acquaah, 2007; Boso et al., 2013). They also argue that the importance of social capital is 
higher in weak institutional environments (Sheng et al., 2011; Talavera et al., 2012). It is 
therefore not surprising that social capital and institutional theories are often integrated to 
study management phenomenon in emerging countries (Boso et al., 2013) 
A few studies have explored the role of social capital in credit markets, especially in 
emerging countries where social ties are prevalent. Specifically, these studies argue that 
managerial business and political ties enable firms to access private equity or get loans from 
banks (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Talavera et al., 2012; Yeh et al., 2013; Batjargal and Liu, 
2004). However, it is not still clear whether political ties enable firms to get loans at low 
interest rates. The link between social capital and cost of debt in emerging countries is 
important because the business environments in emerging countries are plagued by 
institutional voids which make networking relationships important for entrepreneurs 
(Talavera et al., 2012). It is widely argued that social networking relationships serve as 
substitute for the fledgling market supporting institutions in these countries (Xin and Pearce, 
1996; Park and Luo, 2001; Li and Zhang, 2007). The link is also important because in 
emerging countries, access to finance and cost of debt pose significant obstacles for firm 
survival and growth (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006).  
Importantly, social capital research has largely overlooked the complementariness of 
different networking relationships in credit markets. Studies have explored business and 
political ties, but separately, and this has limited our understanding of the combinative effect 
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of different social ties. This thesis draws upon social capital and institutional theories to 
examine the impact of political and financial ties on access to finance and cost of debt in 
Ghana. As research on political ties and connections is situated within the CPA research field, 
the empirical positioning of this thesis will be better understood through a review of the CPA 
literature.  
CPA research has expanded rapidly over the past few years. Springing out from non-market 
strategy (Baron, 1995a; Baron, 1995b), CPA is defined as “corporate attempts to shape 
government policy in ways favourable to the firm” (Hillman et al., 2004 p. 838). It is also 
defined as “any deliberate firm action intended to influence governmental policy or process” 
(Getz, 1997, pp. 32-33). Generally, CPA captures the efforts that firms exert to manage their 
dependency relationships with government (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Kotter, 1979; 
Hillman, 2005). Firms operate within political jurisdictions (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994) 
and are therefore exposed to the consequences of political decisions (Stigler, 1971) such as 
corporate taxes (Osterloh and Debus, 2012), business laws (North, 1990) and expropriation 
(Minor, 1994; Williams, 1975; Frynas and Mellahi, 2003). This exposure motivates them to 
influence the interaction between politics and their economic environments (Hillman et al., 
1999; Buchholz, 1992). While it is undisputed that firms have long been involved in policy 
making processes (Broadbent, 2000; Hillman et al., 2004), it was until recently that scholarly 
research began to keep pace with the practice.  
Early CPA research focused on three main areas – antecedents, types and strategies. Early 
scholars were interested in understanding the determinants of CPA. In other words, they 
wanted to understand why some firms are politically active than others. Studies on the 
antecedents of CPA have shown that firm size, industry regulation, diversification, foreign 
ownership, organizational structures, industry concentration and institutional factors 
influence the participation of firms in politics (Hillman and Keim, 1995; Hansen and 
Mitchell, 2000; Hersch and McDougall, 2000; Hillman, 2003; Schuler et al., 2002; 
Blumentritt, 2003; Hillman et al., 2004; Lawton et al., 2013b). In addition to exploring 
antecedents, early scholars were interested in identifying the different types of political 
behaviours (Weidenbaum, 1980; Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Meznar and Nigh, 1995). 
They were also interested in understanding the strategies and tactics used by firms to 
influence government policy (Baysinger et al., 1985; Keim and Zeithaml, 1986; Hillman and 
Hitt, 1999) as well as the approaches and levels of CPA (Hillman and Hitt, 1999).  
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In recent times however, the focus of CPA research has shifted from antecedents and 
strategies to the impact of political strategies on firm performance. An increasing number of 
studies have asked the question: Does political activity improve firm performance? 
Researchers have found different answers to the question. In other words, the answer to the 
question is not unanimous. While some studies found positive effects (De Figueiredo and 
Silverman, 2006; Claessens et al., 2008; Cooper et al., 2010; Wu et al., 2012b), others 
reported negative outcomes (Chaney et al., 2011; Carretta et al., 2012). However, evidence 
from systematic reviews conclusively shows that CPA does more good than harm to firms’ 
bottom lines (Hillman et al., 2004; Lawton et al., 2013a; Rajwani and Liedong, 2015). 
Nonetheless, further research is needed to help resolve this “paradox” (Lux et al., 2011), for 
as it stands our knowledge of the impact of CPA on firm performance is still vague and 
incomplete (Hadani and Schuler, 2013).    
The growing interest in the relationship between CPA and firm performance has centred on 
some very common performance outcomes such as stock returns (Goldman et al., 2009; 
Cooper et al., 2010; Huber and Kirchler, 2013), return on sales (Fan et al., 2007; Hadani and 
Schuler, 2013), return on investment (Niessen and Ruenzi, 2010; Mathur and Singh, 2011), 
effective tax rates (Adhikari et al., 2006; Richter et al., 2009), leverage levels (Khwaja and 
Mian, 2005; Fraser et al., 2006), accruals quality (Chaney et al., 2011), interest revenues 
(Carretta et al., 2012), academic earmarks (De Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006), anti-
dumping proceeds (Lee and Baik, 2010), government contracts (Witko, 2011), corporate 
bailouts (Faccio et al., 2006), trade mission participation (Schuler et al., 2002) and regulatory 
influence (McKay and Webb-Yackee, 2007). The foregoing show that firm performance has 
been examined using different measures, but there is still room for the effect of CPA on other 
performance measures to be investigated. For instance, the impact of political activity on 
capital structure and cost of debt capital remains under-explored (Fraser et al., 2006; Rajwani 
and Liedong, 2015).  
Though the increased research focus on CPA and organizational performance is welcome, 
some aspects of this research agenda require significant attention. First, review of the 
literature reveals that the performance outcomes that are often investigated are “distant” from 
the direct influence of political strategies. This distance perhaps underlies the limited ability 
of CPA researchers to provide plausible explanations for the causal mechanisms of their 
findings (Puck et al., 2013) as linkages may be improbable or unconvincing. Consequently, 
the lack of credible treatise of mediation along this line of inquiry curtails deep understanding 
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(Guo et al., 2014; Rajwani and Liedong, 2015). Second, it is worth noting that CPA research 
has been conducted in both developed and emerging countries. However, most emerging 
country CPA studies are conducted in a few Asian countries such as China, Indonesia, 
Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand (Chizema et al., 2015; Fan et al., 2007; Fraser et al., 2006; 
Hassan et al., 2012; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Peng and Luo, 
2000). What is quite intriguing is that even though emerging countries have high-risk 
business environments (Henisz and Zelner, 2010; Puck et al., 2013), CPA research conducted 
in these countries tends to focus on financial performance and overlooks other context-
relevant and intermediate outcomes such as risk exposure and cost of debt which 
consequently affect performance. The proposition that political strategies can reduce the 
exposure of firms to uncertainty (Baysinger, 1984; Hillman & Hitt, 1999) is not supported by 
adequate empirical proof, but empirical research has overlooked this intermediate 
relationship.  
1.1 Research Motivation and Research Questions 
In emerging countries, limited access to finance is a major impediment to private sector 
development (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Beck et al., 2008). High interest rates and 
increased demand for collateral discourage a lot of firms from seeking loans (Aryeetey, 1998; 
Abor and Biekpe, 2007b). Further, poor financial literacy has made it difficult for firms to 
develop bankable projects (Adomako et al., 2016) while unstructured governance and poor 
institutionalization of management processes have made banks reluctant to advance loans to 
firms (PwC, 2013). Credit is therefore severely rationed (Jaffee and Russell, 1976; Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1981). In the rationing process, network relationships and social capital play an 
important role (Uzzi, 1999; Berger and Udell, 1995; Hernández-Cánovas and Martínez-
Solano, 2010). In essence, firms with connections to bank officials (Dygryse and Van 
Cayseele, 2000) or politicians (Chan et al., 2012; Cull et al., 2015) are more likely to receive 
credit.  
Despite the role of social capital in debt financing, and given that politics and business are 
intertwined (Du and Girma, 2010), it is surprising that studies have rarely examined the effect 
of managerial political ties on cost of debt. The interest rates firms are charged when they 
borrow have a profound impact on performance. This is because high interest payments do 
not only reduce profitability. They can also cause financial distress. The few studies that have 
investigated the association between CPA and cost of debt have reported mixed findings, 
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triggering a debate as to whether or not politically connected firms receive preferential 
treatment when accessing debt financing. While there is some unanimity that politically 
connected firms are highly leveraged (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Fraser et al., 2006; Claessens 
et al., 2008; Onder and Ozyildirim, 2011; Saeed et al., 2015), there is disagreement about the 
impact of political connections on cost of debt (Bliss and Gul, 2012; Houston et al., 2014; 
Chen et al., 2014). Consequently, our understanding of the role of political connections in 
debt financing is incomplete.  
Additionally, the mechanisms through which political connections affects firm performance 
have received little empirical attention (Lux et al., 2011; Guo et al., 2014). As mentioned 
previously, majority of studies do not explicate mediation. Even if they do, the mechanisms 
are conjectured. Among the studies that have examined the impact of CPA on cost of debt, 
none empirically addresses mediation. This leaves us guessing the processes through which 
political activity affects debt financing outcomes. A commonly mentioned but unverified 
mediator in CPA studies is risk. Proponents argue that political activity reduces the exposure 
of firms to uncertainty, which leads to superior competitive advantage and performance 
(Meznar and Nigh, 1995; Hillman et al., 1999). However, neither the relationship between 
CPA and risk exposure nor the mediating role of risk exposure in the relationship between 
CPA and firm performance or cost of debt has been empirically proven. 
Moreover, risk exposure has not received significant attention in mainstream strategy 
research. This is mainly due to risk being treated as an international business issue with little 
or no ramifications for local firms. MNEs may encounter high risks in their host countries, 
but local firms also face political and institutional challenges. Recent work shows that 
institutional lapses will impact local firms as much as they will impact foreign firms (Wocke 
and Moodley, 2015). There is therefore the need for scholarship to break away from this track 
by conceiving institutional risk as constraints that affect both local and foreign firms. In this 
respect, a re-conceptualization of the local-foreign dichotomy in institutional or political risk 
research needs to be instigated and developed.  
The aforementioned limitations and gaps in the literature motivate this research. Positioned to 
contribute to the literature on CPA and debt financing, this thesis addresses three main 
questions:  
1. What is the impact of managerial political ties on access to finance and cost of debt?  
2. What is the impact of managerial political ties on institutional risk exposure? 
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3. What mechanisms mediate the relationship between political ties and cost of debt? 
Beside these three main questions, other questions focusing on moderation effects are also 
investigated. Specifically, the effects of managerial financial ties, borrowing from 
government-owned banks, financial representation on corporate boards, and the appointment 
of Big Four auditors (PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Deloitte and Ernst & Young) on the 
relationship between political ties and cost of debt are examined. Similarly, the effects of 
CSR, public affairs and industry regulation on the relationship between political ties and 
institutional risk exposure (constraints or barriers to growth and investment) are examined.  
This thesis is positioned within social capital theory (Granovetter, 1985; Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal, 1998a; Lin, 2001) and institutional theory (Scott, 2001; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Dieleman and Sachs, 2008; Doh et al., 2012). It draws on the complementarity between 
social capital and institutional logics (Peng and Luo, 2000; Acquaah, 2007), and in doing so, 
incorporates insights from corporate governance to examine the contingent value of political 
ties in credit markets. Such a multi-theoretical approach to studying non-market strategy 
deepens knowledge and extends theory beyond single lenses and paradigms (Mellahi et al., 
2016). 
1.2 Research Setting and Methods 
Even though there have been calls for management and strategy research to focus on new 
settings such as Africa and the Middle East (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Wright et al., 2005; 
Mellahi and Mol, 2015; Klingebiel and Stadler, 2015), majority of strategy and CPA studies 
are still set in developed countries. Consequently, little is known about strategic management 
in Africa. More precisely, our stock of knowledge on the performance implications of 
strategy in Africa is limited (Mellahi and Mol, 2015). In recent times, scholars have begun 
giving emerging markets some attention, particularly with respect to the exploration of the 
impact of political connections on firm performance (Rajwani and Liedong, 2015). However, 
this attention is not evenly distributed across the emerging world. For instance, there are 
hardly CPA studies that focus on countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, North Africa 
and the Middle East have received little attention from CPA scholars. Emerging markets 
share similar characteristics such as weak regulatory environments (Acquaah, 2007), but they 
may have unique institutional and social frameworks that differentiate them from one another 
(Boso et al., 2013). Consequently, it could be erroneous to generalize findings from China, 
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Malaysia, Indonesia, or Thailand to every other emerging country. The African continent has 
interesting phenomena that have not yet been explained using extant theory, and thus presents 
opportunities for researchers to foray into empirical blind spots that can alter theory 
(Klingebiel and Stadler, 2015).    
This thesis is set in Ghana, a country in sub-Saharan Africa. She has a population of 27 
million (2014 estimate). Classified as a lower middle income country by the World Bank, 
Ghana’s GDP was US$38.62 billion as of 2014. I chose Ghana as the context of this thesis 
for important reasons. First, Ghana is peaceful and politically stable, but just like every other 
country in the sub-region, she is institutionally weak. Regulations are not always applied as 
expected. In fact, most of them exist only on paper and some are outdated. Moreover, most of 
the regulatory documents are not easily accessible by the public. Powers of the government 
are separated, but checks and balances are largely ineffective. Consequent of these 
institutional weaknesses, uncertainty is rife in the country. Institutional voids have not only 
worsened the country’s macroeconomic fundamentals, but they have also harmed private 
sector development. For instance, pervasive corruption and economic mismanagement have 
been cited among the reasons why public debt stock soared from GH¢ 9.5 billion to GH¢94.5 
billion between 2008 and 2015, a figure representing over 70% of GDP (Alhassan, 2015). 
Also, unfavourable tax administration, bribery and corruption have discouraged entrepreneurs 
from participating in the formal sector (Koto, 2015). With a weak institutional environment, 
Ghana is a suitable context for examining institutional risk exposure. 
Second, credit is expensive and rationed in Ghana (Ahiawodzi and Sackey, 2010; Robson et 
al., 2013; Awunyo-Vitor et al., 2014). Over the years, the interest rate regime has become 
unfriendly to businesses. For instance, in the three years between September 2011 and 
September 2014, Ghana’s monetary policy rate increased from 12.5% to 21% while the 91-
day Treasury bill rate surged up from 10.67% to 25.79%. The interbank lending rate, which is 
the overnight rate at which banks lend to one another, took a giant leap from 10.6% to 24.2% 
in the same period. Correspondingly, inflation soared from 8.84% in 2012 to 17.7% in 2015. 
This upward trajectory in interest rates, and of course inflation, has placed dire constraints on 
firms that want to access credit. Ghana’s high interest rate regime provides an interesting 
context for ascertaining the effect of political ties on cost of debt. 
Third, corporate governance is poor in Ghana. There are so many organizations in the country 
that have never filed annual returns since their incorporation (Registrar General's 
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Department, 2015). Company laws are flouted with reckless abandon. The institutions that 
should monitor and regulate the private sector are incapacitated (World Bank, 2005). 
Corporate boards in the country are mere “instruments of management” (Tsamenyi et al., 
2007) because boards are rarely committed to shareholder value maximization. Rather, board 
members are mostly concerned with the financial and private benefits that are associated with 
their positions. These lapses in governance have implications for firm performance. As this 
thesis tests the moderation effects of corporate governance, Ghana presents a setting that 
allows for the impact of good and bad governance to be examined. 
In emerging countries, archival data is difficult to obtain (Wright et al., 2005). Moreover, 
corporate political activity data is rarely available from secondary sources (Hillman and Wan, 
2005). A survey was therefore used to collect data. A structured questionnaire was developed 
and shared with renowned scholars for evaluation (Fowler, 1995). The questionnaire was then 
piloted in three stages to test the validity of the questions vis-à-vis the Ghanaian environment 
(Mesquita and Lazzarini, 2008). Following previous studies, various techniques were 
employed to maximize the response rate. First, assurances of anonymity were made to all the 
respondents (Acquaah, 2007). Second, offers were made to share the results upon completion 
(Chan, 2005). Third, endorsements for the survey were sought from reputable organizations 
in Ghana (Hillman, 2003; Hillman and Wan, 2005). Endorsements were obtained from the 
Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC), the Association of Ghana Industries (AGI) and 
the Ghana Association of Bankers (GAB). These endorsees were strategically chosen to give 
credibility to the study. GIPC, an agency under the Office of the President of Ghana, is 
responsible for promoting private sector development and attracting foreign investment into 
the country. AGI is business group made up of over 1200 small, medium and large scale 
firms operating in Ghana. GAB is the umbrella association for all commercial banks 
operating in Ghana.  
Data was collected from Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), Managing Directors (MDs) and 
Directors of Finance and Administration. The sample consisted of 300 large and medium-
sized firms selected from the Association of Ghana Industries Directory (Abor and Biekpe, 
2007a; Adomako et al., 2016), Ghana Business Directory (Appiah-Adu, 1998; Appiah-Adu 
and Blankson, 1998; Acquaah, 2007; Boso et al., 2013), Ghana company register (Adomako 
et al., 2016) and Ghana Club 100 (Ofori and Hinson, 2007). After several visits and phone 
calls, 179 questionnaires were collected, representing a final response rate of 59.6%. 
Common method variances were checked and the reliability of the constructs was tested 
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using statistical techniques, including exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses. 
Consequently, robust, hierarchical, moderated and mediated regression analyses were done to 
derive the findings. 
1.3 Summary of Findings and Contributions 
This thesis contains three empirical studies, each answering one of the three research 
questions. The first empirical study examines the relationship between managerial political 
ties, access to finance and cost of debt. The findings reveal that political ties are positively 
associated with access to finance and cost of debt, suggesting that while political ties enable 
firms to get loans, they do not reduce interest rates. The result about access to finance is 
consistent with prior studies (Claessens et al., 2008; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Chan et al., 
2012; Saeed et al., 2015; Cull et al., 2015). However, the result about cost of debt is 
counterintuitive, though it is consistent with a previous study done in Malaysia (Bliss and 
Gul, 2012). The negative impact of political ties on cost of debt can be attributed to high 
leverage and likelihood of financial distress in connected firms (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; 
Saeed et al., 2015), unwarranted risk taking and moral hazard problems in connected firms 
(Boubakri et al., 2013), political constraints faced by banks in enforcing loan obligations 
against connected firms, and the adverse effect CPA has on firm performance (Hadani and 
Schuler, 2013).    
Additionally, the findings show that even though managerial political ties and managerial 
financial ties, separately, are positively associated with cost of debt, their combination or 
interaction is associated with low interest rates. This result suggests that both types of 
managerial ties complement each other. At best, political ties create access to loans (Yen et 
al., 2014) while financial ties overcome political affiliation barriers and evoke empathy in the 
determination of loan terms. In another sense, financial ties compensate for the indirectness 
of political ties in the credit market. Interestingly, and contrary to expectations, the findings 
also reveal that the appointment of Big Four auditors does not increase banks’ confidence in 
the financial reporting of politically connected firms. Rather, these appointments strengthen 
beliefs that financial malfeasance can still be hidden. Big Four audit firms play important 
roles for governments, either as tax policy advisors or project managers. Such roles lead them 
to develop ties to politicians, which can make them sympathetic and accomplices to the 
diversionary practices of politically connected firms. Details of this study are contained in 
Chapter 5. 
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The second empirical study investigates the impact of political ties on institutional risk 
exposure. The findings show that political ties are insignificantly associated with risk 
exposure. Even when institutional risk is disaggregated into three types (regulatory, 
administrative and direct controls), political ties are still insignificant. These results, 
consistent with previous findings (Puck et al., 2013), show that the popularly postulated 
effectiveness of CPA in uncertainty reduction (Hillman et al., 1999) could be an illusion.  
Peering deeper, the results show that while public affairs functions are effective for reducing 
regulatory risk, they are not effective for reducing exposure to administrative risk and direct 
controls. Similarly, CSR is effective for reducing administrative risk and not regulatory risk 
or direct controls. Surprisingly, the interactive effect of CPA and CSR on risk exposure is 
insignificant. This finding does not support the concept of complementarity between 
government affairs and social responsibility (Hond et al., 2014; Zhao, 2012; Hadani and 
Coombes, 2015; Ungericht and Hirt, 2010; Morsing and Roepstorff, 2015; Liedong et al., 
2015). Instead, it highlights the likelihood of “cannibalization” if the two activities are 
combined (Liedong et al., 2015) or not aligned properly (Hond et al., 2014). In-depth results 
of this study can be found in Chapter 6. 
The third and final empirical study investigates the processes through which political ties 
affect debt financing outcomes. Specifically, it examines the mediating roles of institutional 
risk exposure, financial reporting quality, non-financial disclosure, social network expansion 
and board independence. The findings reveal a negative relationship between political ties 
and corporate governance (i.e. financial reporting, disclosure, and board independence), and 
confirm previous concerns about the quality of governance in politically connected firms 
(Guedhami et al., 2014; Fan et al., 2007; Gul, 2006; Effiezal et al., 2011). With respect to 
mediation, the results show that poor financial reporting quality and exposure to institutional 
constraints account for the high cost of debt experienced by politically connected firms. A 
detailed discussion of this study can be found in Chapter 7. 
Together, the findings show that political ties can be harmful to organizational performance 
(Okhmatovskiy, 2010; Sun et al., 2012; Hadani and Schuler, 2013). They do not only reflect 
how the cost of developing and maintaining political ties can exceed the resultant benefits 
(Peng and Luo, 2000; Park and Luo, 2001; Chung, 2012), but they also show how the value 
of political ties is contingent on institutional strength and corporate governance. 
Consequently, this thesis makes important contributions to the CPA literature, social capital 
theory and institutional theory. First, it contributes to knowledge by showing that CPA has 
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mixed value in credit markets. In specific terms, this thesis demonstrates that political 
connections are like a “double-edged” sword capable of enhancing access to finance but also 
capable of increasing cost of debt. The thesis also provides empirical evidence to show that 
not only is the conjectured impact of CPA on risk exposure illusional, but also the 
complementarity between CPA and CSR warrants a deeper conceptualization. Moreover, the 
empirical treatise of mediation provides newer and deeper insights into the effect of political 
connections in credit markets by shifting the focus from contingency to process (Peng and 
Luo, 2000; Guo et al., 2014).  
Second, this thesis contributes to social capital theory. It conceptualizes and differentiates 
between types of managerial ties, and by doing so disaggregates and captures the nuances in 
social capital (Peng and Luo, 2000).  The findings contradict the dominant view that social 
capital improves organizational performance in emerging countries (Peng and Luo, 2000; 
Acquaah, 2007; Boso et al., 2013) and support the view that building and maintaining 
network relationships could involve considerable costs (Peng and Luo, 2000; Park and Luo, 
2001; Chung, 2012). This thesis highlights the negative perceptions associated with some 
types of social capital, particularly political ties, and demonstrates how visibility can 
exacerbate the negative effect of these ties in emerging countries. It also addresses the 
paucity of research into the interaction or complementarity of different types of network 
relationships, and therefore extends knowledge about the dynamic value of social capital. 
Third, the findings of this thesis contribute to institutional theory in a significant manner. 
They contradict the widely held view that the value of social capital is more prominent in 
weak institutional environments (North, 1990; Acquaah, 2007; Luo et al., 2008). They also 
reveal that the value of social capital depends on the level institutional development of the 
industry from which the value will be gained, not the overall institutional development of the 
country (Sheng et al., 2011). In this respect, political ties are less valuable when favours are 
sought from clients or partners operating in institutionally stronger industries such as the 
banking industry, regardless of whether the overall institutional development of the country is 
weak or strong. This thesis refines a key tenet of institutional theory by de-scaling from a 
macro-view of institutional development to an industry-view of institutional development. 
Additionally, this thesis suggests that organizational legitimacy from political ties could have 
a negative impact on firms (Barreto and Baden-Fuller, 2006). Besides theoretical 
contributions, the findings of this thesis have implications for managers, development 
agencies and governments of emerging countries.  
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1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
The rest of the thesis proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I systematically review the literature 
on CPA and firm performance by using the CIMO-logic (Denyer et al., 2008; Pilbeam et al., 
2012) to explore the contexts, strategies, outcomes and mechanisms of political activity.  I 
also delve deeper into the literature on CPA, access to finance, cost of debt and risk. 
Following this rigorous review, I problematize the literature and identify gaps in order to 
strategically position the thesis. Consequently, I develop research questions and define the 
theoretical framework for the thesis. A paper from the systematic review was published in 
Journal of World Business (ABS 4). 
In Chapter 3, I justify my decision to use Ghana as the context for this thesis. This chapter 
covers the history and political system of Ghana. It also covers institutional development, 
regulatory development, macroeconomic performance, and corporate governance in Ghana. 
As this thesis is about access to loan finance, I also present an overview of the financial and 
banking industry in Ghana. All of this information is then synthesized and used to explain 
why situating this study in Ghana makes theoretical sense. 
In chapter 4, I discuss the methodological approach used in the thesis. I start by presenting 
my ontological and epistemological stance. I then outline the research strategy and design. 
Thereafter, I discuss and justify why I used survey to collect data. I present detailed 
information on the questionnaire design, pilot testing, sampling procedure, sources of data 
and sample characteristics. Measures to address common method biases are also discussed. 
Additionally, all the variables/constructs and their measures are described and the techniques 
or approaches used to test their reliability and validity are presented.   
Chapter 5 is the first empirical chapter of this thesis. Here, I present and discuss findings on 
the relationship between managerial political ties, access to finance and cost of debt. I also 
present findings on interesting and insightful moderating effects
1
. In chapter 6, I examine the 
relationship between political ties and institutional risk exposure. I also examine how this 
relationship is contingent on public affairs functions and industry regulation. More 
                                                 
1
 A paper from chapter 5 was published in the 2015 Academy of Management Best Paper 
Proceedings. Same paper was a finalist for Best Student Paper of the Social Issues in Management 
(SIM) Division at the Academy of Management. Another paper from this chapter was presented at the 
2015 Strategic Management Society (SMS) Conference in Denver. At this conference, the paper was 
nominated for three prizes - Best Paper Prize, Best Student Paper Prize and Best Paper for Practice 
Implications.  
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importantly, I test the complementarity between managerial political ties and CSR. A paper 
based on the content of this chapter was published in Group & Organization Management 
(ABS 3*) and was selected into the Editor’s Choice Collections, a list of noteworthy 
manuscripts of the journal.
2
  
Chapter 7 contains the third empirical study. Here, I investigate the mediating mechanisms in 
the political ties-cost of debt relationship. In Chapter 8, I bring all the empirical chapters into 
perspective and discuss the overall contribution of the thesis. I also discuss the practical 
implications of the findings. Consistent with convention, I outline the limitations of the thesis 
and explore directions for future research. In Chapter 9, I draw the curtains on the thesis with 
a summary of the findings and a closing note on the contributions. I also present a summary 
of how the content of this thesis has been/is being disseminated. I sign off with a personal 
reflection of the challenges faced during the field work (data collection) and a comment on 
my personal development over the course of the PhD. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Another paper based on chapter 6 was presented at the 2015 Strategic Management Society (SMS) 
Conference in Denver. A revised version of this same paper is currently under consideration for 
publication (2
nd
 Round) at British Journal of Management (ABS 4). 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
In this chapter, I systematically review literature on the impact of CPA on firm performance, 
access to finance and cost of debt
3
. I start by presenting a brief theoretical positioning of the 
thesis. I also present a detailed empirical positioning by defining CPA within the context of 
non-market strategy and exploring the relationship between different political strategies and 
firm performance. In doing this, I take into consideration the context, strategies, mechanisms 
and outcomes reported in previous studies. From this broader review, I delve deeper into the 
effect of CPA on access to finance, leverage levels, cost of debt and risk exposure. 
Consequently, I outline the gaps and problems that give impetus to my research. I conclude 
the chapter with an overview of the different theories that have been used in CPA-firm 
performance studies, and describe (in detail) the theoretical framework that informs my 
thesis. 
2.1 Theoretical Positioning of the Thesis: An Overview 
Organizational theorists have argued that managerial actions are hugely embedded in 
networking relationships (Granovetter, 1985). These relationships create social capital, a 
valuable resource useful for leveraging or exploiting other resources (Li and Zhang, 2007) 
and for gaining competitive advantage (Baker, 1990). The term “social capital” refers to the 
sum of resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or organization as a result of 
the development and maintenance of personal and social networking relationships 
(Granovetter, 1973; Granovetter, 1985; Lin, 2001). The central proposition of social capital 
theory suggests that networking relationships have a significant positive impact not only on 
individuals, but also on firms (Coleman, 1988b; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998a; Moran, 2005). 
In this respect, there are two main perspectives for examining the effect of social capital: the 
micro-micro link and micro-macro-link. While the micro-micro-link focuses on the impact of 
networking ties on managers and employees (Krackhardt, 1990; Brass and Burkhardt, 1993; 
Belliveau et al., 1996; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998; Seibert et al., 2001; Moran, 2005), the micro-
macro link focuses on the effect of managerial ties on organizational performance (Gulati, 
1995; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Peng & Luo, 2000).  
                                                 
3
 A paper from the systematic review was published in Journal of World Business (ABS 4). 
Permission was obtained from the journal to re-use the content of the paper in this thesis. 
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Building on the micro-macro link, management researchers have argued that the social 
capital of managers can affect firm performance (Park and Luo, 2001; Li and Zhang, 2007; 
Nee, 1992a), competitive advantage (McEvily and Zaheer, 1999), business survival 
(Pennings et al., 1998), and organizational flexibility (Leana and Van Buren, 1999). A 
common argument in social capital studies suggests that networking relationships are more 
important and prevalent in emerging countries than in developed countries (Peng and Luo, 
2000). For instance, Li et al. (2007) argue that because of institutional voids in emerging 
countries, managers rely on personal ties and connections to navigate through market 
transactions. Xin and Pearce (1996) also argue that networking relationships are substitutes 
for market supporting institutions, and are therefore valuable in emerging countries. Social 
ties affect the flow of resources (Park and Luo, 2001) and create opportunities for knowledge 
acquisition (Acquaah, 2007) and opportunity recognition (Guo et al., 2014) in these countries.  
Clearly, these arguments establish a link between social capital and institutional theory. 
According to Sheng et al. (2011), social capital in emerging countries will remain a valuable 
resource as long as institutional development remains weak. 
Though social capital researchers have explored a couple of organizational outcomes, there is 
still an important topic which warrants significant attention – the link between social capital 
and cost of debt in emerging countries. This link is interesting in the sense that the business 
environments in emerging countries are plagued by institutional voids which make 
networking relationships important for entrepreneurs (Talavera et al., 2012). The link is also 
interesting because in emerging countries, access to finance and cost of debt pose significant 
obstacles for firm survival and growth (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006). Empirically, 
relationship lending studies have argued and shown that bank-firm relationships affect access 
to finance and interest rates in bank-based economic systems (Uzzi, 1999; Berger and Udell, 
1995; Dygryse and Van Cayseele, 2000; Hernández-Cánovas and Martínez-Solano, 2010). 
However, these studies mainly focus on relationship duration, and hence do not capture social 
capital in its truest form. Other studies have shown that the social capital of entrepreneurs 
affects access to financing (Talavera et al., 2012) and private equity (Batjargal and Liu, 
2004), but they either do not account for moderation or they do not focus on the most 
important source of financing for firms in emerging countries – bank loans.  
To date, social capital research has largely overlooked the complementary role of networking 
relationships in credit markets. Many studies examine either the direct or indirect effects of 
various types of social capital (Peng and Luo, 2000; Acquaah, 2007) but not the combinative 
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effect of social capital. As networking relationships are substitutes for weak market 
supporting institutions in emerging countries (Xin and Pearce, 1996; Park and Luo, 2001), the 
scope of these relationships is important because firms need to develop ties to the multitude 
of important stakeholders within their business environments (suppliers, competitors, 
government, etc.). While it is important to understand the unique effect of each type of 
networking relationship, it is even more important to understand the combined effect of 
different networking relationships. Are different types of networking relationships 
complements or substitutes? Do different networking relationships “cannibalize” one 
another? Does one type of social tie erode the gains of other social ties? These are some of 
the salient questions that require the attention of social capital researchers.  
This thesis draws upon social capital theory to examine the impact of networking 
relationships on cost of debt and institutional risk exposure in Ghana, sub-Saharan Africa. It 
examines the combinative effect of two types of social capital - managerial political ties and 
managerial financial ties. As the research uses data from an emerging country plagued by 
institutional voids and poor corporate governance, this thesis further examines the moderating 
and mediating influence of governance quality and institutional risk in the relationship 
between social capital and cost of debt. Essentially, this thesis integrates social capital theory, 
institutional theory, and corporate governance insights to understand the effect of social ties 
in credit markets. In the next sections, I empirically position the thesis by reviewing the 
literature on nonmarket strategy, CPA-firm performance and CPA-access to finance. Later in 
the chapter, a more detailed theoretical positioning of the thesis is revisited and discussed (in 
section 2.8).   
2.2 Non-market Strategy  
Since the seminal work of Baron (1995a), strategy research has differentiated between market 
and non-market environments and between market and non-market strategies. Baron defines 
the market environment as “those interactions between the firm and other parties that are 
intermediated by markets or private agreements” and non-market environment as “those 
interactions that are intermediated by the public, stakeholders, government, the media, and 
public institutions” (p.47). He argued that while market strategy - a set of concerted efforts 
taken in the market environment – improves a firm’s economic performance, non-market 
strategy improves a firm’s overall performance. This led to the coining of the term 
“integrated strategy” which consists of both market and non-market components (Baron, 
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1995a). Firms do not only compete in the market environment but also in the non-market 
environment. The two markets are different (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Bonardi et al., 
2005; Hillman and Keim, 1995). The market environment consists of suppliers, customers 
and competitors while the non-market is composed of social, political, and cultural 
stakeholders who can either constrain or enhance firm performance (Doh et al., 2012). Both 
market and non-market environments need to be managed for a firm to succeed or gain 
superior competitive advantage (Baron, 1995a; Baron, 1999; Baron, 1995b; Lawton and 
Rajwani, 2011). Figure 2-1 shows the main elements of the non-market environment. 
 
 
Figure 2-1 Elements of the Non-market Environment 
 
Baron (1995a) outlined four components of the non-market environment: issues, institutions, 
interests and information. Issues are the matters that a non-market strategy seeks to address. 
These could range from tax laws to export/import regulations. Institutions are the 
organizations or agencies that formulate government policy and regulation. Interests are 
individuals or organizations concerned with an issue. Information is the knowledge that 
interest groups have pertaining to an issue. Typically, different interest groups compete for 
policy favours in the non-market environment (Getz, 1997; Getz, 2002) by supplying 
information to institutions or government agencies (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). As described by 
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some researchers, the policy-making process works like a market, with demanders on one 
side and suppliers on the other side (Bonardi et al., 2005; Hillman and Keim, 1995). 
Individuals and firms are demanders of policy while politicians and regulators are the 
suppliers. As it is with product and service markets (i.e. market environment), there is a price 
in policy markets. Regulators or politicians have professional or personal needs and will be 
motivated to supply favourable policies when those needs are met. Hillman and Hitt (1999) 
posit two primary needs of the supply side: information and personal incentives. Politicians 
and regulators need information to formulate policy; politicians need money to finance their 
campaigns and seek re-election. Firms that are able to meet the needs of the supply side are 
better placed to influence public policy.  
Within the non-market environment, two main strategies or activities are developed and 
deployed by firms. They are CPA and corporate social responsibility (CSR). While CPA 
involves concerted efforts and tactics deployed by firms to influence policies and regulations 
(Lux et al., 2011; Hillman et al., 2004), CSR entails actions that improve social welfare 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; McWilliams et al., 2006). Even though CSR might seem 
altruistic, it has intended or unintended positive effects on firm performance. For instance, 
studies show that CSR confers legitimacy on firms (Park et al., 2014), enhances corporate 
reputation (Hond et al., 2014) and strengthens trust between firms and their stakeholders 
(Liedong et al., 2015), culminating in improved firm performance. Table 2-1 summarizes 
non-market strategies and their respective environments of influence. 
Table 2-1 Non-market Strategy  
Non-market Strategy Environment Activity Key Text 
Corporate Political 
Activity 
Political, Legal, 
Regulatory 
Firms attempt to shape 
their regulatory and 
political environments 
Hillman & Hitt (1999); 
Hillman & Keim 
(1986); Bonardi et. al 
(2005, 2006) 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
Social, Cultural Firms attempt to influence 
society which in turn 
influences political actors 
responsible for policy 
making.  
 
Firms build a constituency 
of supporters by being 
good corporate citizens 
and contributing to 
societal welfare 
Ioannou & Serafeim 
(2012); Campbell 
(2007); Jackson & 
Apostolakou (2010); 
McWilliams & Siegel 
(2001); Scherer & 
Palazzo (2011) 
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Interest in non-market strategy, both in practice and research, has risen over the past few 
years (Mellahi et al., 2016; Doh et al., 2012; Bonardi et al., 2006). However, the two strands 
of non-market strategy - CSR and CPA - have been studied in isolation due to the different 
and multiple disciplines within which they are explored. For instance, non-market strategy is 
examined from the theoretical perspectives of economics, sociology, political science, 
ecology and management (Getz, 2002), all of which are different. The fragmented nature of 
the subject has created ‘silos’ which hardly interact (Mellahi et al., 2016). Despite early 
suggestions that CSR can be used as a strategy to obtain political favours (Hillman et al., 
2004), it is only recently that scholars begun to synthesize non-market strategy literature 
across different theoretical perspectives (Mellahi et al., 2016), explore the complementarity 
of the two strands (Liedong et al., 2015; Hadani and Coombes, 2015; Hond et al., 2014) and 
examine the use of CSR to establish political connections (Lin et al., 2015) or the linkage 
between political connections and corporate philanthropy (Li et al., 2015). Some scholars 
have suggested that CSR may strengthen CPA (Marquis and Qian, 2014; Rehbein and 
Schuler, 2015b), reduce barriers to political entry (Wang and Qian, 2011) or reduce the 
negative effect of CPA (Liedong et al., 2015; Sun et al., 2012). Others have hinted at the fact 
that CPA and CSR are not mutually exclusive (Jamali and Mirshak, 2010). For instance, 
literature on the political effects of CSR, collectively termed “political CSR”, extols the role 
firms play in strengthening institutions, promoting laws and regulations, and providing basic 
amenities (Frynas and Stephens, 2015; Scherer et al., 2013; Scherer and Palazzo, 2011; 
Scherer and Palazzo, 2007). In developing countries where governments struggle or fail in 
the provision of infrastructure or the protection of basic human rights, CSR essentially 
becomes CPA (Morsing and Roepstorff, 2015). Generally, these new research trajectories 
aim to integrate CSR and CPA, and offer a comprehensive and elaborate understanding of 
non-market activity.       
2.3 Peering into CPA: Approaches and Levels of Participation  
There is hardly any firm whose operations are not affected by government policy or 
regulations (Hillman et al., 1999; Stigler, 1971), yet the role of government in business has 
not received adequate scholarly attention (Capron and Chatain, 2008; Lawton and Rajwani, 
2011; Hillman et al., 2004). The acquisition and deployment of only market resources will 
struggle to deliver sustainable competitive advantage if adequate attention is not paid to non-
market strategy (Schuler, 1996). As global competition surges, an integrated strategy which 
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combines both market and non-market factors has become the best way to go (Baron, 1995a; 
Boddewyn, 2003). Businesses have become concerned about the impact of politics on their 
performance and are using political strategies to extend their spheres of influence in order to 
survive or become competitive (Bowman et al., 2000; Lawton et al., 2013a; McWilliams et 
al., 2002). 
Research on CPA mainly focuses on: 1) the types of CPA; 2) the antecedents of CPA; and 3) 
CPA and firm performance. The antecedents of CPA are among the most researched topics in 
the extant literature. Hillman et al. (2004) classified the determinants of CPA into four groups 
namely: firm; industry; issue; and institutional. Size is the foremost determinant of CPA 
(Hillman et al., 2004; Lux et al., 2011). It is argued that large firms are politically active due 
to the resources and capabilities at their disposal (Mitchell et al., 1997; Hansen and Mitchell, 
2000; Hillman, 2003; Schuler, 1996; Hart, 2001; Oliver and Holzinger, 2008; Capron and 
Chatain, 2008; McWilliams et al., 2002). Firms with a large proportion of revenue from 
government sales are also more likely to engage in CPA (Hansen and Mitchell, 2000; Hadani, 
2011). Ownership influences political activism as foreign-owned firms are cautious not to be 
identified as influencing political processes in other countries. Consequently, these firms are 
largely invisible with their CPA (Hansen and Mitchell, 2000). Investigating the nature of firm 
diversification as a determinant of political activism, Hillman (2003) noted that 
conglomerates are more active in broad policy issues while related-diversified firms have the 
flexibility to participate in specific/narrow policy issues. Industry-wise, due to the free-rider 
problem (Olson, 1971; Murphy et al., 1993), firms in small or concentrated industries are 
more politically active since they are able to share the cost and benefits of political actions 
with other firms (Hersch and McDougall; Schuler, 1996; Hillman, 2003; Grier et al., 1991; 
Grier et al., 1994). Institutional characteristics such as forms of government, corruption, and 
corporatism/pluralism also influence the way firms conduct CPA (Hillman and Keim, 1995). 
While there is a consensus on what drives CPA, there is hardly any on the impact of CPA on 
firm performance. 
Aggregately, policy decisions are skewed towards business interests (Bernhagen and 
Brauninger, 2005). In capitalist economies, the private sector drives economic growth 
through employment and tax revenue. Aware that the dire consequences of policies that are 
inimical to business interests can affect their re-election fortunes, politicians tend to 
accommodate the preferences of the private sector in policy formulation. This has caused an 
increased involvement of firms in policy making. According to Grossman and Helpman 
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(1994), politicians are maximizing agents who pursue interests of their own rather those of 
society. They argue that campaign contributions are able to cause politicians to alter policies 
to suit the interests or preferences of contributing firms, and hence conclude that regulations 
are for sale. Earlier works such as Saltzman (1987) found that PAC contributions influenced 
congressional voting on labour issues in the United States. Similarly, Stratmann (1991) 
reported that campaign contributions have a significant influence on the voting behaviour of 
legislators. These studies cast some evidence on the relationship between business and 
politics, particularly the influence of interest groups in policy making.  
However, the power of firms to influence policy is limited under some circumstances. For 
instance, when policy issues are of interest to many groups and individuals, policy favours 
are difficult to obtain (Hillman and Keim, 1995). Issue salience and wide participation leaves 
little discretion to politicians and policy makers (Bonardi and Keim, 2005; Schuler, 2008). 
Election issues and old policy issues are also hard to influence (Bonardi and Keim, 2005). It 
is worth noting that the literature examining the limits of firms in the policy process does not 
consider the impact of political governance. Autocratic and military governments limit the 
power of the firm. Under these political regimes, elections are not important and firms which 
unduly interfere in government processes face threats of expropriation. In democratic 
societies, it is argued that competition among politicians is attractive to firms but competition 
among bureaucrats is unattractive (Bonardi et al., 2006; Sawant, 2012). This is because 
intense political rivalry makes politicians sensitive to firms while bureaucratic rivalry largely 
maintains the status quo (Bonardi et al., 2005). This argument assumes that firms oppose the 
status quo, hence overlooking the fact that in policy markets there are factions that advocate 
for change and those that defend existing policies. The latter faction would find bureaucrat 
competition highly desirable for the defence of policy and maintenance of the status quo.  
2.3.1 Approaches to CPA 
There are two approaches to CPA – transactional and relational. A transactional approach to 
political activity is short term (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). Firms which adopt this approach 
await the development of a salient issue before embarking on a strategy to influence it in a 
favourable way (Buchholz, 1992). Such an issue-by-issue orientation of strategy is reactive 
(Keim and Baysinger, 1993) and does not attempt to impact policy issues until they are out 
there in the public domain. A transactional approach to corporate political activity can be 
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likened to the transactional form of leadership (Bass, 1985) where the focus is on the 
achievement of specific objectives (Hargis et al., 2011).  
The relational approach, however, “attempts to build relationships across issues and 
overtime” (Hillman and Hitt, 1999, p. 828). These relationships are forward looking and 
proactive, and can be called upon by the firm as and when policy issues arise. The adoption 
of relational approach implies that firms build political capital (Shaffer and Hillman, 2000), 
or relational capital (Hadani and Schuler, 2013) with politicians or regulators and use this 
capital when the need arises. Literature on strategic networks emphasizes the importance of 
social and professional relationships for the management of external dependencies (Gulati et 
al., 2000; Gulati, 1998). The reliance of firms on government for policy is one of such 
dependencies that need to be managed (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Getz, 1997). As the 
policy process is made up of demanders and suppliers (Hillman and Keim, 1995; Bonardi et 
al., 2005), a relational approach facilitates the development of trust between firms and 
politicians (Hillman and Hitt, 1999) and subsequently creates the social capital (Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal, 1998b) needed to influence policy outcomes. 
2.3.2 Levels of Participation in CPA  
Firms participate in CPA at different levels. In his seminal work, Olson (1965) identified two 
levels at which firms and interest groups influence public policy: 1) individual; and 2) 
collective. Hillman and Hitt (1999) define individual action as “solitary efforts by 
individuals, or individual companies in this case, to influence public policy” and collective 
action as “the collaboration or cooperation of two or more individuals or firms in the policy 
process” (p.830). This distinction is similar to what is reported in market strategy literature 
whereby firms choose to pursue market opportunities alone or co-act with others.  In the 
market environment, collaboration enables firms to share risks and reduce resource 
commitments (Burgers and Kim, 1993; Ang, 2008). These benefits of collaboration are the 
same in the non-market environment. Typical examples of collective action are those 
involving trade associations, unions and industry groups.  
2.4 CPA and Firm Performance: A Systematic Review 
In reviewing the literature on CPA and firm performance, I followed the systematic approach 
posited by Tranfield et al. (2003) and Petticrew and Roberts (2006). Systematic review is an 
evidence-based approach which originated from medical sciences and healthcare. It is used to 
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assess knowledge and improve decision making (Tranfield et al., 2003). In management 
research and social sciences, this approach is new and is yet to gain popularity. Management 
reviews are typically narrative reviews which mostly provide descriptive accounts of the 
literature, and they differ significantly from systematic reviews which adopt “a replicable, 
scientific, and transparent process…” and provide an “audit trail of reviewers’ decisions, 
procedures and conclusions (Tranfield et al., 2003, p. 209). Hence systematic reviews attempt 
to reduce reviewer bias as much as possible and provide a critical account of evidence (see 
appendices for the journal article selection process). This review applied the Context-
Intervention-Mechanism-Outcome (CIMO) logic (Denyer et al., 2008; Pilbeam et al., 2012). 
Hence, the next sections will cover political strategies, how they affect firm performance, and 
their underlying mechanisms. They will also cover how political strategies and firm 
performance vary with institutional contexts.   
2.4.1 Political Strategies 
There is hardly any consensus on the list of political strategies that firms employ to influence 
public policy (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). Earlier work on political strategies dwelled on 
popular strategies such as campaign contributions and lobbying (Baysinger et al., 1985), but a 
multitude of political strategies are replete in the literature. For instance, Keim and Zeithaml 
(1986) identified five strategies they claim are common to many firms: constituency building, 
campaign contributions, lobbying, advocacy advertising, and coalition building. Similarly, 
Hillman and Hitt (1999) reported three generic strategies under which various tactics can be 
grouped. Quiet recently, Liedong et al. (2015) conducted a systematic review of the CPA-
firm performance literature and identified three categories of strategies. Despite the 
heterogeneity of political strategies, the common ones are financial, relational and 
informational. 
The financial strategies mostly studied in CPA include political action committee (PAC) and 
“soft money” contributions. They are meant to provide financial incentives to politicians 
(Hillman and Hitt, 1999) and enable firms to gain access to decision makers (Witko, 2011). 
While it may seem that PAC contributions and “soft money” mean the same thing, the two 
are technically different (Ansolabehere et al., 2004). Soft money contributions are non-
candidate specific donations from individuals, corporations and special interest groups to 
political parties (Cooper et al., 2010). They are for broad party building purposes and not for 
supporting specific political candidates (Schuler et al., 2002; Hersch et al., 2008). “Soft 
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money” contributions are advantageous because they are not highly regulated or restricted, 
have no caps (Schuler et al., 2002), and can be targeted at the executive branch where key 
policy decisions are made. “Soft money” contributions were used by firms until the 2000s 
when they were stopped and illegalized (Hadani and Schuler, 2013). While majority of 
studies do not make the distinction between the two types of contributions, a few do. For 
instance, Hadani and Schuler (2013) collectively term both contributions “corporate political 
investments”. Schuler et al. (2002), on the other hand, makes a rare distinction between them. 
Other studies (Kim, 2008; Hadani and Schuler, 2013) examined lobbying expenditures which 
are also technically different from PAC and “soft money” contributions.  
In the United States, PAC contributions characterize the political landscape. They allow 
individuals and firms to contribute to support or oppose political candidates or parties, and 
are therefore important determinants of US election outcomes. Most empirical studies on 
CPA have looked at PAC contributions (Hersch and McDougall, 2000; Hansen and Mitchell, 
2000; Ansolabehere et al., 2002; Bond, 2004; Buchholz, 1992; Cooper et al., 2010; Hadani 
and Schuler, 2013; Claessens et al., 2008; Yoffie, 1987). 
Relational strategy is the most complex and subjective of all political strategies. Generally, 
this strategy entails the establishment of relationships with politicians, mostly through co-
opting them into corporate boards (Hillman, 2005; Goldman et al., 2009; Carretta et al., 2012; 
Hadani and Schuler, 2013), through business executives and top shareholders entering 
politics (McGuire et al., 1988; Hillman et al., 1999; Kim, 2008), or through informal and 
social relationships (Adhikari et al., 2006; Fraser et al., 2006). The common construct used is 
“political connections” which is defined differently by different authors. Table 2-2 presents a 
summary of some key definitions of political connections in the literature. It can be seen that 
there is subjectivity in the definitions. While some studies (Faccio et al., 2006; Chaney et al., 
2011) cast a wider net through broad framing of the construct, others adopt a narrow focus 
(Adhikari et al., 2006; Hassan et al., 2012). The broader definitions are able to capture data at 
all levels of the political echelon, but only when such data is obtainable. There is difficulty in 
collecting data about firms’ political connectedness because this information is private, 
protected and hardly available to the public (Hassan et al., 2012). In recent times, scholars 
have differentiated between different levels of political ties. For instance, Zheng et al., 
(2015), in their study of firm survival and performance in China, drew a distinction between 
central political ties (connections to central government) and local political ties (connections 
to local governments). 
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Table 2-2 Definitions of Political Connections 
Study Definition of Political Connection 
Adhikari et al. (2006) 
"a firm's directors or major shareholders have informal ties with 
leading politicians through personal encounters" 
Boubakri et al. (2012) 
“a company is politically-connected if at least one member of its 
board of directors (BOD) or its supervisory board is or was a 
politician, that is, a member of parliament, a minister or any other 
top appointed-bureaucrat” 
Chaney et al. (2011) 
“A company is classified as politically connected if, at some point 
between 1997 and 2001, at least one of its large shareholders 
(anybody directly or indirectly controlling at least 10% of votes) or 
top directors (CEO, chairman of the board, president, vice-
president, or secretary) is a member of parliament, a minister or a 
head of state, or is tightly related to a politician or party.” 
Faccio et al. (2006) 
“a company is defined as politically connected if at least one of its 
top officers (defined as the company’s chief executive officer, 
chairman of the board (COB), president, vice-president, or 
secretary of the board) or a large shareholder (defined as anyone 
controlling at least 10% of the company’s voting shares) was head 
of state (i.e., president, king, or prime minister), a government 
minister (as defined below), or a member of the national 
parliament, as of the beginning of 1997.” 
Faccio (2006) 
“a company is connected with a politician if one of the company’s 
large shareholders or top officers is: (a) a member of parliament 
(MP), (b) a minister or the head of state, or (c) closely related to a 
top official.” 
Hassan et al. (2012) Firms linked to the prime minister and deputy prime minister 
Sun et al. (2011) 
Firms with "ownership ties to the Shanghai government and board 
members with career experience in municipal government" 
Wu et al. (2012) 
“We define a CEO as politically connected if he or she is currently 
serving or formerly served in the government or military.” 
Yeh (2013) 
“(1) the firm was founded or run by the political party; (2) the 
political party is one of the firm's large shareholders; (3) the 
chairman or CEO publicly supports the presidential candidate 
representing a certain political party, participates in or has his/her 
employees participate in the presidential campaign or was 
described by at least one major newspaper as being supportive of a 
certain political party; and (4) one of the firm's large shareholders, 
directors or top officers is/was a member of parliament, a minister 
or a top government official” 
 
Political connections are a valuable resource (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Faccio, 2006; 
Niessen and Ruenzi, 2010). They reduce uncertainty (Hillman et al., 1999) and allow firms to 
gain private information about policy (Hadani and Schuler, 2013). These benefits, among 
others, confer a competitive advantage on connected firms over their unconnected peers 
through the process of rent extraction from government (Hassan et al., 2012). Relational 
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strategies are common in the literature. Perhaps, their emergence and dominance in the CPA 
field can be attributed to their prevalence in most parts of the world.  
Before laws and regulations are passed and implemented, they are first drafted into proposals 
for approval. At this stage, firms and other interest groups are able to make inputs by 
providing specific information about policy preferences to decision makers (Hillman and 
Hitt, 1999). According to McKay and Webb-Yackee (2007), different interest groups 
compete to influence policy decisions by using information at their disposal. Informational 
strategy involves “efforts by political professionals or company executives to establish 
communication channels with regulatory bodies, regulators and their staff” (Keim and 
Zeithaml, 1986, p.830). The aim of this strategy is to monitor the regulatory environment and 
provide information to influence policies in a favourably way. Informational strategies 
include lobbying (Lo, 2003), petitions (Marsh, 1998) and comments (McKay and Webb-
Yackee, 2007). These strategies are not targeted at politicians, but at government agencies 
where policy issues are initiated and drafted into proposals for parliamentary and executive 
approval. Information strategies are the least investigated CPA strategies.  
The context within which CPA is done or investigated seems to have an impact on the choice 
of strategy. First, financial strategies involving PAC and “soft money” contributions are 
dominant in the United States. Only a few countries in the world have laws that require 
campaign contributions to be disclosed to the public (Claessens et al., 2008). Even if such 
laws exist, they are not strictly adhered to. Moreover, the financial statements of political 
parties are not freely available to the public in most countries. As a result, majority of studies 
that investigate financial strategies use data from United States where there is transparency in 
political financing. However, advancement in some emerging countries has made the study of 
campaign financing possible. For instance, Claessens and colleagues (2008) were able to 
investigate the impact of campaign contributions in Brazil. It needs mentioning that Brazil is 
one of those few countries where corporate donations to political parties are recorded. This 
context-strategy relationship is strongly connected to the quality of institutional structures. In 
countries where laws are enacted to regulate and control corporate political activism which 
includes political donations, it is relatively easier to gather information on campaign 
contributions or study financial strategies.  
Similarly, in countries where there are rules that govern the policy making process, it is easier 
to investigate information strategies. As noted by McKay and Webb-Yackee (2007), the 
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United States Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 requires all agencies to publicly publish 
proposed rules and solicit comments from the public before adopting them. This “notice and 
comment” window provides opportunity for firms to influence the final rules (Lo, 2003). On 
the flip side, there are hardly any of such regulations in countries with weak institutions and 
this makes it difficult or impossible for firms to use or for researchers to study informational 
strategies. It is therefore plausible to argue that financial and informational strategies are 
impacted by institutional and regulatory development. 
Relational strategies are studied in many different contexts, ranging from developing to 
developed countries, emerging to industrialized countries, and capitalist to transition 
economies. Whilst these strategies are common across the world, they are more prevalent in 
emerging countries where institutional development is weak and fragile (Wu and Cheng, 
2011). The ease with which rents can be extracted from political patronage in emerging 
countries encourages business owners to enter politics and motivates firms to connect with 
politicians (Imai, 2006; Fraser et al., 2006; Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang, 2009; 
Hassan et al., 2012). Wu and Cheng (2011) argue that political connections play a much more 
important role in emerging markets than in developed markets due to the existence of 
institutional voids in the former (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). In China which is an emerging 
and transition country, the government plays an important role in resource allocation (Peng 
and Luo, 2000). Owing to the enormous influence of central governments and their 
unpredictability in emerging countries such as China, firms establish relationships with 
politicians in order to manage uncertainty (Hillman et al., 1999) and to gain access to 
government controlled resources (Wu and Cheng, 2011). The literature also cites that 
political connections, formal and informal, are more prevalent in “relationship-based 
capitalisms” (Fraser et al., 2006) where cronyism and personal relationships determine the 
allocation of capital resources (Johnson and Mitton, 2003). Malaysia (Adhikari et al., 2006; 
Bliss and Gul, 2012) and China (Sun et al., 2011) are commonly labelled as relationship-
based economies, but most countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East also exhibit traits of 
relationship-based economies.  
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Figure 2-2 Context and Political Strategies 
 
2.4.2 CPA and Firm Performance 
Three distinct categories of firm performance outcomes can be identified in the literature – 
stock, operating and policy performances. Stock market performance entails the measurement 
of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and Buy-and-Hold abnormal returns (BHARS). The 
popular methodology used to measure this type of firm performance is event study. Using 
this method, researchers investigate how stock markets react to political events. These 
political events include the appointment of politicians to corporate boards (Hillman, 2005; 
Goldman et al., 2009; Carretta et al., 2012; Hadani and Schuler, 2013), the sudden death of 
politicians (Brown, 1996) or the transition of political power (Jayachandran, 2006; Yeh et al., 
2013). Other stock market performance measures include Tobin q (Wu et al., 2012a) and cost 
of equity (Boubakri et al., 2012b). Event study methodology thrives on the assumption that 
capital markets are efficient. This assumption cannot be met in under-developed capital 
markets, hence the few studies applying this methodology to investigate political connections 
in emerging countries.   
Operating performance draws on accounting data contained in annual reports. While 
measures such as return on sales (ROS) (Fan et al., 2007; Hadani and Schuler, 2013), return 
on investment (ROI) (Niessen and Ruenzi, 2010; Mathur and Singh, 2011), effective tax rates 
(ETR) (Adhikari et al., 2006; Richter et al., 2009), cost of debt (Bliss and Gul, 2012), 
leverage (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Fraser et al., 2006), accruals quality (Chaney et al., 2011), 
 
Context: Transition economies, 
Emerging economies, weak 
institutions, Poor policymaking rules 
 
Strategy/Intervention: Relational 
Strategies 
 
Context: Developed countries, 
Strong institutions, Clear 
CPA/Policymaking rules 
 
Strategy/Intervention: Financial 
and Informational Strategies 
 
30 | P a g e  
 
and interest revenues (Carretta et al., 2012) have been used to examine operating 
performance, the dominant measures include return on assets (ROA) and return on equity 
(ROE). Operating performance variables are “backward looking” and hardly capture 
intangible political capital (Hillman, 2005). Hence, they could be misleading. 
As noted in previous reviews (Hillman et al., 2004; Lux et al., 2011), policy performance is 
another outcome of CPA. However policy performance, which measures the performance of 
firms in the policy arena, is the least studied of all the outcomes in the literature. Studies 
examining this type of outcome either investigate the voting patterns of politicians (Liebman 
and Reynolds, 2006), the difference between proposed and adopted agency rules (McKay and 
Webb-Yackee, 2007), government bailouts (Faccio et al., 2006) or the outcomes of petitions 
(Marsh, 1998; Lee and Baik, 2010). Table 2-3 summarizes the key constructs and variables 
that have been used to measure performance. 
Table 2-3 Performance Outcome Constructs and Variables 
Performance Variable(s) Key Studies 
Operating performance 
ROA, ROE, ROI, ETR, 
interest revenues, debt 
maturity, acquisition 
premium, interest rates, 
sales, leverage 
Peng and Luo (2000); Bliss and Gul 
(2012); Richter et al. (2009); Mathur and 
Singh (2011); Lu (2011); Claessens et al. 
(2008); Yeh et al. (2012); Leuz and 
Oberholzer-Gee (2006) 
Stock performance 
CARs, BHARs, Cost of 
equity, Tobin Q 
Hillman (2005); Cooper et al. (2010); 
Boubakri et al. (2012b); Goldman et al. 
(2010); Hadani and Schuler (2013) 
Policy-related 
performance 
Government contracts Witko (2011) 
Anti-dumping proceeds Lee and Baik (2010) 
Trade mission 
participation Schuler et al. (2002a) 
Roll call voting 
Liebman and Reynolds (2006); McKay 
and Webb-Yackee (2007) 
Government bailout Faccio et al. (2006) 
Subsidy Lin et al. (2015) 
Academic earmarks De Figueiredo and Silverman (2006) 
 
2.4.3 Positive Performance Outcomes 
The reviewed literature suggests that there is a positive relationship between CPA and firm 
performance. Majority of studies provide evidence to show that CPA adds value to firms. In 
Malaysia, Adhikari et al. (2006) found that politically connected firms pay lower effective 
taxes than non-connected firms. This finding is consistent with Richter et al. (2009) who 
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reported that in the United States, firms that lobby more in a given year pay lower effective 
tax rates in the next year. Wu et al. (2012b) also reported similar evidence for China where 
firms with politically connected managers pay lower tax rates. Politically connected firms 
have easier and preferential access to financing (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Fraser et 
al., 2006; Claessens et al., 2008; Boubakri et al., 2012a; Hassan et al., 2012), are highly 
leveraged (Fraser et al., 2006), and have longer debt maturities (Boubakri et al., 2012a). They 
experience an increase in stock returns following positive political announcements (Hillman, 
2005; Chen et al., 2013) and record higher market values and ROA (Peng and Luo, 2000; 
Imai, 2006; Muttakin et al., 2015). The magnitude of stock returns, whether raw or risk-
adjusted, is higher for firms that operate in regulated industries and also for firms that are 
connected to higher ranking politicians (Civilize et al., 2015). 
Political connections are also reported to facilitate trade expansion (Lu, 2011), increase sales 
and profitability (Ozcan and Gunduz, 2015), increase the likelihood of government bailout 
(Faccio et al., 2006), reduce business failure (Zheng et al., 2015) and allow firms to pay 
relatively lower premiums to acquire privatized enterprises (Tu et al., 2013). Campaign 
contributions have been shown to increase the number of government contracts firms win 
(Witko, 2011), the likelihood of firms to participate in foreign trade missions (Schuler et al., 
2002) and the likelihood of legislators to vote according to firms’ preferences (Liebman and 
Reynolds, 2006; McKay and Webb-Yackee, 2007). Lobbying is associated with higher 
academic earmarks (De Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006), antidumping regulations and 
increased market value of firms (Marsh, 1998). In sum, most studies show a positive 
relationship between CPA and firm performance. Some of the studies that report a positive 
impact of CPA are summarized in the CIMO framework in Table 2-4. 
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Table 2-4 CPA and Positive Firm Performance 
  
Adhikari 
et al. 
(2006) 
Cooper 
et al. 
(2010) 
de 
Figueiredo 
and 
Silverman 
(2006) 
Dean 
et al. 
(1998) 
Fraser 
et al. 
(2006) 
Goldman 
et al. 
(2009) 
Hillman 
et al. 
(1999) 
Peng 
and 
Luo 
(2000) 
Country context Malaysia U.S U.S U.S Malaysia U.S U.S China 
Political Strategy                 
Financial (PAC/Political 
contributions/Soft money)              
Relational (Politically connected 
boards/CEOs/Top Management 
Teams)           
Informational (Petitions/Comments)                 
Mechanism implied by theory                 
Changes in resources and 
capabilities (resourced based view 
theory)               
Mis/alignment of business and 
political interests; un/profitable 
investment; managerial self-
aggrandizement  (agency theory)              
Co-optation of external 
dependencies; yielding to 
dependencies (resource dependency 
theory)               
Corruption & Cronyism; buffering 
institutional constraints 
(institutional theory)               
Preferential treatment; influence 
and access to government (social 
capital/network theory)             
Outcomes                 
Stock performance              
Operating performance              
Policy influence               
 
2.4.4 Negative Performance Outcomes  
While majority of studies report a positive CPA-firm performance relationship, there are 
other studies which report evidence to the contrary. For instance, using United States data, 
Aggarwal et al. (2011) found that “soft money” donations are negatively correlated with 
returns. They also found that donating firms are involved in more acquisitions and record 
lower abnormal returns on acquisition announcements. Similarly, Hadani and Schuler (2013) 
reported evidence to suggest that CPA has a negative impact on market value. Politically 
connected firms record poor accounting performance after privatization (Boubakri et al., 
2008) and after initial public offerings (Fan et al., 2007). Connected firms also have poor 
accruals quality (Chaney et al., 2011) and are charged higher interest rates on loans (Bliss and 
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Gul, 2012). Moreover, politicians on boards of Italian banks exert a negative impact on 
interest revenues, loan quality, and capitalization level (Carretta et al., 2012). Similarly, 
Malaysian firms with politically-connected boards have low financial values (Yusoff et al., 
2015). Some of the studies that report a negative impact of CPA are summarized in the 
CIMO framework in Table 2-5 
Table 2-5 CPA and Negative Firm Performance 
  
Aggarwal 
et al. 
(2011) 
Bliss 
and Gul 
(2012) 
Carretta 
et al. 
(2012) 
Chaney 
et al. 
(2011) 
Fan et 
al. 
(2007) 
Hadani 
and 
Schuler 
(2013) 
Country Context U.S Malaysia Italy Multiple China U.S 
Strategy/Intervention             
Financial (PAC/Political contributions/Soft 
money)           
Relational (Politically connected 
boards/CEOs/Top Management Teams)        
Informational (Petitions/Comments)             
Mechanism implied by theory             
Changes in resources and capabilities 
(resourced based view theory)             
Mis/alignment of business and political 
interests; un/profitable investment; managerial 
self-aggrandizement  (agency theory)         
Co-optation of external dependencies; yielding 
to dependencies (resource dependency theory)           
Corruption & Cronyism; changes to 
institutional barriers (institutional theory)            
Preferential treatment; influence and access to 
government (social capital/network theory)            
Outcomes             
Stock performance          
Operating/Accounting performance        
Policy influence             
 
2.4.5 No Impact and Mixed Outcomes 
Some studies do not find a significant relationship between CPA and firm performance. For 
example, Ansolabehere et al. (2004) found no benefits from campaign donations while 
Hersch et al. (2008) argue that campaign contributions do not create any financial capital. 
Other studies measured multiple outcomes and reported mixed outcomes. According to 
Faccio et al. (2006), while politically connected firms are able to influence bailout policies, 
they record poor operating performance. Similarly, Tu et al. (2013) reported that while 
connected firms pay lower premium to acquire quality firms during privatization, they record 
lower operating and stock performance in the post privatization period. Zheng et al. (2015) 
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found that connections to central government politicians do not enhance superior 
performance or buffer against business failure. 
In summary, empirical evidence suggests that CPA is positively related to firm performance. 
However, the few studies that report contradictory evidence seem to cast a doubt on this 
stance. As argued by Hadani and Schuler (2013) and suggested by Lux et al. (2011), the 
evidence is not complete and further studies are required.      
2.4.6 Theoretical Mechanisms Underpinning the CPA-Firm Performance Relationship 
Five theoretical mechanisms through which CPA impacts firm performance are identified in 
the literature. They include resource-based view (RBV) (Barney, 1991), agency (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), resource dependency (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), institutional (Scott, 
2005) and social capital theories. Some of these mechanisms are explicitly cited while others 
are implied from the arguments put forward by the studies. These mechanisms are 
summarized in Table 2-6. 
Social capital is frequently implied or used for explaining the outcomes of CPA in emerging 
countries. The establishment of political connections enables firms to build social capital 
which enables them to extract rent from government. These rents are in the form of 
preferential access to finance (Claessens et al., 2008; Yeh et al., 2013) or government 
contracts (Witko, 2011). Social or political capital is more pronounced in relationship-based 
capitalisms (Adhikari et al., 2006; Fraser et al., 2006; Bliss and Gul, 2012) where favouritism 
and cronyism (Johnson and Mitton, 2003) are common. Personal level political capital adds 
value to firms (Sun et al., 2011) and informal connections allow government to confer private 
benefits on firms (Fraser et al., 2006). Campaign contributions also build social capital and 
facilitate access to politicians (Kim, 2008; Witko, 2011). Drawing on RBV, some studies 
argue that the co-optation of directors into corporate boards adds to the resource base of firms 
(Hillman, 2005) and this allows firms to exploit their policy environments (Niessen and 
Ruenzi, 2010). 
While social capital and RBV theories are mostly associated with the positive outcomes of 
CPA, agency theory is used to explicate both positive and negative outcomes. For instance, 
Hadani and Schuler (2013) argue that because firms are not required to disclose political 
spending, information asymmetry occurs between managers and shareholders and this leads 
to negative firm performance. They also posit that managers could pursue CPA for self-
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aggrandizement. Clearly, this represents a misalignment of interests between managers and 
shareholders. Political connections may create an agency problem whereby politicians use 
corporate resources to pursue political and social goals to the detriment of shareholder value 
(Fan et al., 2007; Wu et al., 2012a). Campaign contributions may also be unprofitable 
investments which add no value to firms (Ansolabehere et al., 2004; Hersch et al., 2008). On 
the flipside, Jayachandran (2006) suggests that firms target their contributions towards 
politicians who have interests aligned to theirs. This ensures that when elected, the politicians 
invariably pursue the interests of the firms. In federal agency rule making, firms comment 
and petition in order to make their policy preferences known to regulators and policymakers, 
and because of the agencies’ desire to avoid litigations, they align the final rules with the 
interests of the commenters (McKay and Webb-Yackee, 2007).  
Related to agency theory, some studies highlight corporate governance as a mechanism that 
determines CPA outcomes, particularly in financial markets. Bliss and Gul (2012) argue that 
politically connected firms are charged higher interest rates due to their perceived riskiness. 
This finding is corroborated by Fraser at al. (2006) and Claessens et al. (2008) who found that 
connected firms carry more debt. High leverage increases financial distress and the risk of 
bankruptcy, hence higher interest rates on loans (Bliss and Gul, 2012). 
Majority of the studies in emerging and transition economies point to cronyism and 
favouritism (Johnson and Mitton, 2003), corruption (Khwaja and Mian, 2005) and 
institutional support (Guo et al., 2014) as mechanisms through which political connections 
affect firm performance. For instance, Faccio et al. (2006) found that the value of political 
ties is derived from corrupt practices. Similarly, Fisman (2001) argue that corruption 
underlies political rent extraction. Poor institutional development results in weak systems of 
checks and balances (Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang, 2009) and the prevalence of 
relationship-based capital systems (Fraser et al., 2006) which allow for private benefits to be 
obtained. In China where the government controls many aspects of the stock market (Francis 
et al., 2009) and allocates resources (Peng and Luo, 2000), there is incentive for preferential 
treatment to be accorded to politically connected firms (Wu et al., 2012b; Yeh et al., 2013). 
Institutional theory thus underlies most of the CPA studies in developing countries. 
Resource dependency posits that firms co-opt external dependencies in order to reduce 
uncertainty (Hillman, 2005). However, the resource dependence logic used by studies to 
explain the mechanism through which CPA impacts performance is different. The mechanism 
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used in CPA concerns the coercion or the yielding of other market actors to the demands of 
politically connected firms. The dependency of other market actors on government or 
politicians makes them yield to political pressures to extend favourable treatment to 
politically connected firms (Faccio et al., 2006). For instance, in a study of Pakistani banks, 
Khwaja and Mian (2005) note that politicians threaten bank officials with transfers, removals, 
or promotions if they do not yield to their demands. This institutional lapse coupled with 
corruption makes politically connected firms benefit preferential lending (Claessens et al., 
2008)  and low or no collaterals on lending (Yeh et al., 2013).  
Table 2-6 Summary of Theoretical Mechanisms 
Theory Explanation of Mechanism 
Resourced based view 
theory Changes in resources and dynamic capabilities 
Agency theory 
Mis/alignment of business and political interests; mis/alignment 
of managerial and shareholder interests; un/profitable 
investments; managerial self-aggrandizement 
Resource dependency 
theory 
Co-optation of external dependencies; yielding to the pressures 
of dependency 
Institutional theory Corruption & cronyism; changes to institutional barriers 
Social capital/network 
theory Preferential treatment; influence, and access to government 
 
2.4.7 The Impact of Context on Performance Outcomes 
From the literature, there seems to be a connection between context and firm performance 
outcomes. Majority of the studies conducted in Asia and South America argue that CPA 
improves firm performance. For instance, in Brazil, Claessens et al. (2008) found that 
campaign contributions positively impact stock and operating performances. However, a few 
studies (Fan et al., 2007; Bliss and Gul, 2012) reported a negative impact of CPA on 
performance in Malaysia and China. In North America and Europe, CPA may be beneficial 
but recent evidence shows it either destroys value (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Carretta et al., 
2012; Hadani and Schuler, 2013) or does not add value (Ansolabehere et al., 2004; Hersch et 
al., 2008). In general, the findings across different countries and regions suggest that 
institutional characteristics could have a bearing on CPA outcomes. It appears there is more 
value from CPA in weak institutional environments.  
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2.4.8 Strategy and Performance Outcomes 
Financial strategies are associated with mixed outcomes, even though majority of the studies 
that investigate campaign contributions found a positive relationship between CPA and 
performance. Some studies (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Hadani and Schuler, 2013) show evidence 
to suggest a negative impact of financial strategies on stock and operating performances. 
Most studies on financial strategies measure policy and stock performances. In contrast, 
majority of studies investigating relational strategies measure operating and stock 
performances. These studies also report a positive CPA-firm performance relationship except 
for a few (Boubakri et al., 2008; Chaney et al., 2011; Bliss and Gul, 2012; Carretta et al., 
2012) which report negative outcomes. The only strategy that has a unanimous positive 
relationship with performance is informational strategy. It can thus be argued that firms 
should exert more effort in the policy arena where the chances of success are high. In Table 
2-7, I summarize the dominant performance outcome types and dominant performance 
outcome directions for each of the three CPA strategies.  
Table 2-7 Intervention-Performance Outcomes 
Strategy Dominant Outcome Type Dominant Outcome Direction 
Financial Policy Influence Positive 
Relational Operating performance Positive 
Informational Stock performance Positive 
 
2.4.9 Outcome Type and Outcome Direction 
Mixed findings are found for operating and stock performances, though the outcomes are 
largely positive. Operating performance records the most negative outcomes. Studies found 
that politically connected firms are charged higher interest rates on loans (Bliss and Gul, 
2012), have low accruals quality (Chaney et al., 2011) and poor ROS (Hadani and Schuler, 
2013). Connected banks have poor loan portfolios and record low interest revenues (Carretta 
et al., 2012). Other studies reached similar conclusions for operating performance (Faccio et 
al., 2006; Fan et al., 2007). Using abnormal returns and market value, a couple of studies 
found that CPA has a negative impact (Fan et al., 2007; Aggarwal et al., 2011; Hadani and 
Schuler, 2013) and a non-significant impact (Ansolabehere et al., 2004; Hersch et al., 2008) 
on stock performance  Interestingly, most studies investigating policy performance found that 
CPA is able to influence policy decisions in ways favourable to the firm. For instance, 
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contributions influence senate roll call vote (Steagall and Jennings, 1996; Liebman and 
Reynolds, 2006; Mian et al., 2010) while political connections shape government subsidy 
decisions (Lee and Baik, 2010; Wu and Cheng, 2011; Lin et al., 2015) and protect firms from 
competition (Evans and Sherlund, 2011). At this juncture, it is plausible to argue, based on 
the literature, that informational strategies and any other strategies targeted at policy 
influence are usually successful. There is a higher chance for CPA to influence policy 
outcomes than operating or stock performance. 
In Figure 2-3, solid lines show the dominant relationship between outcome type and outcome 
direction. The broken lines show the other relationships. It can be seen that policy 
performance does not have any relationships with other directions except the positive 
direction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-3 Outcome Type-Outcome Direction 
 
2.5 CPA, Access to Finance and Cost of Debt 
As firm-specific characteristics are instrumental in financing decisions (Rajan and Zingales, 
1995), the impact of CPA in credit markets is worthy of research attention. However, only a 
small body of empirical research has considered the function or utilization of political ties in 
debt financing (See Table 2-8). Leuz and Oberholzer (2006) examined the role of political 
connections in the financing strategies of firms in Indonesia, and argue that domestic 
opportunities available to politically connected firms discourage these firms from seeking 
financing in foreign capital markets. Global financing imposes extra costs on firms as they 
have to abide by the regulations that govern foreign capital markets (Siegel, 2005). Local 
Stock 
Performance 
Operating 
Performance 
Policy 
Performance 
Positive 
Outcome 
Negative 
Outcome 
No 
Impact 
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political patronage offsets the benefits of global financing and enables connected firms to 
access financing at lower costs (Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006). Political connections and 
global financing are therefore alternatives for obtaining low cost financing. Though both are 
associated with some cost, establishing political ties in home country seems the cheaper 
option for firms (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006). 
Indeed, studies have shown that politically connected firms have easier and preferential 
access to financing. For instance, Claessens et al. (2008) investigated the relationship 
between campaign contributions and access to finance in Brazil and found that firms that 
contribute to political campaigns witness an increased growth in bank leverage. They also 
found a negative but insignificant relationship between campaign contributions and the 
growth in the ratio of interest expense to total sales, indicating that contributions might lower 
cost of debt. These findings are corroborated by Chen et al. (2014) who found that politically 
connected firms in Taiwan have large loan books and pay lower interest rates. Connected 
lending, sometimes called “memo-lending” is a common phenomenon in emerging countries 
where poor corporate governance practices are predominant. In Pakistan, Khwaja and Mian 
(2005) note the prevalence of “social lending” whereby banks lend money to socially 
efficient, but risky ventures. They found that politically connected firms are granted 45% 
more loans and have a 50% higher default rate than their non-connected peers. Such 
preferential treatment in the debt market escalates with the power of the politician(s) to whom 
firms are connected (Saeed et al., 2015).  
Substantial evidence of reduced financing constraints for politically connected firms has been 
recorded in China. Chan et al. (2012), in their study of listed Chinese firms, found that 
politically connected firms have no financing constraints whereas non-connected firms 
experience significant constraints in obtaining investment financing. Similarly, Cull et al. 
(2015) demonstrate that government connections are associated with substantially less 
financing constraints. They show that connected firms are less likely to fund investments 
using internally generated cash flows. Li et al. (2008a) also found that political party 
membership helps private entrepreneurs to obtain loans from financial institutions. Some 
studies even go further to establish how reduced financing constraints, through political 
connections, play a significant role in innovation efficiency (Song et al., 2015). Others show 
how connections to corrupt bureaucrats give firms a comparative advantage in obtaining long 
term debt as well as how this advantage erodes upon termination of the ties (Fan et al., 2008). 
In Taiwan, Shen and Lin (2015) and Yen et al. (2014) documented a significant mitigation of 
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financial constraints and an increase in investment for firms connected to the ruling political 
party. Essentially, all of these studies reveal the extent to which credit allocation in emerging 
or developing countries is impacted by connections to politicians and governments (Desai 
and Olofsgard, 2011).  
Even in the developed countries where CPA is not expected to be significantly beneficial to 
firms (Goldman et al., 2009), political ties are highly valued in the credit market. According 
to Houston et al. (2014) who studied the political ties of S&P 500 companies in the U.S, 
firms with politicians on their boards are associated with lower cost of debt. They found that 
board political ties reduce the average loan spread by approximately 13 to 20 basis points. In 
Italy, Infante and Piazza (2014) found that politically connected firms that borrow from banks 
with politicians on their boards benefit from low interest rates. They also revealed that 
interest rates are lower when loan officers have greater autonomy and when banks are located 
in local areas where the incidence corruption is higher. Their findings do not only hint at the 
existence of agency problems and collusion between loan officers and politicians, but they 
also buttress calls for the rotation of loan officers in order to make lending and 
creditworthiness reports accurate (Hertzberg et al., 2010)  
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Table 2-8 Summary of Studies on CPA, Access to Finance and Cost of Debt 
Study Political Strategy Country 
Context 
Main Findings 
Claessens, Feijen & 
Laeven (2008) 
Financial (campaign contributions) Brazil Campaign contributions are associated with increase in leverage following 
elections. They are also associated with an increase in stock returns 
following announcement of positive election results. Though insignificant, 
there is a negative relationship between campaign financing and interest 
expense 
 
Houston, Jiang, Lin 
& Ma (2014) 
Relational (politicians on corporate 
boards) 
United 
States 
Politically connected firms, especially those that depend on government 
procurement contracts or face foreign competition, pay a lower loan spread 
than their non-connected peers. Also, banks are less likely to impose capital 
expenditure and liquidity covenants on connected firms 
Khawaja & Mian 
(2005) 
Relational (politicians as directors of 
firms) 
Pakistan Politically connected firms borrow 45% more than non-connected firms. 
They also have a 50% higher default rate. Preferential treatment is higher 
when the politicians are stronger or powerful, or when connected firms 
borrow from government banks. 
 
Yeh, Shu & Chiu 
(2013) 
Relational (firm owned by political 
party, shareholders leading members in 
political parties) 
Taiwan Politically connected firms benefit from long-term non-collateral loans from 
government-owned banks. The extent of this favourable treatment varies 
with the power or control the ruling party has in congress 
Infante & Piazza 
(2014) 
Relational (board member or executive 
is a member of a political body) 
Italy Firms with politicians on their boards are charged lower interest rates when 
they borrow from national and local banks. Additionally, banks with 
politicians on their boards give preferential treatment to politically 
connected firms.  
 
Bliss & Gul (2012) Relational (large shareholder or top 
official is a member of parliament, 
minister or head of State) 
Malaysia Politically connected firms are charged higher interest rates. They are also 
highly leveraged and are more likely to report a loss 
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Beside the impact of CPA on leverage and interest rates, political ties are also able to 
generate other non-rate benefits. For instance, politically connected firms have longer debt 
maturities (Boubakri et al., 2012a; Chen et al., 2014). These firms are able to contract long 
term loans which are valuable, especially when credit supply is scarce (Charumilind et al., 
2006). They are also able to obtain bank lines of credit (Luo and Ying, 2014). The high 
prevalence of long-term loans indicates the greater access political connected firms have to 
finance (Saeed et al., 2015). Moreover, politically connected firms do not require collateral to 
obtain credit from banks (Yeh et al., 2013), suggesting that political capital perhaps replaces 
physical-asset collaterals. Connections to government, through ownership or stockholding, 
reduce the exposure of firms to lending corruption (Barth et al., 2009). Connected firms have 
strong bargaining power when negotiating loans with banks, especially in countries where 
bank supervisory agencies are less powerful and are prone to capture and manipulation by 
politicians (Beck et al., 2006b)  
A common finding in the literature concerns the role of government-owned banks in the 
provision of economic rent to politically connected firms. In most countries, governments 
own or have controlling/significant stakes in banks (La Porta et al., 2002). Even though the 
last few decades have witnessed significant privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
the phenomenon of state ownership of enterprises, including banks, is far from over as 
governments continue to retain control of some privatized firms in what some scholars refer 
to as “partial privatization” (Fan et al., 2007; Tu et al., 2013). Besides retention of control 
through shareholding (Wu et al., 2012b), governments appoint politicians to the boards of 
privatized SOEs in order to keep the bond and embeddedness alive. In government-owned 
banks, it is politicians who determine the constitution of the Board and top management 
teams. With such governance arrangements, bank managers become puppets who are 
expected to kowtow to the whims and caprices of politicians. Failure of managers to comply 
with political directives is met with threats of transfer, demotion or removal (Khwaja and 
Mian, 2005). As agency theory posits, managers (agents) of government-owned banks are 
coerced or are expected to satisfy the preferences of politicians (principals). In election years, 
government-owned banks increase their lending relative to private banks (Dinc, 2005; Micco 
et al., 2007), with most of the loans going to firms located in the areas where the incumbent 
political party has strong support (Sapienza, 2004). 
Though it is widely held and believed that political connections are associated with 
preferential access to credit and low cost of debt, there are a few dissident views. In 
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Malaysia, Bliss and Gul (2012) reported results that contradict the effectiveness of political 
ties in reducing cost of debt.  They show that politically connected firms are charged high 
interest rates. They cite heightened perceptions of riskiness in connected firms (Johnson and 
Mitton, 2003; Gul, 2006) as a probable reason for their findings. 
2.5.1 CPA and Preferential Loans: Exploring the Mechanisms 
Unlike the literature body that explores the association between CPA and firm performance, 
studies examining the effect of political ties on debt financing have attempted to theoretically 
explain the mechanisms underlying the relationship. These mechanisms are four-fold. First, 
researchers argue that government ownership of banks creates an implicit requirement for 
loan officers and bank executives to honour the preferences of politicians (Yeh et al., 2013). 
Since agents are largely subject to the demands of principals, as posited by agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), government-owned banks are captives of government officials. 
Any acts of insubordination are penalized with dismissal or demotion (Khwaja and Mian, 
2005). Consequently, politically connected firms are treated favourably by government-
owned banks (Chen et al., 2014). Even in countries where private banks are dominant, 
political connections can still yield some benefits through regulation, persuasion or the 
dynamics of dependency (La Porta et al., 2002; Lashitew, 2014).  
Second, studies highlight the effect of institutional and financial development in the CPA-
cost of debt relationship. Weak institutions and high levels of corruption make it possible for 
politicians to influence lending decisions (Barth et al., 2009; Luo and Ying, 2014). Owing to 
weak regulatory systems, lack of law enforcement and rampant government interference in 
developing countries (Allen et al., 2005), banks’ lending policies follow government 
directives and discriminate in favour of politically connected firms (Brandt and Li, 2003; 
Firth et al., 2009). It is not surprising that most studies about CPA and debt financing are set 
in emerging countries where arguments of credit misallocation and huge involvement of the 
State in the private sector are not farfetched. In Pakistan where politicians and the private 
sector are highly linked, it is estimated that about 50% of total credit in the country reaches 
firms with political connections (Saeed et al., 2015). Directed lending is a common 
phenomenon in most emerging or developing countries (Brandt and Li, 2003). This 
phenomenon will continue to exist until financial sector development, competition and 
efficiency erode the gains of political connections (Lashitew, 2014).  
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Third, Houston et al. (2014) suggested the “bank channel” as a possible mechanism through 
politically connected firms may benefit low interest charges on loans. The bank channel 
hypothesis argues that banks will give preferential treatment to connected firms in order to 
gain an indirect access to the corridors of political and regulatory power. Having access to 
politicians, through lending relations with connected firms,  could avail some economic 
benefits to the banks, such as winning underwriting business (Butler et al., 2009) or contracts 
(Witko, 2011) from governments or even participating in government foreign trade missions 
(Schuler et al., 2002).  
Fourth, increased riskiness has been posited as the reason why politically connected firms are 
charged high interest rates (Bliss and Gul, 2012). The main thrust of this argument lies in the 
fact that connected firms are highly leveraged (Fraser et al., 2006; Claessens et al., 2008), 
have a higher propensity to have negative equity and are characterised by CEO duality (CEO 
and board chairperson are the same person) (Bliss and Gul, 2012). Essentially, the riskiness 
argument bodes well with corporate governance concerns that are commonly anticipated or 
observed in connected firms (Guedhami et al., 2014; Cheng et al., 2015). There is a reported 
high propensity for connected firms to publish false accounting and financial information 
(Gul, 2006). Table 2-9 summarizes the commonly espoused mechanisms in CPA, access to 
finance and cost of debt literature. 
Table 2-9 Mechanisms in CPA-Access to Finance Research 
Mechanism Mechanism in Practice Key Texts 
Political Capital 
 
Political connections improve firm performance 
(through stock returns, government contracts, etc.) 
hence enhance creditworthiness  
 
Houston, Jiang, Lin & Ma 
(2014) 
Political 
Coercion and 
Agency 
Government-owned banks are expected or are 
coerced to extend favours to politically connected 
firms 
 
Khwaja & Mian (2005) 
Weak Institutions Corruption and collusion between politicians and 
bank officials results in preferential treatment for 
politically connected firms 
 
Infante & Piazza (2014); 
Johnson & Mitton (2003); 
Khwaja & Mian (2005) 
Inherent 
Riskiness 
Politically connected firms are highly leveraged 
and are more likely to report losses or falsify their 
financial reports 
Bliss & Gul (2012); Gul 
2006) 
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2.6 CPA, Uncertainty and Risk Exposure  
Emerging countries around the world, despite their heterogeneity, share a common 
characteristic – high level of risk owing to weak institutional frameworks (Henisz and Zelner, 
2010; Khanna et al., 2005; Puck et al., 2013). Firms operating in emerging countries therefore 
have a high exposure to uncertainty or risk. Miller (1992) proposed five types of uncertainty. 
They include: 1) political uncertainty arising from regime changes; 2) government policy 
instability; 3) macroeconomic uncertainty; 4) social uncertainties; and 5) natural 
uncertainties. The first four types of uncertainty, together, underscore institutional risk. In 
CPA studies, government policies such as nationalization or expropriation; trade protection; 
earnings repatriation restrictions; import, export and currency restrictions; subsidies; and 
capital controls have been established as common sources of risk. Risks increase economic 
and transaction costs (North, 1990; Williamson, 1991), endanger survival, reduce 
competitiveness, and consequently affect firm performance (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). Hence, 
it is imperative for firms to manage their exposure or insulate themselves from the risks in 
their environments (Hillman et al., 1999; Meznar and Nigh, 1995). To do this, CPA is argued 
to be effective (Doh et al., 2012; Hillman et al., 1999).  
Rarely have studies empirically examined the effect of CPA on risk exposure, yet many 
researchers claim that risk reduction is a CPA outcome that ultimately affects firm 
performance.  To the best of my knowledge, only one study has attempted to investigate this 
relationship. In their study, Puck et al. (2013) surprisingly found reverse and insignificant 
relationships between political strategies and risk exposure among multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) operating in emerging countries. Their findings challenge prior affirmative and 
theoretical assumptions (Hillman et al., 1999), and thus open up opportunities for further 
inquiry into the topic.  Other studies have addressed topics that are tangential to risk 
exposure. For instance, some studies have examined the antecedents of corporate risk-taking, 
and have established that politically connected firms take higher risks (Boubakri et al., 2013). 
Consequently, it is believed that investors may perceive connected firms as risky investments 
(Pantzalis and Park, 2014). Other studies have noted that risk moderates or determines CPA 
and organizational behaviour (Schwens et al., 2011; White et al., 2015). For instance, it is 
argued that privately-owned firms in countries with high expropriation risk are conservative 
about reporting financial losses in order to prevent “benevolent” governments from 
intervening and taking over ownership (Bushman and Piotroski, 2006; Bushman et al., 2004). 
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However, this conservatism in earnings management does not apply to politically connected 
firms because of their “immunity” from expropriation (Batta et al., 2014). 
Generally within the management field, the topic of risk exposure has been relegated to 
international business studies. Consequently, risk, to a large extent, is mainly examined 
among multinational enterprises (MNEs) and mostly considered in the discussion of foreign 
direct investment (Frynas et al., 2006; Schwens et al., 2011; Puck et al., 2013). While it is 
agreeable that MNEs may encounter high risks in their host countries, the trend of limiting 
risk exposure to MNEs is harmful, as it entrenches and reinforces a misleading assumption 
that only MNEs face political and institutional challenges. Weak regulatory structures, poor 
enforcement regimes, bureaucratic red-tape and corruption among other institutional lapses 
will impact local firms as much as they will impact foreign firms (Wocke and Moodley, 
2015). 
2.7 Research Gaps 
Reviewing the CPA literature has not only improved our knowledge of the CPA-firm 
performance relationship, but it has also facilitated the identification of gaps in the extant 
literature. First, there is a controversy surrounding the impact of CPA on firm performance.  
Among management researchers, there is a burgeoning interest in the outcomes of corporate 
political activity (Hillman et al., 1999; Chizema et al., 2015; Faccio, 2006; Goldman et al., 
2009; Hillman, 2005; Marsh, 1998). Consequently, the performance implications of CPA 
have received increased research attention, but the findings are inconsistent. While some 
studies report a positive impact (Claessens et al., 2008; Cooper et al., 2010; Witko, 2011; Wu 
et al., 2012a), others report a negative impact (Carretta et al., 2012; Hadani and Schuler, 
2013). However, consensus from systematic reviews of the literature suggests that, in general, 
CPA does more good than harm to firm performance (Hillman et al., 2004; Lawton et al., 
2013a; Rajwani and Liedong, 2015; Mellahi et al., 2016). Nevertheless, further research is 
required to resolve this “paradox” and improve our understanding of the link between CPA 
and firm performance, for as it stands our knowledge of this topic is incomplete (Hadani and 
Schuler, 2013) 
Second, there is a need for research to examine the link between CPA and outcomes that 
ultimately effect organizational financial performance. One of such outcomes is the cost of 
debt. It has been noted that one of the biggest impediments to firm growth and performance is 
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lack of access to external financing, such as bank loans (Beck & Demirguc-Kunt, 2006). This 
suggests that firms with access to cheap debt are able to finance their growth and gain 
competitive advantage. Despite this strategic importance, surprisingly, extant research has 
paid little attention to the link between CPA and cost of debt, especially in emerging markets 
where access to finance is difficult and interest rates are likely to vary depending on firms’ 
political connections.  The few studies which touched on this topic reported mixed findings 
(Bliss and Gul, 2012; Chen et al., 2014; Onder and Ozyildirim, 2011; Houston et al., 2014; 
Lashitew, 2014). While it is generally agreed that connected firms have access to finance and 
are thus highly leveraged, there is no consensus regarding the impact of political connections 
on cost of borrowing. Hence, it is still unclear whether politically connected firms receive 
preferential treatment in credit markets. 
Technically, access to finance is different from cost of debt, but extant research has mainly 
focused on access to finance and leverage levels. It is true that access to finance is a 
constraint for firm growth (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006), but recent evidence shows that 
majority of loan applicants receive funds irrespective of rationing processes (Vos et al., 
2007). The important issue, therefore, concerns the terms of the loans (Rostamkalaei and 
Freel, 2016). In this respect, it is possible that firms willing to pay high interest charges will 
have unimpaired access to credit.  In fact, anecdotal evidence shows that acceptance to pay 
high interest rates is a determinant of the rationing process. Since most firms are getting 
loans, it behoves that the focus of research shifts from credit access to credit terms, and 
central to credit terms is the price of loans. 
Moreover, the few studies that have examined the political tie-cost of debt relationship are set 
within the contexts of Asia, Europe and the United States, with no contribution from Africa 
where CPA is rarely researched. Generally, not much is known about the impact of strategy 
on firm performance in Africa (Mellahi and Mol, 2015). Yet, institutional differences 
between countries suggest that investigating the topic in different contexts could add new 
dimensions and introduce fresh insight and impetus to the debate. With the current limitation 
of the topic to a few countries, it is not clear to what extent the findings can be generalized. 
Additionally, mediation and moderation effects have received limited consideration in 
political strategy research (Guo et al., 2014; Rajwani and Liedong, 2015), thus constraining 
insight into the contingent value of political activity in emerging credit markets.  
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Third, the argument that risk moderates CPA-firm performance relationship is common in the 
literature (Bliss and Gul, 2012; Kim et al., 2012; Pantzalis and Park, 2014). However, 
empirical proof is generally lacking. What studies do is examine the annual reports of 
politically connected firms, use the reported figures to estimate cost of debt and then take a 
position on the riskiness of the firm based on the results. Other studies dwell on the implicit 
guarantees that governments offer to politically connected firms. By doing this, the risk 
mechanism becomes a mere speculation that could be true or false. It is possible for banks to 
come under political coercion to lend to risky but connected firms (Khwaja and Mian, 2005). 
It is also possible that banks, through their own objective and independent risk assessments, 
perceive connected firms to be risky but profitable (Houston et al., 2014) and hence lend to 
them. Whichever way this argument swings cannot be determined by conjecture or 
postulation as is done in the literature, but by an empirical investigation of the impact of CPA 
on firm riskiness. Does CPA reduce or increase risk exposure? This relationship has to be 
determined before risk can be argued as a mechanism of the CPA-cost of debt relationship. 
Particularly, the few studies that have posited risk as a mechanism in the CPA-cost of debt 
relationship have argued their case from a corporate governance perspective (Bliss and Gul, 
2012), hence have only explored internal risk. Houston et al. (2014), in their borrower 
channel hypothesis, suggest that political connections could reduce cost of debt by reducing 
external risk exposure, but they do not offer an empirical proof. In emerging countries where 
the business environments are risky, external risk merits specific attention in the CPA-cost of 
debt relationship because of how it impacts firm survival and performance. 
Additionally, more mechanisms of CPA need to be explored and examined. Currently, there 
is a huge interest in investigating the relationship between CPA and firm performance, but 
little emphasis is placed on understanding the underlying mechanisms (Rajwani and Liedong, 
2015; Guo et al., 2014; Lux et al., 2011). There are only a few studies (Peng and Luo, 2000; 
Hadani and Schuler, 2013) that explicitly and theoretically discuss mechanisms through 
which political activism impacts firm performance. In debt financing, there is room to 
empirically explore and test the mechanisms that translate political connections into 
preferential access to finance. 
This thesis is positioned to address the aforementioned research gaps, and hence addresses 
the following questions:  
1. What is the impact of managerial political ties on access to finance and cost of debt?  
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2. What is the impact of managerial political ties on institutional risk exposure? 
3. What mechanisms mediate the relationship between political ties and cost of debt? 
Cost of debt is an important topic because most private firms, even in developed countries, 
rely almost exclusively on loan financing (Brav, 2009). This leaves the performance of these 
firms prone to adverse price movements in the credit market. Using survey data from Ghana 
where private firms dominate, this thesis offers insight from a weak institutional 
environment. Importantly, the data captures “soft” variables such as political and financial 
ties, and other information that is hardly available to the public. This primary data enables 
this thesis to transcend the trajectory of current CPA research, into realms that make 
significant contributions to theory and practice. Essentially, the thesis takes unique 
moderation and mediation effects into account and tests how the impact of political ties is 
strengthened or weakened by other relevant factors previously overlooked by extant 
literature.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-4 Overall Research Model 
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As shown in the overall research model (Figure 2-4), this thesis comprises of three empirical 
parts. First, I examine the effect of managerial political ties on access to finance and cost of 
debt. In doing this, I also capture the extent to which this effect is contingent on managerial 
financial ties, borrowing from government-owned banks, financial representation on 
corporate boards, CEO duality and the appointment of Big Four auditors 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Deloitte and Ernst & Young). Second, I examine the 
relationship between political ties and institutional risk exposure (investment climate 
constraints or barriers to growth) in order to find empirical proof for the widely postulated 
effect of CPA on risk reduction. My analysis account for the moderating effects of public 
affairs functions, corporate social responsibility and regulatory vulnerability. Third, I test for 
mechanisms of the CPA-cost of debt relationship. The mechanisms explored are largely 
ignored in the literature, but are very important in emerging country contexts where 
institutions are fragile and corporate governance is poor. Particularly, I test the mediating 
roles of institutional risk exposure, financial reporting quality, non-financial disclosure, social 
network expansion and board independence. Altogether, these three empirical tests deepen 
knowledge about the value of political connections in credit markets.   
2.8 Theoretical Framework 
CPA research draws on several theories (Getz, 1997). As mentioned previously, this is 
because CPA is examined by scholars from different disciplines ranging from sociology to 
management, and these scholars typically use theories that are central to their disciplines. For 
instance, within the political science discipline, CPA is informed by interest group theory. In 
economics, CPA is explained using transaction cost and collective action theories. In 
sociology, CPA is understood using social capital and institutional theories. In management, 
resource-based view, resource dependency and agency theories are the dominant theoretical 
foundations.   
These different theories cover various facets of CPA, including the reasons why firms do 
CPA, the nature of CPA and performance outcomes of CPA. For instance, institutional 
environments have been identified to impact strategic decisions (Peng, 2003; Oliver, 1991; 
Peng, 2002) and corporate political activity (Hillman and Keim, 1995; Lawton et al., 2013a; 
North, 1990; Doh et al., 2012). According to Hillman and Hitt (1999) and Barron (2011), 
firms in corporatist countries where consensus and cooperation are valued (Wilson, 1990) are 
more likely to choose a relational approach to CPA. Institutional theory has also been used to 
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explain why some political strategies are dominant in particular countries or why the benefits 
of CPA are more pronounced in some contexts (Rajwani and Liedong, 2015). The theory of 
collective action (Olson, 1965) has been applied to show that the choice of individual action 
or collective action is influenced by the costs and benefits of CPA (Keim and Zeithaml, 
1986). Firms that believe a political action will bring private benefits will likely take 
individual action. However, if benefits are collective, firms will prefer collective action so 
that they can share the costs of political action with other beneficiaries. This prevents the 
free-rider problem (Yoffie, 1987) whereby firms are not motivated to participate in the 
provision of a public good provided they are not excluded from the resultant benefits (Olson, 
1971). Studies examining the antecedents of CPA have used resource-based view theory to 
explain why large firms are politically active (Masters and Keim, 1985; Hillman, 2003; 
Hillman et al., 2004; Lawton et al., 2013b) and the resource dependency theory to understand 
why firms in highly regulated industries do more CPA (Grier et al., 1994). The commonly 
used theories in CPA research are summarized in Table 2-10 
In recent times, there has been an increase in calls for a multi-theoretical approach in the 
study of non-market strategy (Mellahi et al., 2016). With respect to CPA, the call for 
researchers to expand intellectual horizons to cover relevant theories was made about two 
decades ago (Getz, 1997). Consequently, in the hypotheses of most CPA-firm performance or 
CPA-cost of debt studies, a couple of theories can be found. For instance, hypotheses 
predicting that political connections reduce cost of debt when firms borrow from 
government-owned banks (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Lashitew, 2014) can be argued to be 
theoretically rooted in social capital and agency theories. Similarly, predictions or arguments 
that the benefits of political connections are higher in highly corrupt countries (Faccio, 2006) 
can be positioned within social capital and institutional theories. Essentially, multiple theories 
are drawn upon to understand CPA. According to Mellahi et al. (2016), there is a swing 
towards a multi-theoretical approach in studying non-market strategy – an increase from 
about 20% in the 2000-2004 period to about 30% in the 2010-2014 period. 
Subsequently, this thesis uses social capital and institutional theories and in doing so, draws 
on corporate governance insights to develop the hypotheses and interpret the results. Figure 
2-5 depicts how these theories are combined to inform and address the research questions. It 
also shows the theoretical positioning of the thesis.   
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Table 2-10 Theories of CPA 
Theory Application in CPA Key Texts 
 
Interest Group 
Theory 
 
Firms are politically active in order to prevent the domination of the policy arena by competing or 
rival interest groups. 
 
 
Salisbury (1983); Mundo (1992); 
McKay & Webb-Yackee (2007) 
 
Collective Action 
Theory 
Inability to preclude other firms from the benefits of CPA results in a collective approach to lobbying.  
 
Large firms in concentrated industries are more likely to capture more benefits of CPA, hence they 
are willing to lobby solitarily even if smaller firms will benefit from their actions 
 
Masters & Keim (1985) Keim & 
Zeithaml (1986); Lenway & 
Rehbein (1991);  
Transaction Cost 
Economics 
Firms use intermediaries when political or policy issues are infrequent or less important to their 
survival or profitability, but they internalise CPA when the issues are salient and frequent 
 
Firms tend to influence policy issues collectively through trade associations when industry interests 
converge, but act alone when their interests are specific and diverge from industry preferences 
 
Littlejohn (1986); Kaufmann, 
Englander & Marcus (1993); 
Sawant (2012) 
Social Capital 
Theory 
Personal-level relationships between managers and politicians can enable firms gain competitive 
advantage 
Peng & Luo (2000); Acquaah 
(2007); Adhikari, Derashid & 
Zhang (2006)  
 
Institutional 
Theory 
Firm are politically active in developing countries in order to buffer any investment climate 
constraints or reduce political risks that may adversely affect business. 
 
The level of political participation, choice of political strategy and benefits of CPA are affected by 
institutional frameworks and culture 
 
Hillman & Hitt (1999); Henisz & 
Zelner (2005); Puck, Rogers & 
Mohr (2013); Barron (2011); 
Faccio (2006) 
Resource 
Dependency & 
Agency Theory 
Firms are politically active in order to manage their dependency relationship with politicians. They 
co-opt politicians into corporate boards, finance campaigns or develop ties with government officials 
to ensure that that policies are aligned with their business interests 
 
Pfeffer & Salacik (1972;1978); 
Hillman (2005) 
 
Resource-Based 
View 
Resource-endowed firms are politically active. They have money to donate to PACs. They also have 
dynamic capabilities to pre-empt or adjust to policy issues 
Hersch & McDougall (2000); 
Lawton, Rajwani & Doh (2013);  
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Research on political ties is deeply rooted in social capital theory. Social capital is defined as 
the sum of resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or organization as a result 
of the development and maintenance of personal and social networking relationships 
(Granovetter, 1973; Granovetter, 1985; Lin, 2001). These relationships provide value to 
individuals or firms by allowing them to exploit the resources embedded in social 
connections (Acquaah, 2007; Acquaah, 2011). Social capital can be developed through 
schooling, family ties and informal associations (e.g. guanxi, keiretsu). Early application of 
social capital theory was limited to the effect of social relationships on individual behaviour, 
effectiveness and career growth (micro-micro link) (Krackhardt, 1990; Burt, 1992; Brass and 
Burkhardt, 1993; Belliveau et al., 1996; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998; Seibert et al., 2001). Peering 
into the micro-micro link, the externalities of social capital can be categorized into two levels 
– first-order and second-order effects (Burt, 2007; Galunic et al., 2012). While first-order 
effects are the direct and personal gains from social capital, second-order effects are the 
spillovers that individuals experience through the social capital of others. Even till date, the 
micro-micro link is still popular. For instance, recent studies have explored the effect of 
social capital on employee innovation (Carnabuci and Dioszegi, 2015), knowledge-sharing 
(Choi, 2016) and managerial performance (Ahearne et al., 2014).  
While research on the first-order effects of social capital still go on unabated, researchers 
have extended the influences of social capital to the organizational level and have examined 
the micro-macro link (Gulati, 1995; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Peng & Luo, 2000). This 
micro-macro link whereby the personal networks of senior managers can affect firm-level 
outcomes is the bedrock of this thesis. Indeed, several studies have revealed that social capital 
improves organizational performance. For instance, entrepreneurship research shows that 
social capital increases entrepreneurs’ access to information (Birley, 1985) and financial 
resources (Batjargal, 2003; Baron and Markman, 2003). Social capital also confers legitimacy 
on entrepreneurs, gives them competitive edge (McEvily and Zaheer, 1999) and enhances 
new venture performance (Stam and Elfring, 2008). In the general field of management, 
research shows that social capital leads to the development of human capital (Coleman, 
1988a), facilitates access to private and public financial resources (Florin et al., 2003), 
enables organizational flexibility, collectiveness and commitment (Leana and Van Buren, 
1999) and reduces the likelihood of business failure (Pennings et al., 1998). Across the value 
or supply chain of firms, social capital can be value-adding. For instance, social capital with 
customers increases brand loyalty and revenues (Park and Luo, 2001) while social capital 
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with suppliers enhances access to quality inputs, fast delivery and favourable trade financing 
terms (Peng and Luo, 2000). Even social capital with competitors can lead to innovation and 
collaboration (von Hippel, 1988; Park and Luo, 2001). Due to these benefits, managers spend 
a lot of time developing interpersonal relationships (Mintzberg, 1973). On the flipside 
however, studies highlight the potential of social capital to destroy value. It is argued that 
strong networking relationships could stifle innovation in organizations (Coleman, 1990; 
Leana and Van Buren, 1999), increase rigidity and inertia to change (Gargiulo and Benassi, 
2000) and lead to groupthink in decision making and negotiations (Janis, 1981).  
The micro-macro link of social capital has received some attention in CPA research. Almost 
all the studies examining the impact of political ties on firms (connections to ministers, 
presidents, senior bureaucrats, members of parliament) implicitly draw on network or social 
capital theory, but only a few explicitly acknowledge the theory. This, perhaps, is because 
majority of the studies on CPA-firm performance are authored by academics within finance 
and economics disciplines where social capital is not a popular theoretical foundation. In 
management and political science disciplines, the role of social capital in lobbying has been 
noted. Peng and Luo (2000) and Acquaah (2007) drew on social capital to frame their studies 
of managerial political ties in China and Ghana respectively. Similarly, Chamlee-Wright and 
Storr (2011) examined how lobbying for Federal support following hurricane Katrina in the 
U.S was influenced by the social capital of community leaders.  
From a contingency perspective, some researchers have investigated how the value of social 
is strengthened or weakened by peer size , industry type (Peng and Luo, 2000; Rowley et al., 
2000), and firm size (Peng and Luo, 2000). Extending this contingency perspective to 
institutions, researchers agree that even though social capital influences individual and 
organizational outcomes in many parts of the world, its prominence is higher in developing 
countries (Nee, 1992b; Peng and Luo, 2000). Developing countries have relationship-based 
capital systems (Adhikari et al., 2006; Francis et al., 2009) whereby social relations influence 
outcomes in economic markets (Peng and Heath, 1996). In these countries, the 
ineffectiveness of market-supporting institutions in facilitating information access and 
economic exchange enhances the need for developing social capital which replaces 
insufficiently developed institutions (Peng and Luo, 2000; Acquaah, 2007; Acquaah, 2011). 
As noted, some countries have achieved rapid economic growth despite being bedevilled by 
weak institutions (Boisot and Child, 1996; Peng and Luo, 2000), and hence have defied the 
logic that growth is facilitated by strong institutions (North, 1990). Basically, there is a strong 
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link between social capital theory and institutional theory, and the main thrust is that social 
capital is much more important in weak institutional contexts where mutual trust replaces 
regulations and arms-length contracts. My thesis, set in the sub-Saharan country of Ghana, 
therefore draws on both of these theories. 
Delving deeper into the focus of this thesis, social capital and institutional theories have been 
applied to understand the dynamics of debt financing. In countries with weak institutions and 
poorly developed financial markets and systems, access to external financing is difficult, 
especially for small firms (Beck et al., 2006a; Beck et al., 2008). In these countries also, 
banks are the main source of credit for medium and large-scale firms (Luo and Ying, 2014; 
Santikian, 2014). This is because other non-bank sources of financing such as stock markets 
and venture capital firms are barely existent. The resultant pressure on the banks to meet the 
financing needs of firms, coupled with the rampant poor corporate governance practices, low 
transparency and weak creditor rights in developing countries, leads to credit rationing 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). In this rationing process, banks are influenced either by their 
social capital with firms (Uzzi, 1999; Rowley et al., 2000) or by the firms’ social capital with 
others, particularly politicians (Lashitew, 2014). “Relationship lending” literature reveals that 
bank-firm relationships increase the exchange of information between both parties 
(Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993; Bhattacharya and Chiesa, 1995) and reduce information 
asymmetry (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Petersen and Rajan, 1997), 
a major market failure that makes bank financing problematic in developing countries. As 
information asymmetry and moral hazard are reduced and trust is fostered, banks’ cost of 
monitoring borrowers reduces (Boot, 2000; Carletti, 2004), hence resulting in lower 
borrowing costs and improved firm performance (Uzzi and Gillespie, 2002). 
Going beyond bank-firm relationships, this thesis captures politician-bank-firm relationships. 
These relationships are important in developing and transition economies where governments 
own banks and politicians play a significant role in the allocation of resources. The ability of 
politicians to coordinate directed lending will only diminish when regulatory institutions are 
strengthened and financial markets are developed (Lashitew, 2014). Unfortunately, most 
developing countries, particularly those sub-Saharan African countries, still have fledgling 
markets, despite making progress in the last few decades. Consequently, the impact of 
political connections on access to finance and cost of debt in emerging/developing countries 
will continue to be an interesting topic for finance and non-market strategy scholars.  
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It is believed that the micro ties senior managers establish with influential politicians can 
enable their organizations to reduce exposure to uncertainty and allow then to exploit macro 
opportunities (Luo and Zhao, 2013; Puck et al., 2013). This belief is based on the new 
institutional economics perspective (North, 1990; Williamson, 2000) which emphasizes the 
effect of political governance on institutional structures (Doh et al., 2012) and the strong link 
between political or regulatory uncertainty and non-market strategy (Kingsley et al., 2012; 
White et al., 2015). It is also based on the notion that political stakeholder management in 
emerging markets revolves around social ties and networks (Dieleman and Sachs, 2008; 
Rajwani and Liedong, 2015).  
 
 
 
Figure 2-5 Theoretical Positioning of the Thesis 
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2.9 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I reviewed the literature on non-market strategy, CPA and firm performance. I 
show the two strands of non-market strategy and highlight the increasing calls for their 
integration. I then peer into the approaches, levels of participation and strategies of CPA. My 
systematic review of the literature, which was published in Journal of World Business (ABS 
4), yielded mixed results about the impact of CPA on various measures of firm performance, 
including cost of debt. The review also revealed that the type of political strategy used by 
firms or studied by researchers is affected by institutional development. Some gaps and 
problems were identified. First, it is still not clear whether CPA improves performance. 
Particularly, there is scanty research on the effect of political connections on cost of debt. The 
few studies that have examined the topic have failed to show conclusive evidence.  
Additionally, these studies miss important moderating variables that could affect access to 
finance and cost of debt.  
Second, the mechanisms through which CPA affects cost of debt are rarely articulated. The 
few studies that try to explicate causation do not show any empirical proof of mediation. For 
instance, empirical evidence for the popularly postulated mediating role of risk in firm 
performance and cost of debt is still lacking. Third, most of the studies examining CPA, firm 
performance and cost of debt are set in either developed countries or a few emerging 
countries in Asia. Consequently, not much is known about CPA in Africa or the Middle East. 
Positioned to address these gaps, this thesis attempts to clarify the contested impact of 
political ties on cost of debt by using firm-level survey data from Ghana, sub-Saharan Africa. 
It also seeks to examine the efficacy of political ties in institutional risk reduction, as well as 
the mediating roles of risk exposure, financial reporting and disclosure, social network 
expansion and board independence in the CPA-cost of debt relationship. As CPA is informed 
by multiple theoretical foundations, this thesis draws on social capital and institutional 
theories as well as corporate governance insights.    
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Chapter 3 Research Setting – The Ghana Context 
The main aim of this chapter is to offer a concise and systematic argumentation to support the 
positioning of the study within the Ghanaian context. Consequently, this chapter provides 
relevant information about the setting of this thesis. It begins with an overview of Ghana’s 
history and political system. It then explores Ghana’s institutional and economic development 
before delving into the state of financial services, banking and access to finance in the 
country.  
3.1 Republic of Ghana 
The Republic of Ghana is a country located in sub-Saharan Africa. It is a sovereign, unitary 
and democratic nation in the sub-region of West Africa. According to the World Bank, the 
country has a population of approximately 27 million people. It is a lower middle income and 
multicultural country with different ethnic and religious groups (Ghana Statistical Service, 
2012). Table 3.1 shows some facts and figures about the country.  
Table 3-1 Facts and Figures – Ghana 
Indicator/Variable Fact 
 
Capital city 
 
Accra 
Population 26.79 million (2014 estimate) 
Official Language English 
Government Unitary Constitutional Republic 
Area 238,535 km
2 
Currency Ghana Cedis (GHS or GH¢) 
Calling Code +233 
Time Zone GMT (UTC+0) 
Income Level Classification Lower Middle Income Country (LMIC) 
Gini Coefficient 0.43 
Human Development Index 0.579 
Poverty Headcount (% of population) 24.2% 
Life Expectancy 61 years (2013 estimate) 
Source: Compiled by Author 
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Since attaining independence from the British on 6
th
 March 1957, Ghana has experienced 
political turmoil and upheavals. A series of military and civilian governments run the country 
alternatingly until 1992 when a new constitution was enacted and multi-party elections were 
held. Since then, Ghana has consolidated her democracy and has peacefully gone to the polls 
on five occasions – in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012. Under the current constitution, 
Ghana runs a presidential system of government. Multi-party, presidential and parliamentary 
elections are organized by an independent Electoral Commission every four years. A count of 
50% +1 is required for an outright win, otherwise a re-run is organized. In Ghana, there is 
strong unity between incumbent local and central government politicians. This means that 
even connections to the lowest ranking local government politician can still yield significant 
benefits to firms. Historically, the party that wins the presidential election usually has the 
majority of MPs and hence controls parliament. The consequence is that rent extraction, 
through political connections, goes unchecked, unstopped or unscrutinised. 
3.2 Corruption and Public Sector Efficiency in Ghana 
According to Transparency International (2016), 41 of the 47 SSA countries in its Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) scored below 50 on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 where 0 is “highly 
corrupt” and 100 is “very clean”. Ghana scored a CPI of 47. Another recent report by the 
World Economic Forum ranked Ghana 98
th
 out of 144 countries on a global measure of 
irregular payments and bribes made in public contracts and transactions (WEF, 2014). The 
high prevalence of corruption in Ghana is supported by weak checks and balances. The 
constitution empowers parliament to remove the President, Vice President and even the 
Speaker of Parliament (Lindberg and Yongmei, 2009). However, due to the frequent 
dominance of parliament by the party that wins the presidential elections as well as the strong 
cohesion within the governing party (Stapenhurst and Pelizzo, 2012), parliament rubber-
stamps the activities and decisions of the executive. Consequently, public accountability is 
very low. The issue of low accountability is exacerbated by weaknesses in institutionalizing 
public sector performance systems in the country (Dodoo, 1997; Ohemeng, 2009; Ohemeng, 
2011). Vague standards of performance render the Ghanaian public sector highly inefficient 
(Haruna, 2003; Gyimah-Boadi, 1990), culminating in deplorable service delivery and 
management. For instance, per WEF ratings, Ghana ranks 110
th
 out 144 countries for 
infrastructural development. With respect to electricity supply, Ghana is 112
th
 (WEF, 2014). 
Using data from Ghana, Tanzania and Kenya, Faruq and colleagues (2013) show that these 
institutional lapses, including bureaucracy and corruption, hinder firm productivity.  
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Politicization of the Ghanaian public sector is phenomenon that further weakens 
accountability (Haruna, 2003). Supporters of the ruling party are mostly placed in public 
agencies and departments. Particularly, there is a trend in Ghana whereby the youth of 
political parties, popularly called “foot soldiers”, are offered civil service employment as 
compensation for their contribution to the agenda of their parties. Such politically motivated 
hiring practices accentuate and perpetuate inefficiency and poor performance (Owusu, 2005). 
Additionally, the public sector is poorly financed, has low wages and hence struggles to 
recruit, retain and motivate top talent (Antwi and Analoui, 2008; Antwi and Phillips, 2013). 
Consequently, moonlighting – the phenomenon of holding multiple jobs to earn more money 
– is very common in the Ghanaian public sector (Owusu, 2005), especially among political 
hires who double as political party agents.  As commitment and dedication is divided, the 
quality of public service falls, therefore unleashing negative implications for business and 
society (Adhikari et al., 2006). 
3.3 Regulatory Development 
Regulatory development in Ghana has improved over the years, but it has not reached an 
acceptable level. As noted by the African Development Bank, private sector development in 
Africa is hindered by disabling investment climates and non-supporting “soft” infrastructure 
(African Development Bank, 2013). In Ghana, regulatory lapses manifest in five ways. First, 
even though there are policies governing the private and public sectors, these policies are not 
applied or implemented as expected. Second, the various laws and policies regulating and 
governing both private and public sectors in the country are not readily available to the 
public. Ideally, the websites of State ministries and government agencies should contain 
regulations that fall within their scopes or jurisdictions. Unfortunately, online repositories for 
policy documents are barely existent. It is therefore difficult to know the “rules of the game” 
in Ghana. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that some regulations have to be 
purchased. According to the World Bank, Ghana is one of the few countries where the private 
sector has to purchase building or construction regulations (World Bank, 2016). Not only 
does monetizing what should be public knowledge an obstacle to entrepreneurship, but it also 
increases the cost of doing business. Third, most of the regulations in the country exist only 
exist on paper. For instance, on paper it should take an entrepreneur an average of 14 days to 
register or start a business in Ghana (World Bank, 2016). However in reality, it takes weeks 
and months. Fourth, some regulations in Ghana are known to be outdated; the rules are not 
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amended to reflect changes in global and international standards or socio-economic 
movements. In addition to outdated laws, Ghana has grey areas that are not covered by 
regulation. For instance, there was no protection scheme for clients of banks and deposit-
taking institutions until recently when a deposit protection bill was brought before parliament 
for approval (Ernst & Young, 2015). Finally, there is limited scope for private sector 
participation in policy making. Consequently, the executive and legislative arms of 
government enact policies that are unfavourable to firms. For instance, in 2014, government 
announced a 17.5% value added tax on selected financial transactions (Dzawu, 2014) without 
adequate consultation with opinion leaders and financial sector. 
3.4 Economy of Ghana 
From being a Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) and benefiting from debt relief from the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), Ghana reached the per-capita income 
threshold required for classification as a lower middle income country in July 2011. Since 
then however, GDP annual growth and GDP per capita annual growth have been on a 
recession. GDP growth declined from a high of 14.05% in 2011 to 3.99% in 2014. Huge 
fiscal imbalances and budget deficits have led to a build-up of public debt. As of June 2015, 
the country’s debt stock reached GH¢ 94.5 billion, representing 70.9% of GDP (Alhassan, 
2015). Clearly, Ghana’s debt stock has become unsustainable. This, coupled with rising 
inflation (18.9% as of May 2016) and a depreciating currency, has created an unfavourable 
environment for business. The economy is projected to grow at around 6% in 2016. This 
projection is based on increased oil production, private sector investment and improved 
public infrastructure (African Development Bank, 2015). However, declining crude prices 
will make it difficult or impossible for the country to meet this growth target. Other oil 
producing countries such as Nigeria and Saudi Arabia are already faced with budget deficits 
due to declining oil revenues.  
3.5 Corporate Governance in Ghana 
Corporate governance in Ghana is poor. Processes, structures and lines of accountability are 
poorly developed and implemented (Bokpin, 2009; Agyeman et al., 2013), leaving room for 
misappropriation and mismanagement of corporate resources. All corporate bodies in Ghana 
are governed by the Companies Code 1963 (Act 179) which, among other things, stipulates 
principles for annual general meetings (AGMs), corporate disclosure, financial reporting, and 
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the appointment of boards of directors and auditors. However, most registered companies do 
not follow the rules. A couple of governance issues in Ghana are worth discussing. First, as 
the Companies’ Code is not clear on the distinction between executive and non-executive 
directors, most firms in Ghana have more executive directors than non-executive directors. In 
fact, some firms do not have non-executive directors, and this renders the supervision of 
Management teams difficult, if not impossible (Abor and Fiador, 2013). Moreover, the 
criteria for appointing board members and evaluating board performance are not 
institutionalized or well-defined (Simpson, 2014). Appointments to boards are hardly merit-
based. Second, the phenomenon whereby one person serves as both CEO and board 
chairperson (CEO Duality) is very common among Ghanaian firms (Abor and Biekpe, 
2007a). Though CEO duality allows for unity of command in organizations, it raises concerns 
about supervision and monitoring of management teams (Krause et al., 2014), and thus 
captures the possibility of power abuse and mismanagement in Ghanaian enterprises. As a 
result, Ghana’s Securities Commission recommended that the roles of CEO and chairman 
should be separated (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2010). Third, transparency and 
disclosure are lacking in the country. According to Agyei-Mensah (2016), firms in Ghana do 
not disclose enough internal control information in their annual reports. This makes it 
difficult for stakeholders to determine the quality of corporate governance in the firms, 
culminating in high information asymmetry (Agyeman et al., 2013). Not surprising, a World 
Bank study noted that in Ghana, there is weak enforcement of the disclosure of material 
events and related party transactions (World Bank, 2005).   
3.6 Banking and Access to Finance in Ghana 
As of June 2016, there were 29 commercial banks in Ghana - 12 owned by Ghanaians and 17 
owned by foreign nationals. Three of the 12 Ghanaian-owned banks are wholly controlled by 
the government. The government also has significant stake in four other privately-held banks. 
In Ghana, access to finance is limited due to constraints on both the supply and demand sides 
of the credit market. On the supply side, poor enforcement regimes and weak creditor rights 
have made it difficult for banks to meet the credit needs of firms and households. Similarly, 
lack of competition among banks in the country has stifled financial innovation necessary to 
expand access. Additionally, the lack of credit referencing bureaus, or the limited use of the 
existing few, has rendered credit checks impossible or ineffective and has thus excluded 
many credible enterprises that have yet to develop credit histories. Moreover, alternative 
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sources of financing, such as the secondary markets, private placements, securitizations, 
invoice financing, crowd funding and venture capital funds are either under-development or 
non-existent, hence putting a lot of pressure on the banks. All of these factors have led to 
credit rationing (Awunyo-Vitor et al., 2014; Robson et al., 2013), particularly for small and 
medium size enterprises (Tagoe et al., 2005; Abor and Biekpe, 2006) which make up over 
90% of all registered firms in Ghana (PwC, 2013). For these small enterprises, bank loans 
account for less than a quarter of their total debt financing (Abor and Biekpe, 2007b). On the 
demand side, high cost of debt and increased demand for collateral have prevented firms 
from seeking financing (Aryeetey, 1998; Abor and Biekpe, 2007b). Further, poor financial 
literacy has made it difficult for firms to develop bankable projects (Adomako et al., 2016) 
while unstructured governance and poor institutionalization of management processes have 
made banks wary and conservative (PwC, 2013). 
Particularly noteworthy is the “unfriendly” interest rate regime in Ghana. Ghana has been 
recognised as one of the countries in the world with very high interest rate spreads (Aboagye 
et al., 2008). Over the past few years, the central bank has raised the monetary policy rate in 
order to mop up cash, break the inertia of inflation and arrest the decline of the local 
currency. Correspondingly, the prevailing risk-free rates, measured by the interest rates for 
the 91-day, 182-day and 1-year government bills and notes have increased too. As shown in 
Table 3-2, the policy rate and Treasury bill rates almost doubled in the six-year period 
between 2010 and 2015. Interbank lending rates also increased significantly between 2013 
and 2015, from 16.28% to 25.29%. Typically, banks choose between 1) investing in 
government securities; 2) lending to other banks or, 3) lending to firms and individuals. Since 
the first option is risk-free, and the second option is safer and secure, firms and individuals 
must accept to pay interests higher than the rates on government securities or interbank 
lending, and this places constraints on the private sector.  
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Table 3-2 Interest Rate Movements in Ghana 
Year Monetary 
Policy Rate 
One-year Treasury 
Note Rate 
182-Day  Treasury 
Bill Rate 
91-day Treasury 
Bill Rate 
2010 13.50% 12.65% 12.66% 12.25% 
2011 12.50% 11.30% 11.25% 10.67% 
2012 15.00% 22.90% 22.88% 22.90% 
2013 16.00% 17.00% 18.66% 19.22% 
2014 21.00% 22.50% 26.39% 25.79% 
2015 26.00% 23.00% 24.35% 22.79% 
 Source: Bank of Ghana 
3.7 Chapter Summary and Context Justification 
This chapter has presented an overview of Ghana, and has covered topics on the economic, 
political and institutional landscape of the West African country. It has also covered issues 
pertaining to banking, financial services and access to finance in the country. In this final 
section, I synthesize and summarize the discussion so far to emphasize and justify why I 
chose Ghana as the setting or context for investigating managerial political ties, institutional 
risk exposure and cost of debt. The reasons for my choice are underpinned by theory and 
inspired by real phenomenon, and they include the following. 
First, there is barely any strategy research in sub-Saharan Africa. Though there have been 
calls to expand strategy research in emerging countries beyond the nations in Asia, Eastern 
and Central Europe (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Wright et al., 2005), Africa has received little 
research attention. Up till now, the situation is not any different. Though there is a lot of 
unexplored management phenomena in Africa that are worth studying (Mellahi and Mol, 
2015), management research is generally lacking on the continent (Klingebiel and Stadler, 
2015). The few emerging countries where CPA has been researched are predominantly 
China, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brazil. Emerging countries may exhibit similar institutional 
characteristics such as weak market supporting institutions and weak legal structures (Khanna 
and Palepu, 1997; Luo, 2004), but there are still differences between them (Acquaah, 2007), 
which make it implausible to draw any far-reaching generalizations based on studies done in 
Asia. In Ghana and the rest of Africa, research culture is weak. This is because the business 
schools in most universities in the country are young and fledgling, and hence tend to place a 
stronger emphasis on teaching over research. The existing scanty management studies have 
not explored CPA or business-government relations.  
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Second, institutional voids in sub-Saharan Africa have led to economic problems, poverty 
and political instability. Sub-Saharan Africa is the poorest geographic region in the world. It 
is home to some of the poorest countries in the world and has a high rate of political 
instability owing to frequent military intervention in politics. Ghana and other countries in 
this impoverished region are saddled with pervasive corruption, weak legal and regulatory 
structures and ineffective enforcement regimes which create uncertainty in the business 
environment. These institutional lapses render the investment climate unfriendly and volatile. 
Per data from the World Bank, Bank of Ghana and Ghana’s Ministry of Finance, the 
country’s economy has taken a nosedive in recent years. For instance, between 2008 and 
2015, public debt stock soared from GH¢ 9.5 billion to GH¢94.5 billion. The current 
ballooned figure represents over 70% of GDP. Similarly, inflation skyrocketed from 9.5% in 
2010 to 17.7%% at the close of 2015. In 2014, the local currency, Ghana cedi, depreciated by 
31.2% and was ranked by Reuters as one of the worst performing African currencies of the 
year. These economic woes, which are often attributed to poor governance and fiscal 
indiscipline, are institutional rooted and their ramifications for firms are significant (Anaman 
and Agyei-Sasu, 2012). Institutional voids have been noted to motivate entrepreneurs to 
choose the informal sector over the formal sector (Lacko, 2000; Torgler and Schneider, 
2009). More precisely, unfavourable tax administration, bribery and corruption spur the 
informal sector (Koto, 2015) which, according to Ghana Statistical Service, employs over 
80% of workforce in the country. The Ghanaian formal sector is laden with uncertainty, red-
tape and rigidities which harm business performance or kill entrepreneurial aspirations. The 
sad part of the spectacle is that firms have limited opportunities to influence regulations or 
policy outcomes. Commenting on government bills and proposals is yet to be 
institutionalized. At best, only a few draft proposals are published on Parliament’s website.  
Adding to institutional lapses and uncertainty are the strings that are usually attached to the 
loans and grants developing countries such as Ghana receive from Bretton-woods institutions 
- The World Bank and the IMF. Ghana and other sub-Saharan economies are still 
implementing World Bank/IMF recommended structural programs which include banking 
reforms, privatizations, import controls, foreign exchange controls and subsidies. These 
changes create uncertainty in business environments, culminating in increased transaction 
costs. In August 2014, Ghana applied for a bailout from the IMF to revamp its failing 
currency and boost its ailing economy. The three-year bailout program, valued at about $918 
million (IMF, 2015), holds uncertainties for businesses. Already, the program has led to a 
67 | P a g e  
 
freeze on public sector employment, removal of subsidies, introduction of new taxes and a 
host of policy uncertainties. To empirically examine the postulation that CPA reduces 
uncertainty (Hillman et al., 1999) will require a setting where uncertainty is rife. This makes 
Ghana a highly suitable context.  
Third, managing uncertainty in emerging countries requires firms to develop political 
connections (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Puck et al., 2013) which serve as substitute for the 
poorly functioning market supporting institutions (Lashitew, 2014). According to Henisz and 
Zelner (2010), there are no effective checks and balances in emerging countries. This 
suggests that governments of these countries have a high propensity to harm business 
interests, hence making it imperative for firms to establish and manage relationships with 
politicians and governments. Political connections are thus expected to be more prevalent in 
emerging countries where social capital and networking relationships shape economic 
exchange (Peng and Heath, 1996; Peng and Luo, 2000; Acquaah, 2011). In Ghana, political 
connections exist. Identifying these political connections is mandatory for financial 
institutions in the country. The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) require countries to ensure that financial institutions 
implement systems for identification and verification of politically exposed persons (PEPs). 
The central bank of Ghana classifies PEPs as higher-risk customers. Banks are therefore 
required to identify PEPs (politicians, senior bureaucrats and their families or close 
associates) through their customer due diligence (CDD) processes (Bank of Ghana, 2011). 
They are also required to monitor PEPs and their associates to prevent them from abusing 
their offices and laundering corruption proceeds. Consequently banks make efforts to identify 
political ties of the senior managers of borrowing firms, and they are able to identify these 
ties because in most emerging countries such as Ghana: 1) politically connected firms that 
want to borrow often get introduced to lenders by politicians; 2) It is common to find 
politicians following up so that lenders approve loans for connected firms; and 3) strong and 
visible family, social and ethnic ties make political ties obvious to lenders. In sum, the 
existence and possibility of banks in Ghana to identify political ties allows for the causality 
between CPA and loan decisions to be established, thus making the country appropriate for 
this study. 
Fourth, in Ghana, credit financing is expensive and inaccessible. The interest rate regime has 
become unfriendly to businesses. For instance, in the five years between September 2011 and 
December 2015, Ghana’s monetary policy rate increased from 12.5% to 26% while the 91-
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day Treasury bill rate surged up from 9.37% to 22.79%. The interbank lending rate, which is 
the overnight rate at which banks lend to each other, took a giant leap from 10.6% to 25.29% 
in the same period. Moreover, net interest spreads are very high in the country (Aboagye et 
al., 2008), partly because bank executives are motivated to extract excess rent in the form 
bonuses, salaries and directors’ fees from high interest charges (Mensah and Abor, 2014). 
This upward trajectory in interest rates has placed dire constraints on firms that want to 
borrow. As one of the motivations for building up political connections is to obtain 
preferential access to financing (Li et al., 2008a; Yeh et al., 2013; Lashitew, 2014; Chen et 
al., 2014), Ghana’s high interest rate regime provides an interesting context for ascertaining 
the effect of political ties on interest rates.  
Fifth, the Ghana government wholly owns about 3 of the registered and licensed commercial 
banks in the country. The government, through its agencies and the national pension Trust, 
has significant shareholding in at least four other banks. This phenomenon is not strange, 
because in developing and transition countries where government ownership of enterprises is 
prevalent (Okhmatovskiy, 2010), governments own banks (La Porta et al., 2002). What is 
interesting is that government-owned banks tend to extend favours to politically connected 
firms (Khwaja and Mian, 2005). These banks defy the social and agency roles for which they 
are established (Sapienza, 2004) and become avenues for the direction of resources to 
political supporters and friends (Li et al., 2008a; Lashitew, 2014). As the State owns or 
controls some of the banks, Ghana provides a suitable context to examine whether 
government-owned or affiliated banks extend favourable credit terms to firms with political 
ties. 
Finally, there are concerns about corporate governance in politically connected firms (Gul, 
2006; Guedhami et al., 2014). It is believed that firms with connections to governments take 
governance less seriously. In Ghana, corporate governance is poor. Institutional lapses have 
weakened supervisory agencies and rendered enforcement ineffective. Firms have existed for 
years and decades without filing any annual returns at the Registry. Processes to ensure 
accountability and financial prudence do not exist, and if they do, they are not effectively 
implemented. As governance is argued as a mediator of the CPA-firm performance 
relationship, particularly in the credit market (Bliss and Gul, 2012), the Ghanaian context is 
suitable for empirically examining the role of governance moderators and mediators such as 
the quality of financial reporting, board independence, and the level of non-financial 
disclosure.  
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Table 3-3 summarizes the pertaining conditions in Ghana and how these conditions make the 
Ghanaian context highly suitable for this doctoral research. Taking the comments of 
Klingebiel and Stadler (2015) into account, I find Ghana to be theoretically appropriate for 
addressing the research questions of this thesis and for altering or contributing to theory.  
Table 3-3 Justification of the Ghana Context 
Ghana… Hence Ghana… 
Is an emerging country where social capital 
and interpersonal relationships moderate 
outcomes in economic markets 
Has political connections that have not been 
explored, but are worth studying 
Experiences high corruption, weak 
enforcement of regulations and has weak 
State institutions, culminating in high 
uncertainty and investment climate 
constraints 
Is suitable for addressing the impact of 
political connections on institutional risk 
exposure 
Has poor economic growth, crippling 
inflation, high public debt stock, and high 
interest rates 
Is suitable for addressing the impact of 
political connections on cost of debt 
Has under-developed or non-existent 
alternative sources of financing, hence there 
is increased pressure on banks 
Is suitable for addressing the impact of 
political connections on credit rationing and 
interest rates 
Has a weak corporate governance culture 
underpinned by poor monitoring and 
supervision by the relevant authorities 
Is suitable for addressing the moderating and 
mediating role of corporate governance on 
cost of debt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
70 | P a g e  
 
 
71 | P a g e  
 
Chapter 4 Data and Methodology 
This chapter describes the tools, techniques and methods used to address the research 
questions asked in this thesis. It proceeds as follows. First, I discuss my philosophical 
perspective and outline the ontological and epistemological assumptions that underpin my 
research approach. Next, I discuss and justify my research strategy. Thereafter, I explain how 
data was collected and analysed. In doing so, I provide detailed accounts of how the survey 
instrument was designed; the data collection techniques used; the methods used to ensure 
reliability; and how the data was coded and analysed.  
4.1 Philosophical Perspective 
Academic research is located within paradigms – theoretical and philosophical perspectives 
which provide different ways of connecting ideas and experiences of people in the social 
world (Blaikie, 2007). Simply, a paradigm is the representation of the “entire constellation of 
beliefs, values and techniques, and so on shared by the members of a community” (Kuhn, 
1970, p. 175). Blaikie (2007) identified 10 research paradigms, based on ontological 
assumptions about the nature of reality and epistemological assumptions about ways of 
gaining knowledge. In detail, ontology is a branch of philosophy that is concerned with the 
constitution or nature of social reality. Theories of social reality fall into two categories, 
namely idealist and realist. While the idealist theories assume that the external world has no 
independence from human thoughts, the realist theories assume that social phenomena exist 
independently of the human observer (Bhaskar, 1979; Collier, 1994; Blaikie, 2007). 
Epistemology is a theory of the methods through which people gain knowledge about things 
around them (Blaikie, 2000; Chia, 2002). It is a philosophical stance for establishing what 
can be known, how meaning is given to social phenomena, and what criteria is used to judge 
the accuracy and adequacy of knowledge (Crotty, 1998). Researchers attach meaning to 
social phenomena in three ways: 1) objectivism whereby social phenomena have meaning; 2) 
subjectivism whereby human observers impose meaning on social phenomena; and 3) 
constructivism whereby meaning is constructed through interactions between human 
observers and social phenomena (Crotty, 1998; Blaikie, 2007). Table 4-1 summarizes some 
of the common ontological and epistemological assumptions used in social science research.  
.
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Table 4-1 Summary of Philosophical Perspectives 
Ontological Assumptions 
Shallow Realist External reality consists of objects or events that can be observed. The role of science is to discover these objects which exist independent of human 
observers. What observers see is what is there; everybody can observe reality 
Conceptual Realist External reality consists of objects or events that are independent of human observers, but these objects can only be known or discovered not by 
experience but by reason or use of thought. Only rational thinking persons can observe reality 
Cautious Realist External reality consists of objects or events that can be observed. The role of science is to discover these objects which exist independent of human 
observers, but it is difficult for humans to perceive reality accurately due to imperfections of the human senses.  
Depth Realist Reality consists of three levels – experience (empirical), observation (actual) and mechanisms/structures (real). Reality is a social arrangement and a 
product of material but unobservable relationship structures. 
Idealist Reality is a creation of the mind. What is real is real because observers believe it is real. Reality is therefore subjective, and could differ from person 
to person. There are fundamental differences between the natural and social worlds. 
Subtle Idealist Reality is independent and social phenomena are observable, but interpretations of reality are based on human construction and are therefore 
subjective. This ontology shares features of the shallow realist and idealist ontologies 
Epistemological Assumptions 
Empiricism Knowledge comes from observing the world around us. Objective observation of the external world can lead to an accurate representation of the 
world in scientific concepts and theories. Any idea that cannot be confirmed by observation must be left out of scientific accounts of the world. 
Rationalism The path to knowledge rests on the examination of “thought” itself and the structure of the human mind. Behind a world that can be “seen” lies a 
world of thought that needs to be understood  
Falsification Knowledge comes from critical evaluation of theories through rigorous testing. Researchers impose theories on the world and use data to refute 
false theories in order to draw closer to the truth   
Neo-realism Understanding social phenomena requires a determination of the mechanisms responsible for producing what happens in the empirical or 
observable world. This epistemology places more emphasis on explanation of causation.  
Constructionism Knowledge is the outcome of people making sense of their experiences, observations or encounters with the physical world or with other people.  
Source: Compiled and adapted from Blaikie (2007)
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To a very large extent, researchers are rarely explicit about their ontological and 
epistemological assumptions. These assumptions may not be articulated, but they are 
embedded in the methods used to address research questions (Blaikie, 2007). Nevertheless, 
ontology and epistemology remain contentious topics in social science research. The question 
of whether the natural and social worlds are similar or different and whether or not they can 
be studied using same methods has stirred animated debates. According to Blaikie (2000), 
ontological and epistemological assumptions influence concepts, theories, type of data 
collected, methods of analysis, and interpretations of research findings. In this respect, 
philosophical perspectives have cascading effects on the core elements of social research. 
My ontology and epistemology are respectively rooted in cautious realism and falsification. I 
share the positivist philosophy that reality consists of observable events or things that are 
both independent of humans and are controlled by natural and social laws (Bhaskar, 1979; 
Collier, 1994). Humans’ direct contact with independent and observable events provides 
valid knowledge (Hammersley, 1992). Therefore, only what is observable or can be 
perceived by human senses is considered real and worthy of scientific attention (Blaikie, 
2007). The role of scientific research is to discover empirical regularities (Sayer, 2000) and 
draw universal generalizations to ease our understanding of the world. However, I do not 
agree that humans or scientific research can perceive or make accurate sense of external 
reality because of the frailties or imperfections of human senses (Blaikie, 2007). Thus, 
researchers need to be cautious or critical of their work or interpretations. Following from my 
cautious realism ontology, I share the view that it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine 
whether theories are true. The possible solution is to test proposed theories with data and 
refute those that cannot be proved (Popper, 1959; Popper, 1972). In falsification, critique is 
essential for strengthening scientific enquiry and for establishing the truth.  
In this thesis, I build on the cautious realism ontology and the falsification epistemology to 
investigate how social capital, institutional and corporate governance logics can be used to 
understand how political ties affect cost of debt and institutional risk exposure. I believe this 
philosophical stance is useful for my research for two reasons. First, even though political 
connections exist, they are soft in nature and may not be captured or observed accurately. 
Hence, caution is required, especially when objective data is unavailable. Second, the 
animated debates about the outcomes of CPA (Rajwani and Liedong, 2015; Mellahi et al., 
2016) reinforce the need for continuous falsification of existing or proposed CPA theories in 
order to reveal the “true” effect of CPA on organizational performance.   
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4.2 Research Strategy 
According to Blaikie (2000), a research design must answer three basic questions: 1) what 
will be studied; 2) why will it be studied; and 3) how will it be studied. Among other things, 
the third question involves designing a research strategy. A research strategy, sometimes 
called a logic of enquiry, is necessary to ensure a researcher adopts a consistent and valid 
approach to answer research questions (Blaikie, 2000). It provides a starting point for 
addressing a research problem, and is one of the most important decisions researchers must 
make.  
Blaikie (2000, 2007) identified four major strategies used in social science research, namely 
inductive, deductive, retroductive, and abductive strategies. Each of these strategies has its 
own philosophical and theoretical foundations, a unique set of ontological and 
epistemological assumptions, and a different logic of generating new knowledge. The 
inductive strategy is popularly used for conducting experiments. It starts with data collection, 
followed by data analysis and then the development of generalizations which are used to 
explain patterns (Hempel, 1966). This strategy is based on realist ontology which assumes 
that the world is made up of observable events that can be represented by universal 
propositions (Blaikie, 2007). Epistemologically, knowledge is created through objective 
human observation and experimentation (Mukherji and Albon, 2015) devoid of any 
preconceptions or biases (Durkheim, 1964; Harre, 1972). Inductive strategy is deeply rooted 
in physical and natural sciences where the major aim is to establish general laws. The 
retroductive strategy aims at exploring mechanisms and underlying structure to explain 
observed phenomenon. It is associated with the philosophical approach of Scientific Realism 
(Harre, 1977; Bhaskar, 1979) and is used to seek explanations (Buchanan and Bryman, 
2009). The abductive strategy is used to understand social life through the accounts of social 
actors (Blaikie, 2000). Table 4-2 summarizes Blaike’s research strategies.  
Consistent with my realist ontology and epistemology, I chose the deductive strategy for this 
thesis. The deductive strategy, also known as the hypothetico-deductive method, is a method 
of conjecture and refutation. It was developed by Karl Popper (1959), the founding father of 
Critical rationalism (Blaikie, 2000; Ormerod, 2009). This strategy shares the same 
ontological assumptions with the positivist philosophical perspective, but derives its 
ontological and epistemological assumptions from cautious realism, falsification and critical 
rationalism (Blaikie, 2000). According to critical rationalism, nature and reality consist of 
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essential uniformities and complex causal relationships. This realist ontological assumption 
suggests that the aim of science is to find universal statements that truly describe the facts of 
nature or observed states of affairs (Blaikie, 2000). Popper (1959) argued that a theory holds 
unless proved otherwise. Hence the deductive strategy rests heavily on rigorous testing aimed 
at refuting rather than confirming theories (Faran and Wijnhoven, 2012). In this sense, a 
theory that is not capable of being tested cannot be called scientific. Similarly, for a theory to 
be scientific, it must be possible to falsify it. Epistemologically, theories are developed to 
account for observation, not derived from them. Researchers impose theories on the world, 
and use data and objective testing to reject false ones. Observations are therefore theory-
dependent. In other words, observations are made from a reference point of view. Tentative 
questions and hypotheses are necessary to provide direction for data collection (Bryman, 
2012). The kind of data collected is informed by theoretical ideas (Popper, 1972).  
Table 4-2 Comparism of Research Strategies  
  Inductive Deductive Retroductive Abductive 
Aim 
To establish 
generalizations and 
patterns 
To test theories and to 
eliminate false ones 
To discover 
underlying 
mechanisms 
To describe and 
understand 
social life 
Ontology 
Cautious, depth or 
subtle realist 
Cautious or subtle 
realist 
Depth or subtle 
realist 
Idealist or subtle 
realist 
Epistemology Conventionalism 
Falsification or 
Conventionalism 
Neo-realism Constructionism 
Starting Point Data Theory Theory Data 
Objectives:         
Exploration Major     Major 
Description Major     Major 
Explanation Minor Major     
Prediction Moderate Major     
Understanding       Major 
Evaluation Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Assess impacts Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Source: Compiled by author based on Blaikie (2000, 2007) 
Applying the deductive strategy to my thesis, I started by reviewing the literature and 
developing hypotheses that predict the direct and moderated impact of managerial political 
ties on cost of debt and institutional risk exposure. I also developed hypotheses to predict the 
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mediating mechanisms in the relationship between political ties and cost of debt. After, I 
collected relevant data and subjected my hypotheses to empirical scrutiny. Even though 
critical rationalism and the deductive strategy have been criticised for being too logical and 
stifling scientific creativity (Feyerabend, 1978; Blaikie, 2007), they provide a basis for the 
use of quantitative methods. Indeed, most questionnaire-based studies, like mine, use the 
deductive strategy (Blaikie, 2000)  
4.3 Research Design 
It is difficult to obtain archival or objective data in emerging countries (Wright et al., 2005). 
But over the past few years, increased public listing, proper data management and 
institutional strengthening in some emerging countries in Asia and the Americas have made 
secondary data available to researchers. In most African countries however, access to 
secondary data remains a problem (Klingebiel and Stadler, 2015). Bringing Ghana into 
context, there is no single comprehensive public register of firms in the country (Buame, 
1996; Adomako et al., 2016). Similarly, there are not many databases that contain corporate 
information. The few public sources of firm-level information in Ghana are the Stock 
Exchange and company annual reports, but these sources have their limitations. For example, 
the Ghana Stock Exchange is small with only 42 listed companies, 10 of which are financial 
stocks. Private and informal firms, which are not mandated to disclose information to the 
public or publish their annual reports, dominate the business landscape. As stock market data 
and bank annual reports are the most readily available public information, scholarly research 
in Ghana is dominated by financial studies (Aboagye et al., 2008; Bokpin and Isshaq, 2009; 
Isshaq et al., 2009; Biekpe, 2011; Fiador, 2013). Strategy and management research is 
generally lacking in Ghana, just as it is in the rest of Africa (Mellahi and Mol, 2015).  
Generally, CPA data is rarely available from secondary sources (Hillman and Wan, 2005), 
especially in emerging countries. In Ghana, archival data on political directorships is non-
existent. In the same vein, data on corporate contributions to political parties is hard to obtain. 
Though the Political Parties Act 2000 requires all political parties to file annual returns and 
disclose their sources of funds, these annual reports are only accessible after paying a fee 
(Electoral Commission, 2015). Moreover, it is unlikely to obtain detailed information of 
companies that make donations to the political parties since this information is aggregated 
and reported. Therefore, the most possible way to study CPA in Ghana is to examine political 
ties, and since ties are “soft” in form, I used a survey to collect cross-sectional data.  For 
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reasons already mentioned, surveys are the commonest tools used by researchers in Ghana 
(Ofori and Hinson, 2007; Acquaah, 2007; Acquaah, 2011; Kuada and Hinson, 2012; Robson 
et al., 2013; Adomako et al., 2016). Surveys have also been used to study CPA in other 
emerging countries (Peng and Luo, 2000; Puck et al., 2013; White et al., 2015). In the 
absence of archival data, it is acceptable to use self-reported information from reliable 
respondents (Peng and Luo, 2000).  
Cognizant of the fact that objective financial data would strengthen some of my measures, I 
tried to follow earlier studies (Agyei-Mensah, 2016) and use annual reports of companies 
published in Ghana Club 100 (GC100), an annual list of the 100 best performing companies 
in the country compiled by the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) – an agency 
under the Office of the President. However, I found that majority of the companies in GC100 
were not eligible to be included in my sample. This is because the GC100, since its launch in 
1998, has always been dominated by banks, savings and loans companies and microfinance 
institutions. I also contacted the Registrar General’s Department to request access to the 
annual returns filed by firms but my request was not granted for obvious reasons. First, there 
are unresolved issues (anonymity, etc.) about whether the reports of private companies should 
be made available for research purposes. Second, manual record keeping at the registry 
(World Bank, 2005) has made information search cumbersome, if not impossible. Hence the 
registry does not entertain the inconvenience. It is therefore not surprising that studies have 
occasionally drawn sample frames from the Registry (Boso et al., 2013) but have rarely used 
actual financial data from the Registry.      
4.4 Survey Design 
I designed a structured questionnaire containing only closed-ended questions because such 
questions provide uniformity (Babbie, 1990), enhance comparability (Bryman, 2012) and 
make processing easier (Brace, 2013). Open-ended questions could have returned results 
irrelevant to my intent and made coding difficult and time consuming. Such questions also 
require greater effort from respondents, which can put off prospective participants (Bryman, 
2012). However, the danger with close-ended questions is the tendency to overlook some 
important items and miss interesting responses not covered by fixed answers (Bryman, 2012). 
Nonetheless, I employed strategies to ensure that the survey items measured the intended 
constructs. The questions were ordered so that less sensitive ones were asked first. Questions 
on political ties and financial information, the most sensitive set of questions, were asked 
78 | P a g e  
 
later. I used headings to enable respondents make sense out of the questions at every sub-
section (Babbie, 1990).  
The questionnaire development started with a review of survey-based studies. I first searched 
for existing scales which I could adopt or adapt. When I did not find a scale for a construct, I 
resorted to creating one using insights from the literature. In this respect, all scales included 
in the questionnaire are theoretically grounded. Important issues and general rules of thumb 
about ambiguous, long, leading, double-negative and double-barrelled questioning; the use of 
technical jargons; and questionnaire layout, aesthetics and length were all taken into 
consideration when designing the questions (Oppenheim, 1992; Timming, 2009; Dillman et 
al., 2009; Bryman, 2012). I also wrote a cover letter, co-signed by my supervisor, to 
introduce the purpose and significance of the survey. In this letter, our email addresses and 
phone numbers were stated and respondents were encouraged to contact us if they have any 
queries or need clarification.    
After designing the questionnaire, I shared it with some finance and non-market strategy 
experts in the UK, US and Netherlands to check whether the items were appropriate for the 
constructs I wished to examine (Fowler, 1995). This was aimed to help in early identification 
of any validity problems (Galan et al., 2007). Two interesting suggestions were made by the 
experts. First, they recommended that I include questions that ask for objective financial 
information in order to accurately measure my financial variables. Second, they suggested 
that I replace “corporate political activity” with a more simplified term so that the 
respondents can understand. They also mentioned that the word “political” could restrain 
managers and harm response rate. I revised the survey accordingly, by requesting financial 
information and replacing CPA with “business-government relations”, a less “frightening” 
term that is common among Ghanaians.  
After addressing the comments of the experts, I followed best practice by putting the 
questionnaire through three phases of pilot testing in Ghana (Bryman, 2012; Brace, 2013). In 
the first stage, the questionnaire was self-administered to 10 senior managers to test whether 
the questions were understandable and also to test the validity of the questions vis-à-vis the 
Ghanaian environment (Mesquita and Lazzarini, 2008). At this stage, I found that most of the 
respondents skipped questions about Hillman & Hitt’s (1999) 18 items which I intended to 
use to measure political strategies (Hillman and Wan, 2005; Puck et al., 2013). I also found 
that questions asking for financial data (actual amounts) were not answered. To understand 
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why these questions were skipped, I launched the second phase of pilot testing. In this stage, I 
selected and conducted face-to-face interviews with five of the 10 senior managers who 
participated in the first phase. The interviews enabled me to collect more information on (a) 
content validity; (b) ease of comprehension; and (c) discomforting and sensitive questions 
that might lower response rate. Some of the responses, shown below, proved useful as they 
helped me to refine the survey instrument. 
“The questions on business-government relations are very prying. The level of detail 
requested is discomforting. As a matter of fact, it was difficult for me to disclose all of that 
detail regarding our connections with government and our involvement in politics” (Pilot 
Respondent B) 
“We treat accounting information very confidential. As a private company, we don’t disclose 
our financials to third parties except to our regulators or shareholders” (Pilot Respondent F) 
Through the interviews, I realised that the questions respondents disapproved (and hence 
didn’t answer) could harm the quality of responses for other questions or even the response 
rate of the entire survey. Hence, I replaced Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) 18 items with a 
different scale of questions adapted from the literature. I replaced the questions that asked for 
hard financial data with scales. Afterwards, I entered the third phase of piloting where I re-
tested the revised instrument with a different set of 10 senior managers. The response rate 
was good as no questions were skipped. This revised instrument was the final questionnaire 
used for data collection between August 2014 and December 2014 (see Appendix). As best 
practice, the 20 organizations involved in the pilot testing were excluded from the final 
sample (Bryman, 2012).   
4.5 Sample and Data 
There are not many comprehensive databases containing records of firms operating in Ghana 
(Buame, 1996). A couple of databases exist online, but their reliability is questionable as they 
fail to regularly update their records. I therefore used multiple databases to draw the sample, 
just like other studies have done in the past (Robson et al., 2013). Following prior studies, I 
developed the sampling frame from the Association of Ghana Industries Directory (Abor and 
Biekpe, 2007a; Adomako et al., 2016), Ghana Business Directory (Appiah-Adu, 1998; 
Appiah-Adu and Blankson, 1998; Acquaah, 2007; Boso et al., 2013), Ghana company 
register (Adomako et al., 2016) and Ghana Club 100 (Ofori and Hinson, 2007). To ensure 
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that the sampled firms are operational, I verified their tax paying status from a list of 
corporate tax payers obtained from the Ghana Revenue Authority. This verification was 
necessary since many inactive firms exist in Ghanaian company databases.  
To be included in the sample, firms had to meet four important requirements. First, firms 
must be operational in Ghana for at least three years (Appiah-Adu and Blankson, 1998). This 
is to ensure that only “going-concerns” and viable firms are included in the research. Second, 
they must have borrowed from bank(s) in Ghana within the last three years (between 2011 
and 2013). This requirement was used because the survey made reference to the past three 
years as the time frame for responses, a strategy aimed at avoiding biased responses based on 
one-off positive or negative experiences (Mesquita and Lazzarini, 2008; White et al., 2015). 
It was also aimed to capture potential lagged effects and reduce causal ambiguity. A similar 
approach was used by Robson et al. (2013) to explore credit rationing in Ghana. Third, 
contact information (phone number or email) must be available for the firms (Boso et al., 
2013). Fourth, firms must have at least 5 employees. This minimum size requirement does 
not only reflect sample conventions in Ghanaian research (Robson et al., 2013; Boso et al., 
2013), but it also ensures that “one-man” firms which are unlikely to have physical presence 
or offices are excluded from the sample.    
Prior to data collection, I drafted 500 companies to conduct pre-screening, verify physical 
addresses and contact information. During this process, I could not find phone numbers or 
emails addresses for some of the firms. Similarly, physical addresses were barely available, 
as anticipated. After the pre-screening, 368 firms remained. Next, I tried to contact these 
firms on telephone to introduce the study and solicit their participation (Adomako et al., 
2016). Some of the phone numbers contained in the directories did not exist.  Also, some of 
the firms I managed to reach confirmed addresses different from the ones contained in the 
directories. This experience confirmed the obsolescence of the company directories in Ghana. 
On failing to reach a firm, I searched online or contacted associates to assist me locate or 
contact the firm. In the end, 300 companies were reachable and agreed to participate. This 
sample is relatively large when compared with similar studies conducted in Ghana (e.g. 232 
firms for Appiah-Adu and Blankson, 1998; 200 firms for Acquaah, 2007; and 100 firms for 
Kuada and Hinson, 2012). 
Data was collected from Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), Managing Directors (MDs) and 
Directors of Finance and Administration at the sampled firms between August 2014 and 
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December 2014. These executives were chosen as the respondents for a number of reasons. 
First, they are best positioned to have an overall picture of their organizations (Appiah-Adu 
and Blankson, 1998), including information about corporate governance, investment climate 
constraints and debt financing. Second, they have the best appreciation of their firms’ 
political and business connections. Hence, they are usually the main respondents in social 
capital and CPA studies (Peng and Luo, 2000; Acquaah, 2007; Boso et al., 2013). Third, 
political connections are developed by corporate executives and are usually identified and 
defined at the top management level (Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006). During data collection, I 
developed a rota detailing name of firm; date questionnaire was delivered; agreed date for 
collection; follow-up contact number; and date the questionnaire was collected. This enabled 
me to track the data collection exercise.  
It would have been cost effective to administer the survey online, but poor internet access and 
unreliable connectivity in Ghana made this impossible. Moreover, most firms in Ghana do 
not have websites and official email accounts. Furthermore there is no database that contains 
details and email addresses of senior managers in Ghana. According to the World Bank, only 
12.3% of Ghana’s population had internet access in 2013. In this regard, email culture, even 
in large organizations, is poor. Using the post did not also seem a good idea as postal services 
are slow and ineffective in Ghana. Mail delivery to physical addresses is difficult because 
address systems are poorly developed. Most organizations use post boxes which they check 
infrequently. Hence, the questionnaires and cover letters were delivered on-site and dates to 
collect the completed questionnaires were agreed with the respondents (an average of two 
days after delivery). When possible, I collected completed surveys on the day of delivery. 
On-site delivery enabled me to develop relationships and acquaintances which are crucial in 
emerging countries where trust influences survey participation. Surveys were self-
administered so that respondents could have the time to consider their responses or look up 
more information (Brace, 2013). This “lax timing” and convenience is particularly important 
when respondents are asked to provide information for an entire firm. Moreover, self-
administration ensures uniformity and anonymity (Dunning and Cahalan, 1973) and 
eliminates the effect of variability present in interviewer-administration (Bryman, 2012). The 
major downside of self-administration is high risk of missing data and the lack of opportunity 
for respondents to probe the questions. Also, the ease of respondents to read the whole 
questionnaire affects the true independence of the questions (Bryman, 2012; Brace, 2013). 
Nonetheless, as discussed next, I employed tactics to address these issues. 
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Following previous studies, I sought to maximize response to the survey through assurances 
of anonymity and confidentiality (Acquaah, 2007), offers to share results upon completion 
(Chan, 2005) and endorsements (Rochford and Venable, 1995; Hillman, 2003; Hillman and 
Wan, 2005). Often, researchers mistake anonymity and confidentiality to be the same, but 
they are different. Assurances of anonymity mean the researcher will be unable to identify the 
respondents and non-respondents of a survey while confidentiality mean the researcher will 
not divulge information to third parties (Babbie, 1990). In my case, I did not need to know 
the names of the senior managers who completed the questionnaires for their firms, but I 
needed to know which firms responded to the survey so that I can follow up in events of non-
response. Hence, I assured anonymity to the respondents, and confidentiality to the firms. 
Assurances of anonymity are important in Ghana where corporate secrecy is common. 
Due to the lack of objective secondary data for management research in Ghana, most 
researchers use surveys. Consequently, firms are usually ladened and inundated with too 
many questionnaires, resulting in respondent fatigue and nonchalance. It was therefore 
imperative for me to distinguish my survey from the pack, and to do that, I obtained 
endorsements from the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC), the Association of 
Ghana Industries (AGI) and the Ghana Association of Bankers (GAB). These endorsees were 
strategically chosen to give credibility to the study. GIPC, an agency under the Office of the 
President of Ghana, is responsible for promoting private sector development and attracting 
foreign investment into the country. Its role in the Ghanaian business environment is 
significant. AGI is a business group made up of over 1200 small, medium and large scale 
firms operating in the manufacturing industry in Ghana. A powerful pressure group, AGI 
represents its members in policy discourses with government. GAB is the national association 
of banks operating in Ghana. Among its aims are to represent the banking community and to 
ensure a healthy performance of the industry, particularly in the area of credits. Though I 
expected the endorsements to improve response rates, I did not expect the endorsees to 
influence the responses. This is because respondents did not have to answer questions about 
the endorsees or about normative standards and values. Moreover, assurances of anonymity 
were enough to quell any fears of discrimination from the endorsees. A sample of the 
endorsement request is contained in Appendices.  
Following the suggestion of Bryman (2012) to use monetary incentives to improve response 
rates, my supervisor agreed to offer senior managers who completed the survey a 30% 
discount on his executive development programme “Creating Strategic Advantage”. This 
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programme is designed to teach and support managers to develop effective strategies for their 
firms, and we thought it was a relevant incentive for our target respondents. Our discount 
decision was firmly grounded on empirical evidence that monetary inducements encourage 
high response rates (Armstrong, 1975; Hansen, 1980; Zagorsky and Rhoton, 2008). In our 
case, the discount was aimed to have a twin effect: 1) increase participation in the research; 
and 2) create business for Cranfield School of Management through increased enrolment for 
the programme. 
After several visits and phone calls, 188 surveys were collected. Nine surveys were unusable 
because they were poorly completed, leaving a final sample of 179. The final response rate of 
59.6% compares favourably with other studies that have employed surveys in Ghana (e.g. 
53% for Acquaah, 2007 and 37% for Appiah-Adu, 1998) or studies that have used surveys to 
examine CPA (e.g. 12% for Puck, Rogers and Mohr, 2013; 39% for Guo et al., 2014; 31.75% 
for Peng & Luo, 2000). Table 4-3 summarizes the stages of the sampling process. 
Table 4-3 Sampling Process 
Sampling Process Sample Size 
Initial stratified random sample  500 
Sample after removing firms without contact information 368 
Effective sample after telephone solicitations 300 
Final sample after removing incomplete questionnaires 179 
 
4.6 Sample Characteristics 
As shown in Tables 4-4 and 4-5, the sample is made up of firms from 21 industries, and is 
thus highly representative of the private sector landscape in Ghana. The petroleum industry 
dominates with 35 firms, representing 19.6% of the entire sample. Publishing, airline and 
telecommunication industries contribute the lowest with 3 firms each. There are 99 local 
firms (55.3%) and 80 foreign owned firms (44.7%) in the sample. Majority of the firms 
(62%) borrowed from private banks only while only a few appointed a Big Four auditor 
(21.8%) within the three-year period covered by this study. These statistics are expected 
because there are more private banks in Ghana. Also, majority of the firms are expected to 
struggle to pay the high fees charged by top audit firms. It is interesting to note that only 
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22.3% of the firms in the sample have an employee or ex-employee from the financial 
services industry on their corporate boards. Unsurprisingly, 54.2% of the firms indicated that 
the CEO and the Board Chairman is the same person, which supports claims that CEO duality 
is highly prevalent in Ghana (Abor and Biekpe, 2007a; Abor and Fiador, 2013).  
Table 4-4 Industry Distribution of the Sample  
Industry Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Agriculture/Agribusiness 4 2.2 2.2 
Airline 3 1.7 3.9 
Automobile 9 5.0 8.9 
Chemicals 4 2.2 11.2 
Fast-moving Consumer Goods 15 8.4 19.6 
Telecommunications 3 1.7 21.2 
Building & Construction 16 8.9 30.2 
Education 5 2.8 33.0 
Electricity & Energy 6 3.4 36.3 
Foods, Drinks & Beverages 5 2.8 39.1 
Hotels & Hospitality 6 3.4 42.5 
Information Technology 4 2.2 44.7 
Equipment Manufacturing 16 8.9 53.6 
Mining & Minerals 6 3.4 57.0 
Petroleum 35 19.6 76.5 
Pharmaceuticals 9 5.0 81.6 
Rubber & Plastics 7 3.9 85.5 
Packaging, Distribution & Transportation 11 6.1 91.6 
Publishing & Stationery 3 1.7 93.3 
Steel 8 4.5 97.8 
Textiles 4 2.2 100.0 
Total 179 100.0   
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Table 4-5 Sample Frequencies  
Variable Descriptors Frequency Percentage 
Ownership Local 99 55.3 
 
Foreign 80 44.7 
    Borrowing Government Bank 68 38 
 
Private Bank 111 62 
    Auditing Big Four Auditors 39 21.8 
 
Non-Big Four Auditors 140 78.2 
    Board  Financial Representation 40 22.3 
 
Non-Financial Representation 139 77.7 
    Management CEO Duality 97 54.2 
 
CEO/Chair Separation 82 45.8 
    Structure Public Affairs Function 111 62 
  No Public Affairs Function 68 38 
 
Table 4-6 shows some important descriptive information about the sample. On average, firms 
in the sample borrowed from three banks between 2011 and 2013. This statistic depicts how 
multiple banking relationships are the norm in Ghana. Rarely do organizations or individuals 
use the services of a single financial institution. The longest duration of a loan is 60 months 
(5 years) and the average is 16 months (a little over a year). It is interesting to see that firms 
borrow for as short as two months, perhaps not because they want it that way but because of 
high credit rationing in the country. Age of the firms varies from five years to 79 years, with 
a standard dispersion of about 12.5 years. On the average, the sample is 19 years old. The 
highest cost of borrowing is 35% and the average is 24%. A few firms in the sample however 
borrowed from banks for as low as 17%. Nevertheless, cost of debt is generally high. Besides 
the high interest rates charged by the banks, access to finance is limited. The mean score of 
3.44 for access to finance is below the average for the 7-point Likert scale (which is 3.5).  
A look at the mean values for managerial political ties and managerial financial ties reveals 
an interesting but unsurprising phenomenon. The data shows that firms seem to be more 
connected to politicians than they are to bank executives. This is because the power wielded 
by politicians in emerging countries is huge and can affect many outcomes, including loan 
market decisions. In Ghana, political ties can generate idiosyncratic and exclusive benefits, 
hence most individuals or organizations feel “secured” when they have such connections. 
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Table 4-6 Some Important Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Credit relationships 3.82 1.57 2 9 
Duration of loans (months) 16.74 14.49 2 60 
Value of collateral 4.91 1.71 1 7 
Firm Performance 4.96 1.13 2.57 6.86 
Managerial Political Ties 3.90 2.19 1 7 
Managerial Financial Ties 3.03 0.95 1 7 
Institutional Holding 2.08 1.51 1 5.83 
Regulation 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Interest Rate 0.24 0.04 0.17 0.35 
Board Independence 0.15 0.13 0 0.5 
Firm Size 4.56 0.62 3.09 5.86 
Firm Age 19.17 12.62 5 79 
Social Network Expansion 1.88 1.39 1 6 
Access to Finance 3.44 1.58 1 7 
Financial Reporting Quality 5.83 1.19 1 7 
Non-financial Disclosure 2.00 0.74 1 4.5 
 
4.7 Addressing Common Method Variance 
In survey research, Common Method Variance (CMV) is an important concern (Sea-Jin et al., 
2010). CMV is defined as “variance that is attributable to the measurement method rather 
than to the constructs the measures represent” (Podsakoff et al., 2003, p.879). Its presence 
can generate Type I and Type II errors and lead to systematic measurement errors. I 
addressed common method variance (CMV) by using seven methods at different stages of the 
study – questionnaire design, administration, and data analysis. First, because of the financial 
divergence potential (Hadani and Schuler, 2013; Guedhami et al., 2014), cronyism and 
corruption (Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Gul, 2006) 
associated with political ties, firms might be unwilling to disclose their political ties. I was 
therefore very careful with the wording of the questions. As much as possible, questions were 
diligently phrased to reduce social desirability bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003). I also availed my 
questionnaire for peer and expert evaluations, and ensured that ambiguous and unfamiliar 
terms were excluded (Harrison et al., 1996; Lindell and Whitney, 2001). Besides carefully 
wording the questions, I chose self-administration over interviewer-administration in order to 
reduce the high incidence of social desirability bias that is often associated with face-to-face 
interviews (Kellner, 2004; Brace, 2013). 
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Second, I measured my main independent and dependent variables using different scale ends 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). While a Likert scale was used to measure political ties, cost of debt 
was measured as a rate (%). In some cases, I measured the same variable or construct using 
different criteria (Galan et al., 2007). For instance, I measured cost of debt as a rate (%) and 
also as a perceptual measure in order to avoid potential CMV since my independent variable 
is a perceptual measure (Sea-Jin et al., 2010). Additionally, the questions were ordered to 
reduce the likelihood of CMV across the independent, dependent and control variables 
(Barden et al., 2005). By ensuring that questions about the dependent and independent 
variables do not follow sequentially, I made it difficult for respondents to “create” variable 
correlations that could bias their responses (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2005; Sea-Jin et al., 
2010). 
Third, I followed earlier suggestions and reverse-phrased some of the questions (Field, 2013) 
by adding negative particles such as “not” and “no” (Swain et al., 2008) in order to reduce 
acquiescence bias whereby respondents agree or disagree with statements regardless of 
content or without scrutiny (Winkler et al., 1982). In essence, when all statements are 
positively-worded, there is a high tendency for yea-saying respondents to agree than to 
disagree (Wang et al., 2015). Reverse-phrasing works like a cognitive “speed ramp” which 
requires respondents to read more carefully (Kamoen et al., 2011) and be more controlled in 
their cognitive processing (Hinkin, 1995). Though some studies argue that reverse phrasing 
or negation of questionnaire items can lead to mis-response (Swain et al., 2008) and 
reliability problems (Barnette, 2000), there is evidence to show that it improves internal 
consistency by preventing biases in mean scores (Merritt, 2012), hence its acceptance and 
popular use in survey research (Allen and Meyer, 1990; Marsh, 1996; Billiet and McClendon, 
2000). I suspected a high rate of acquiescence bias in Ghana because of the increased use of 
questionnaires and the expected respondent fatigue, thus my decision to negate some of the 
items so that respondents will read the questions more carefully.   
Fourth, I delivered two surveys, to be independently completed by two different managers 
(CEOs and the deputies), to each sampled firm (Lee and Miller, 1999) in order to control for 
common rater biases (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Only 10 firms returned both questionnaires and 
inter-rater agreements were measured using Cohen’s kappa (Cohen, 1960). The kappa 
statistic for all ten firms was statistically significant, and ranged from .818 to .944, indicating 
that responding managers had a “very good” agreement (Altman, 1991). Responses were thus 
averaged to derive a representative response for each of those 10 firms. In general, the high 
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level of agreement suggests that the remaining data from single respondents is reliable, as has 
been shown by other studies (Miller et al., 1997; Peng and Luo, 2000; Barden et al., 2005; 
White et al., 2015). In Ghana, single-respondents are commonly used to examine firm-level 
issues (Acquaah, 2007; Ofori and Hinson, 2007; Boso et al., 2013). In my case, I believe 
using multi-respondents per firm was out of the “norm”.  
Fifth and related to the above, I advised that while questions on political and social ties, 
governance and institutional risk should be answered by CEOs/MDs or their deputies, 
questions requesting financial information should be answered by financial controllers, 
finance directors or accountants (Acquaah, 2007). This approach followed recommendations 
to reduce single-rater bias by sourcing information on dependent, independent and control 
variables from different sources (Carraher et al., 2008; Sea-Jin et al., 2010).   
Sixth, even though it was difficult to obtain secondary data, I triangulated some of the 
primary data using information from secondary sources. In management research, some 
topics can only be studied using perceptual measures, therefore limiting data options (Doty et 
al., 1993). For political ties, that was the case; triangulation was impossible in Ghana. But for 
financial measures, I tried to collect objective data and I was able to do this for the few 
publicly listed firms in my sample. With little success, I was also able to convince a few 
private firms to allow me see their annual report(s) on the spot.   
Finally, the inclusion of moderation effects in most of my hypotheses reduces the effect of 
CMV. According to management scholars and methodologists, complex interactions are not 
predicted by CMV (Doty et al., 1993; Dooley and Fryxell, 1999). Complex relationships are 
likely to be out of respondents’ cognitive maps (Harrison et al., 1996). Also, they are less 
likely to be part of respondents’ theories-in-use (Sea-Jin et al., 2010). Because respondents 
are not able to guess the interactions that will be tested, they are not able to respond in a 
socially desirable matter (Murray et al., 2005) and this reduces the likelihood of CMV (Aiken 
and West, 1991).     
I tested for non-response bias using the approach of Armstrong and Overton (1977) whereby 
I compared early and late-arriving completed surveys. I defined late-arriving questionnaires 
as those completed surveys I obtained after Week 10 of the data collection exercise. I had to 
constantly follow up to get them back. In some cases, I had to re-deliver questionnaires 
because the respondents could not locate the ones I delivered to them earlier. T-tests revealed 
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no significant difference for any key items or variables, thus ruling out the existence of 
systemic non-response bias.  
4.8 Variables and Measures 
Mentioned earlier, objective data is unavailable or difficult to obtain in emerging countries 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000), particularly when it relates to financial performance (Amoako-
Gyampah and Boye, 2001) or political activity. In Ghana particularly, objective data is 
limited or unavailable because most of the firms are privately owned and do not provide 
information to the public; only 42 companies are listed on the stock exchange.  I therefore 
relied on self-reported data for two reasons. First, subjective data is appropriate in situations 
where objective data is unavailable (Peng and Luo, 2000; Acquaah, 2007). Second, there is 
usually a strong and significant positive correlation between objective and subjective data 
(Dess and Robinson, 1984). In this respect, I adapted the measures in the survey from 
scholarly, peer-reviewed, published studies, and triangulated the primary data with secondary 
data where possible. Following previous survey-based studies conducted in Ghana (Acquaah, 
2007; Kuada and Hinson, 2012; Boso et al., 2013; Adomako et al., 2016), all perceptual 
scales were measured on a seven-point Likert scale, and the scores of the items were 
averaged to create composite variables. Firms were asked to provide average responses for 
the past three years (2011 to 2013) in order to help minimize the effect of annual fluctuations 
(Roth, 1992) and annual variability in perceptions and experiences (Mesquita and Lazzarini, 
2008)  
In the next sections, I describe the variables and measures that have been used in all three 
empirical analyses of this thesis. To make the presentation clearer, the variables have been 
grouped under three headings: 1) Dependent Variables; 2) Independent variables; and 3) 
Control variables. A summary of these variables can be found in Table 4-7.  
4.8.1 Dependent Variables  
Cost of Debt: The corporate bond market in Ghana is barely existent. Just as it pertains in 
most emerging countries (Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Fraser et al., 2006), the main source of 
financing for firms in Ghana is bank borrowing. On my last check in February 2016, only two 
corporate bonds were traded on the Ghana Stock Exchange. Following Dygryse and van 
Cayseele (2000), Bliss & Gul (2012), and Infante and Piazza (2014), I measured cost of debt 
as the interest rate firms are charged when they borrow. Respondents (financial directors and 
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accountants) were asked to state their firms’ three-year average interest rate on loans obtained 
from banks operating in Ghana (converted to decimal units for multivariate analysis). As 
mentioned previously, a Likert was also used to measure perceptions of level of interest rates. 
After determining that the numerical interest rates and perceptual level of interest rates are 
significantly and positively correlated, I decided to use the numerical rate. Any loans from 
banks outside of Ghana were excluded. Of course, local political connections could be useful 
for international borrowing but conventional wisdom holds that local political patronage 
yields stronger financing benefits on home turf (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006). 
Considering how interest rate regimes differ across the world, excluding foreign borrowing 
allowed for a robust and fair comparison across the firms.  
Access to Finance: Access to finance (α = 0.96) is a big impediment to private sector 
development in emerging countries, particularly in Africa (Aryeetey, 1998; African 
Development Bank, 2013). Following previous studies, I measured this variable using four 
items. First, two items (positive and negative) were taken from Wiklund and Shepherd (2003; 
2005) to measure the extent to which managers are satisfied with their firms’ access to debt 
finance and the adequacy of debt finance for their firm’s development. These items have been 
used in other studies (Adomako et al., 2016). Second, drawing on credit rationing literature 
(Jaffee and Russell, 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), it became apparent that when access to 
finance is constrained and credit is being rationed, banks either: 1) refuse to grant credit; 2) 
grant credit but reduce the amount; or 3) grant the full amount. Since all firms in the sample 
have borrowed in the last three years, the first option is not relevant to this study, but the 
second and third options are. I therefore adapted one item from Robson et al. (2013) to 
measure the extent to which firms are given the full loan amounts they apply for. Loan 
proceeds less than the full amount will suggest credit rationing. Third, when firms harbour 
fears that their loan applications will be rejected, they become discouraged to apply for credit 
(Kon and Storey, 2003; Han et al., 2009). This negative feeling impedes access to finance; 
hence I developed a subjective item from Raturi and Swamy (1999) to measure the extent to 
which firms are discouraged to apply for bank loans due to fears of refusal. All four items for 
this variable are measured on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from (1) “strongly disagree” 
to (7) “strongly agree”.   
Institutional Risk Exposure: Drawing on previous studies (Schwens et al., 2011; Puck et al., 
2013) and incorporating insights from The World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) and the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) methodology, I developed an 11-item scale for 
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Institutional Risk Exposure (α = 0.90). Firms were asked to indicate the extent to which 
certain political, economic and legal factors are obstacles to their operations, on a scale 
ranging from (1) “minor obstacle” to (7) “major obstacle”. While previous studies, 
particularly international business (IB) studies have treated institutional risk at the country or 
industry level (see Schwens et al., 2011), I conceptualized and operationalized this construct 
at the firm level for a salient reason. Insights from resource-based view theory suggest that 
firms are not equally resourced; while some are resource-rich, others are resource-
constrained. Due to this heterogeneity, perceptions or exposure to business barriers will differ 
among firms even if they operate in the same country or industry. More precisely, varying 
embeddedness in political networks or implementation of CSR practices will cause firms to 
have different views of their business environments. Using this same logic, Wocke and 
Medley (2015) examined uncertainty of firms in the South African Health Sector. Puck and 
colleagues (2013) also examined the exposure of multinational firms in emerging countries. 
Both studies measured risk exposure as a firm-level variable, not a national or industry-level 
variable.   
4.8.2 Independent Variables  
Managerial Political Ties: The study initially intended to use Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) 18 
items as applied by other studies (Hillman and Wan, 2005; Puck et al., 2013) to measure 
political strategies but pilot studies and interviews revealed that firms in Ghana were 
uncomfortable with the level of detail requested or exposed by the items, and therefore did 
not respond to the questions. Hence I followed Peng & Luo (2000), Li, Poppo, & Zhou 
(2008b) and Guo et al. (2014) and developed a three-item scale to measure Managerial 
political ties (α = 0.94). Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with (a) 
investing in building ties with government officials (b) spending time dealing with 
government officials and (c) making efforts to ensure good relations with government 
officials. These were measured on a scale ranging from (1) “strongly disagree” to (7) 
“strongly agree”. 
Managerial Financial Ties: This variable is original and has not been previously used. The 
measures were therefore developed through insights from the literature. The closest variable 
to financial ties is business ties which previous studies measure as the extent to which 
managers interact with counterparts including suppliers, competitors, customers and 
distributors (Peng and Luo, 2000; Yiu et al., 2007; Boso et al., 2013). This business ties 
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measure has little relevance for my research because it is generic. With my focus on ties to 
managers in the financial services industry, I measured managerial financial ties (α = 0.87) 
by asking respondents to indicate the extent to which they have developed relationships with 
managers of various institutions including commercial banks, mutual funds, pension funds 
and the central bank on a scale from (1) “very little” to (7) “very much”.  
Corporate Social Responsibility: CSR is a non-market strategy which can complement CPA 
in risk reduction (Hond et al., 2014; Liedong et al., 2015). Since actual measures of CSR are 
difficult to obtain (Carroll, 2000), particularly in emerging countries, I measured CSR (α = 
0.80) by adopting the subjective items and scale developed by Turker (2009). This scale 
comprehensively captures firms’ CSR to society, natural environment, future generations, 
employees, customers and government. It has been widely used by other researchers (cited by 
445 studies as of February 2016). Respondents were asked to indicate their level of 
agreement with the items on a scale ranging from (1) “strongly disagree” to (7) “strongly 
agree”.   
Government-owned bank, Big Four Auditor, PA Function, and Financial representation 
were defined by dummy variables, coded 1 for respectively borrowing from government-
owned banks, appointing Big Four auditors, having a public/government affairs department, 
and having a past or current employee of the financial services industry on the corporate 
board. For government-bank borrowing, firms were asked to indicate whether they have 
borrowed from the three State-owned banks (Ghana Commercial Bank, Agricultural 
Development Bank and National Investment Bank) within the past three years. For Big Four 
variable, firms were asked to indicate whether or not they have sought the services of any of 
the Big Four auditors (PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Deloitte and Ernst & Young) within 
the past three years. To pry deeper into government bank borrowing and financial 
representation, firms were asked to state the proportion of loans (in relation to total loans) 
they obtained from State-owned banks. They were also asked to indicate the number of board 
members with financial experience and their cumulative wealth of financial experience. 
Regulation: Following Hadani & Schuler (2013), regulation is defined by a dummy, coded 1 
for firms operating in highly regulated industries (telecommunications, mining, oil and gas, 
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, utilities). 
Social Network Expansion: The desire by banks to expand their social networks, particularly 
their networks of politicians, can mediate the relationship between political ties, access to 
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finance and cost of debt. Social network expansion (α = 0.96) is an original variable that has 
not been used in previous studies. To measure it, I asked respondents to indicate how 
frequent banks relate with their firms in the following ways: a) soliciting referrals and 
introductions to elected officials from their firm’s executives, b) requesting direct support 
from their firm’s executives in order to affect a policy issue, and 3) utilizing the networks of 
their firm’s executives to mobilize grassroots support for a policy issue. These were measured 
on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from (1) “strongly disagree” to (7) “strongly agree”. 
Financial Reporting Quality: There is rampant non-compliance in filing annual returns by 
firms in Ghana. There are also concerns about the quality of financial reporting in connected 
firms. This variable therefore aims to capture the responsibility of firms to stakeholders, 
including government and investors. There is no consensual definition of financial reporting 
quality (Chen et al., 2011). Prior studies have measured reporting quality (α = 0.91) by 
studying accounting data, specifically accruals quality (Garrett et al., 2014; Filip et al., 2015; 
Abbott et al., 2016), but due the absence of accounting data, I measured this variable using a 
scale of statements developed from the literature. Defining reporting quality as ‘the 
usefulness of financial statements to investors, creditors, managers, and all other parties 
contracting with the firm” (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005, p.84) and acknowledging the 
different elements of reporting quality (Givoly et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2011), I asked firms 
to indicate their level of agreement with statements about a) financial reports meeting 
reporting standards; b) financial reports prepared in a timely manner; c) expenditure and 
losses recognized immediately they occur; and d) revenues deferred until they are verified. 
Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement to the statements on a scale 
ranging from (1) “strongly disagree” to (7) “strongly agree”. My measurement of this 
variable covers the key issues in financial reporting quality, including earnings management, 
accounting conservatism and reporting standards (Givoly et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2011), and 
satisfies the requirement that no single item can capture reporting quality (Givoly et al., 
2010). Putting mediation into perspective, quality reporting is expected to lead to lower cost 
of debt.    
Non-Financial Disclosure: A scan of the literature revealed that there is no existing scale for 
measuring non-financial disclosure. Guided by EU Non-financial reporting guidelines, UN 
Global Compact, and OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, I developed an 
original measure for this variable (α = 0.86). Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to 
which they agree that their firms voluntarily disclose information on related party 
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transactions, conflicts of interests, external risk assessments, and anticorruption and bribery. 
The items were measured using a scale ranging from (1) “strongly disagree” to (7) “strongly 
agree”. 
Board Independence: Following previous studies (Abor and Biekpe, 2007a; Kyereboah-
Coleman and Amidu, 2008; Bokpin, 2009; Bokpin and Isshaq, 2009; Abor and Fiador, 2013), 
I defined board independence as the ratio of independent/non-executive directors to total 
number of board members. Respondents were asked to state the size of the corporate board 
and the number of non-executive directors on the board. CEO duality was measured as a 
dummy variable, taking the value of 1 for firms with CEO and board chairperson positions 
occupied by an individual and 0 if otherwise. 
4.8.3 Contingency/Control Variables  
I controlled for a number of variables that can influence: 1) firms’ ability to acquire low cost 
debt, and 2) firms exposure to institutional risk exposure. The following control/contingency 
variables are used in this thesis. While some apply to all three empirical analyses, others are 
specific to particular studies. 
Financial Performance: Strong financial performance can reduce cost of debt for firms. I 
tested this by including the variable Financial Performance (α = 0.93). Private firms in 
Ghana and in other emerging countries are often reluctant to provide financial information 
(Amoako-Gyampah and Boye, 2001). Like previous researchers (Acquaah, 2007), my request 
for objective financial data was unsuccessful. I therefore followed other studies (Li and 
Zhang, 2007; Acquaah, 2007; Guo et al., 2014) and asked respondents to rate the 
performance of their firms vis-à-vis their competitors on seven items (return on assets, return 
on equity, return on sales, growth in productivity, growth in market share, growth in sales and 
growth in net income) measured on a scale ranging from (1) “much worse” to (7) “much 
better”. This approach of using subjective measures of firm performance is popular in survey 
research (Park and Luo, 2001; Murray et al., 2005; Boso et al., 2013). By asking firms to 
compare themselves to their competitors, industry effects are minimized (Dess et al., 1990). It 
is worth reiterating that the financial performance data was solicited from a different set of 
respondents (finance directors and accountants) in order to minimize common method 
variance. 
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Institutional Shareholders: Institutional shareholders, through their large shareholdings, are 
able to monitor firms, take corrective actions, and reduce agency costs (Schleifer and Vishny, 
1986). Managers of firms that have large institutional shareholding are more likely to focus 
on shareholder wealth and less likely to seek personal gains (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; 
Almazan et al., 2005). Consequently, institutional shareholding improves firm performance 
(Smith, 1996; Elyasiani and Jia, 2010) and reduces cost of debt (Elyasiani et al., 2010). The 
large stakes of institutional shareholders also motivates them to help their firms succeed, 
which includes providing the necessary guidance or assistance for the firms to overcome 
institutional constraints and risks. I therefore included Institutional ownership (α = 0.94) as a 
control variable in all three empirical studies. Due to the absence of objective data which 
most studies use to measure institutional ownership (Hoskisson et al., 2002; Goranova et al., 
2010; Hsiang-Lan et al., 2014), I measured this variable by asking respondents to indicate the 
extent to which Pension Funds, Mutual Funds, Insurance companies, Charities, and Private 
Equity Firms hold shares in their companies on a Likert scale ranging from (1) “very low” to 
(7) “very high”. The typology of institutional investors used for the scale was adapted from 
Bennett et al. (2003). With little success, I also asked respondents to state the total percentage 
of shares owned by institutions (David et al., 2001). 
Credit Relationships: As embeddedness in dense networks facilitate information exchange 
and facilitate access to finance (Uzzi, 1997; Uzzi, 1999), firms that borrow from multiple 
banks may benefit low interest rates since competition between the banks may reduce rent 
extraction and prevent a single bank from charging above-market rates (Von Thadden, 1994; 
Dygryse and Van Cayseele, 2000). Conversely, multiple borrowing relationships may signal 
low borrower quality (Bris and Welch, 2005) and can lead to high interest rates. I measured 
credit relationships by asking respondents to state the number of banks in Ghana from which 
their firms have borrowed funds. 
Collateral Value: Collaterals provide security for loans. Highly valued collaterals could 
therefore improve access to finance and reduce interest rates (Talavera et al., 2012; Cull et 
al., 2015). Due to the general lack of data on collateral values, previous studies have used 
dummies (Dygryse and Van Cayseele, 2000; Chen et al., 2014) and total fixed assets 
(Talavera et al., 2012) or ratio of fixed assets to total assets (Yeh et al., 2013) as proxies for 
collateral. In my study, a dummy would not be useful since almost all firms in Ghana have to 
pledge collateral for loans. Also, financial data on total assets was unavailable. I therefore 
measured Collateral value by asking respondents to indicate the perceived value of collateral 
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(in relation to total assets) their firms pledged for loans on a scale from (1) “very low” to (7) 
“very high”.  
Ownership: Firm ownership can have implications for access to finance and exposure to risk. 
In emerging countries, foreign firms or subsidiaries of foreign firms are expected to be better 
governed than local firms. This expectation is grounded in political-CSR whereby 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) promote institutional entrepreneurship and development 
(Scherer and Palazzo, 2011; Frynas and Stephens, 2015). They also have access to finance in 
their home countries, and hence should not rely much on local sources of finance in host 
countries. Banks will therefore treat foreign firms favourably. Conversely, the liability of 
foreignness is well documented in international business literature (Bell et al., 2012; Wocke 
and Moodley, 2015). Among other things, it is believed that foreign firms have a high 
exposure to risk, particularly discrimination and expropriation (Puck et al., 2013). To account 
for the effects of foreignness, I included Ownership which was defined by a dummy variable, 
coded 1 for foreign firms (more than 50% of the firm held by a foreign investor) and 0 for 
local firms (50% or more of the firm held by a local investor).  
Firm Age: Firm age can facilitate the acquisition of knowledge and experience (a steep 
learning curve) which can help reduce cost of debt. Moreover, long existence can enable 
firms to build long-term relationships with lenders or develop good credit histories (Bliss and 
Gul, 2012). Firm age has also been used as a proxy for visibility (Hansen and Mitchell, 
2000), credibility (Hillman et al., 1999; Hillman, 2003), and reputation (Boddewyn and 
Brewer, 1994; Dygryse and Van Cayseele, 2000), all of which positively affect firm 
performance (Wocke and Moodley, 2015) and improve access to finance. With respect to risk 
exposure, longevity can enable a firm develop important relationships (Acquaah, 2007) and 
build a strong constituency (Keim and Baysinger, 1988) which can be used to overcome 
institutional constraints and other liabilities (Wocke and Moodley, 2015). Following previous 
studies (Hillman, 2003; Acquaah, 2007; Wocke and Moodley, 2015), I measured Age as the 
number of years the firm has been operational in Ghana.  
Firm Size: Size has implications for all three empirical analyses of this thesis. First, size is a 
proxy for information opaqueness and information asymmetry (Han et al., 2009). As the 
collection of private information for small firms is costly (Ang, 1991), cost of debt is 
expected to be high. Second, size is an antecedent of CPA (Hillman et al., 2004) and a proxy 
for resource endowment (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Hillman and Hitt, 1999). Not only 
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does the possession of vast resources improve creditworthiness, but it also helps firms to 
engage with politicians in order to reduce uncertainty (Hillman, 2003). Following previous 
studies (Peng and Luo, 2000; Murray et al., 2005; Acquaah, 2007; Yiu et al., 2007; Boso et 
al., 2013), Firm size was operationalized as the logarithm of the number of employees. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4-7 here. See page 102 
------------------------------------------------ 
4.9 Construct Validity and Reliability  
Validity and reliability are important issues that need to be addressed in research. In simple 
terms, reliability refers to the consistency of a measure of a concept while validity refers to 
how well an indicator (or set of indicators) gauge or measure a concept (Bryman, 2012). 
Because survey studies usually measure latent constructs using scales of multiple items, 
questionnaires must be robustly designed (Brace, 2013). I performed several tests to ensure 
that that my constructs are reliable and valid. First and prior to statistical tests, most of the 
measures for the constructs were obtained, adapted or developed from the literature, thus 
ensuring reliability and validity (Murray et al., 2005). I also insisted that only senior 
managers completed the questionnaire. This approach during the survey administration stage 
was to ensure that accurate information is collected from appropriate respondents (Peng and 
Luo, 2000). On the average, respondents worked at their respective companies for 6.5 years, 
suggesting that they are knowledgeable of their firms’ debt profile and political ties. 
Second, I performed an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) on all relevant survey items using 
the Varimax (orthogonal) rotation method to measure construct validity (Acquaah, 2007), 
item appropriateness (White et al., 2015) and unidimensionality of the constructs and their 
measurement items (Murray et al., 2005; Field, 2013). I started by assessing the individual 
factor structure for the constructs. To do this, I performed EFA on each and every construct 
(Yiu et al., 2007). As shown in Table 4-8, all items loaded significantly on their underlying 
factors. The amounts of variance explained by the items are high, ranging from 67.58% to 
93.02%. Internal consistency of the items was measured for all scales using Cronbach’s 
alpha. A Cronbach coefficient of 0.70 was typically considered adequate (Nunnally, 1978), 
but this minimum acceptable reliability was revised upwards to 0.80 (Nunnally, 1993). All of 
the scales have reliability scores even above the revised threshold (the lowest and highest 
Cronbach alphas are 0.86 and 0.96 respectively).  
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----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4-8 here. See page 103 
------------------------------------------------ 
Following the EFA on individual constructs, I performed a global EFA on the major 
constructs to assess their true uniqueness and unidimensionality (Acquaah, 2007; White et al., 
2015). This time, all items relating to the main constructs were included in the factor analysis. 
Following Kaiser’s (1960) criterion which has become the default in most statistical software 
packages and the convention in EFA (Field, 2013), only factors with eigenvalues of 1 and 
above were retained. The results, in Table 4-9, show that the items load on seven distinct 
factors (constructs) as previously defined, with loadings ranging from 0.74 to 0.91. These 
loading are high above the conventional cut-off of 0.40 used or suggested by researchers 
(Field, 2013; White et al., 2015). Sample size can affect the accuracy of EFA results (Comrey 
and Lee, 1992). I therefore assessed the adequacy of the sample to provide a stable factor 
solution by studying the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy (Kaiser, 
1970). KMO measures the ratio of the squared correlations to the squared partial correlations 
between variables. Values closer to 1 indicate that an adequate factor solution can be 
obtained from the sample (Field, 2013). The KMO statistic was 0.82, which is well above the 
recommended 0.50 (Kaiser, 1974). Moreover, as the factor loadings are above 0.60, the 
sample is adequate and reliable (Guadagnoli and Velicer, 1988). I further performed the 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity to confirm that the correlation matrix of the data is significantly 
different from an identity matrix. In sum, high loadings, coupled with high Cronbach alphas, 
support convergent validity and show that the measurement items used in the survey are 
reliable (Hair et al., 1998).   
Even though the global EFA analysis shows that one factor does not emerge from the data 
and hence suggests common method variance is not a problem, I still performed the 
Harman’s (1967) single factor test by loading the dependent and independent variables into 
another EFA. If CMV is present, one factor is expected to emerge from the EFA or one factor 
is expected to account for much of the variance in the data (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). The 
EFA revealed multiple factors, with Factor 1 accounting for 15.41% of the variance. This 
shows that variance in the data cannot be attributed to a single factor (Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
I also observed the scree plot of the EFA (Li and Zhang, 2007) to further confirm the factor 
structure of the survey, and to ensure that CMV is not a problem. 
 
99 | P a g e  
 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4-9 here. See page 104 
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Third, I subjected the identified factor structure of the constructs to hypothesis testing by 
performing Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). CFA is different from exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA) because it is theory-driven. In this respect, CFA requires a researcher to 
develop hypotheses about factor structures prior to any statistical analysis. In survey studies, 
researchers first explore factor structures using EFA before they employ CFA techniques to 
confirm or check the consistence of the measurement items underlying a factor. Following 
prior studies and accepted conventions in survey research (Murray et al., 2005; Boso et al., 
2013; White et al., 2015), I tested the priori hypotheses about the relatedness of the survey 
items to the constructs. In CFA, besides checking the fit statistics of the measurement 
models, two important statistics of reliability are worth calculating. They are: 1) Average 
Variance Extracted; and 2) Composite Reliability.  
Composite reliability (CR) is a measure of the overall reliability of a construct (Fornell and 
Larcker, 1981). It estimates the extent to which a set of items share in the measurement of a 
latent construct (Hair et al., 1998). In essence, CR is a measure of the reliability of a set of 
heterogeneous but similar items. Traditional reliability measures such as the Cronbach alpha 
are obtained under assumptions that all factor loadings and error variances are constrained to 
be equal to 1, and thus may under or overestimate reliability (Raykov, 1997; Raykov, 1998; 
Raykov, 2001). For instance, the Cronbach alpha is typically interpreted as a lower-bound 
estimate of reliability, and could be misleading if constructs are multidimensional (Miller, 
1995). CR varies from 0 to 1, where high scores denote strong reliability. Conventionally, a 
reliability of 0.70 is considered adequate. Following earlier studies (Murray et al., 2005; Yiu 
et al., 2007), I used the approach of Fornell and Larcker (1981) to compute CR: 
CR =  
(∑ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔)2
(∑ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔)
2
+(∑ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟)
 
Average Variance Extracted (AVE) measures the amount of variance captured by the 
measurement items of a construct in relation to the variance caused by random measurement 
error (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). Similar to CR, AVE varies from 0 to 1. Extracted 
variances above 0.50 indicate that the measurement items and the construct are valid (Fornell 
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and Larcker, 1981; Dillon and Goldstein, 1984; Bagozzi, 1991). I used the approach of 
Fornell and Larcker (1981) to compute AVE: 
  AVE =  
∑(𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔2)
∑(𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔2)+∑(𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟) 
 
As shown in Table 4.10, the computed CR and AVE for the constructs are above the 
generally accepted thresholds of 0.70 (for CR) and 0.50 (for AVE) (Fornell and Larcker, 
1981; Hair et al., 1998). These results confirm that the measures and constructs are reliable 
for use in further analyses. Measurement models were specified for all the empirical studies 
of this thesis. The fit statistics (CFI, NFI, IFI, and RMSEA) and X
2 
significance were 
interpreted according to generally accepted rules (Bentler and Bonett, 1980; Anderson and 
Gerbing, 1988). The results show that the models fit the data. High factor loadings and high 
AVE values (above construct correlations) provide support for convergent validity and 
discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker, 1981; Murray et al., 2005).  
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4-10 here. See page 105 
------------------------------------------------ 
4.10 Overview of Analytical Approach 
The questionnaires were coded and entered into IBM’s Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences (SPSS) for onward analysis. The sample size of 179 is large enough for regression 
analysis, per the rule of thumb of 10 cases for each predictor (Field, 2013). I applied the 
sample size assumption of the central limit theorem and employed parametric analysis 
(Lumley et al., 2002; Field, 2013). To establish association between dependent and 
independent variables, hierarchical multiple, moderated and mediated regression analyses 
were performed. 
In order to ensure robustness of the Models, I performed casewise diagnostics to check the 
residuals for bias using a stringent criterion of ±2 instead of the default criterion of ±3 in 
SPSS. The results show that around 95% of the cases have standardized residuals within the 
criterion, a finding consistent with ordinary samples (Field, 2013). I also checked whether 
any cases exert undue influence over the parameters of the Models by analysing Cook’s 
distances (Cook and Weisberg, 1982), Mahalanobis distances (Barnett and Lewis, 1978) and 
leverage (Stevens, 2002). I found no influential cases. As recommended in moderated 
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regressions, I mean centred the variables (lower-order terms) before creating the interactions 
(higher-order terms) (Aiken and West, 1991; Cohen et al., 2003). There were no problems of 
multicollinearity as Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) were less than 10 (Bowerman and 
O'Connell, 1990; Hair et al., 1998; Field, 2013). 
Additionally, I checked for problems of endogeneity by measuring autocorrelation of the 
residuals of the predictor variables using the Durbin-Watson test (Durbin and Watson, 1951). 
The result for all the Models is closer to 2, indicating that serial correlation does not affect the 
robustness of the findings (Field, 2013). This approach showed that endogeneity from auto-
regression or autocorrelation does not affect the findings of this thesis.  
To further check the robustness of the models and to avoid any negative implications of 
violating normality and homoscedasticity assumptions, I re-run the regressions by performing 
bootstrapping  using 1000 bootstrapped samples and estimating a 95% bias corrected and 
accelerated confidence interval for the coefficients (Elfron and Tibshirani, 1993; Wright et 
al., 2011). The significance of the coefficients did not change dramatically in the 
bootstrapped Models, indicating that the coefficients are an accurate estimate of the true 
population (Field, 2013). 
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Table 4-7 Summary of Variables and Measures  
Variable  Measure Source  
Managerial Political Ties Three-item scale (see questionnaire in Appendix) Peng & Luo (2000); Guo et al. (2014); 
Li et al. (2008) 
Managerial Financial ties Four-item scale (see questionnaire  in Appendix) Original, but developed from literature 
(Peng and Luo, 2000; Yiu et al., 2007; 
Boso et al., 2013) 
Cost of Debt Three-year average interest rate on loans  Dygryse and van Cayseele (2000); Bliss 
& Gul (2012); Infante and Piazza (2014) 
Access to Finance Four item scale (see Appendix Wiklund and Shepherd (2003; 2005); 
Robson et al. (2013); Raturi and Swamy 
(1999) 
Institutional Risk Exposure 11-item scale (See questionnaire in Appendix) Schwens et al. (2011); Puck et al. 
(2013); World Bank Enterprise Survey 
(WBES); International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) methodology 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
18-item scale (See questionnaire  in Appendix) Turker (2009) 
Government-bank borrowing Binary whereby 1 = borrowing from State-owned 
banks and 0 = otherwise 
Khwaja & Mian (2005) 
Big Four Auditor Binary whereby 1 = audited by a Big Four firm  
and 0 = otherwise 
Developed from literature (Effiezal et 
al., 2011; Guedhami et al., 2014) 
PA Function Binary whereby 1 = having a public affairs 
department and 0 = otherwise 
Developed from literature (Lawton et 
al., 2014) 
Financial Representation Binary whereby 1 = having a financial expert on 
the board and 0 = otherwise 
Developed from literature (Hillman, 
2005) 
Size of Financial 
Representation 
Number of Financial Representatives Developed from literature (Stearns and 
Mizruchi, 1993; Sisli-Ciamarra, 2012) 
Depth of Financial 
Representation 
Combined experience (years) of Financial 
Representatives 
Developed from literature (Stearns and 
Mizruchi, 1993; Sisli-Ciamarra, 2012) 
Regulation Binary whereby 1 = highly regulated industry and 
0 = otherwise 
Hadani & Schuler (2013) 
Social Network Expansion Three-item measure (see questionnaire in 
Appendix) 
Original, but developed from literature 
(Hillman, 2005; Houston et al., 2014) 
Financial Reporting Quality Four-item scale (see questionnaire in Appendix) Original, but developed from literature 
(Givoly et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2011) 
Non-financial Disclosure Four-item scale (see questionnaire in Appendix) Original, but developed from literature 
(EU Non-financial reporting guidelines, 
UN Global Compact, OECD 
Guidelines) 
Board Independence Ratio of non-executive directors to board size Abor & Biekpe (2007); Bokpin (2009) 
Firm Performance Seven-item scale (see questionnaire  Appendix) Acquaah (2007); Guo et al. (2014) 
Credit Relationships Number of banks from which firms borrow  Original, but developed from literature 
(Dygryse and van Cayseele, 2000) 
Collateral Value Perceived value of collateral in relation to total 
assets 
Yeh et al. (2013); Talavera et al. (2012) 
Ownership Binary whereby 1 = foreigner owning more than 
50% of firm and 0 = otherwise 
Adapted from Acquaah (2007) 
Firm Age Years the firm has been operational in Ghana Hillman (2003) 
Firm Size Natural log of number of employees Acquaah (2007); Boso et al. (2013) 
Institutional Holding Six-item scale (see questionnaire  in Appendix) 
Proportion of shares held by institutions 
Developed from literature (Bennet et al., 
2003; David et al. 2001) 
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Table 4-8 Constructs, Measures and Reliability  
Construct Measurement Items 
Factor 
Loadings 
Variance 
Explained 
(%) 
Cronbach 
Alpha 
Managerial Political Ties  
 
89.14 0.94 
 
Spending time dealing with gov’t affairs 0.95 
  
 
Investing in relationships with gov’t officials 0.94 
  
 
Maintaining good relationships with gov’t 
officials 0.94 
  Managerial Financial Ties 
 
71.65 0.87 
 
Ties to Mutual Funds 0.87 
  
 
Ties to Bank of Ghana 0.84 
  
 
Ties to Commercial Banks 0.84 
  
 
Ties to Pension Funds 0.84 
  Access to Finance 
 
88.89 0.96 
 
Access to finance adequate 0.95 
  
 
Discouraged to apply for loans  0.95 
  
 
Full loan amounts given by banks 0.94 
  
 
Access to finance insufficient  0.94 
  Firm Performance 
 
72.98 0.93 
 
Return on assets 0.90 
  
 
Growth in net income 0.89 
  
 
Growth in productivity 0.88 
  
 
Growth in sales 0.88 
  
 
Return on sales 0.86 
  
 
Growth in market share 0.83 
  
 
Return on equity 0.75 
  Institutional Holding 
 
79.47 0.94 
 
Shares held by Pension Funds 0.93 
  
 
Shares held by Insurance companies 0.92 
  
 
Shares held by Mutual Funds 0.91 
  
 
Shares held by Endowment Funds 0.89 
  
 
Shares held by Charities  0.87 
  
 
Shares held by Private Equity Firms 0.84 
  Financial Reporting Quality 
 
79.56 0.91 
 
Expenses and losses recognised immediately 0.92 
  
 
Financial reporting done timely 0.90 
  
 
Revenues deferred until verified 0.89 
  
 
Financial reports meet acceptable standards 0.86 
  Non-financial Disclosure 
 
70.18 0.86 
 
Disclosure of conflicts of interest  0.85 
  
 
Disclosure of anti-corruption policy 0.85 
  
 
Disclosure of related party transaction 0.84 
  
 
Disclosure of external and business risk 
assessments  0.81 
  Social Network Expansion 
 
93.02 0.96 
 
Banks utilizing political network of company 
executives 0.98 
  
 
Banks soliciting company assistance on policy 
issues  0.97 
  
 
Banks soliciting political referrals from company 0.95 
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Table 4-9 Global Factor Analysis 
  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 Factor 7 
Firm Performance               
Growth in productivity .88       .14   -.13 
Return on assets .87 .13 -.16   .14     
Growth in sales .87       .20     
Growth in net income .85 .16     .16   .13 
Growth in market share .84             
Return on sales .81 .19     .16   .10 
Return on equity .74 .20 -.14         
Institutional Holding               
Shares held by Mutual Funds   .92 -.11         
Shares held by Pension Funds .14 .90 .24         
Shares held by Charities    .87 -.11 .13       
Shares held by Insurance companies .28 .87 .19         
Shares held by Endowment Funds .15 .84 .32         
Shares held by Private Equity Firms .12 .83           
Managerial Financial Ties               
Ties to Comm. Banks   -.19 .83   -.15   .15 
Ties to Pension Funds -.11 .14 .80 .14     .16 
Ties to Mutual Funds     .80 .24 -.13     
Ties to Bank of Ghana   .14 .78 .12 -.14     
Access to Finance               
Access to finance insufficient     .16 .91       
Full loan amounts given by banks   .13 .19 .89   -.15 .12 
Access to finance adequate   .11 .20 .89   -.14 .16 
Discouraged to apply for loans    .17 .19 .87   -.17 .21 
Financial Reporting Quality               
Revenues deferred until verified         .89   -.11 
Financial reporting done timely .17       .89     
Expenses and losses recognised 
immediately .16   -.15   .87 .18   
Financial reports meet acceptable 
standards 
.23 .17     .80 .12   
Non-financial Disclosure               
Disclosure of conflicts of interest to 
shareholders       -.11 .11 .82 -.12 
Disclosure of related party transaction to 
shareholders 
        .13 .81 -.13 
Disclosure of external and business risk 
assessments to shareholders       -.19   .81   
Disclosure of anti-corruption policy to 
shareholders 
  -.11       .79 -.25 
Managerial Political Ties               
Maintaining good relationships with 
gov’t officials     .32 .27   -.22 .82 
Spending time dealing with gov’t affairs     .29 .29   -.30 .79 
Investing in building relationships with 
gov’t officials .11   .32 .20 -.12 -.36 .77 
                
Eigen value 7.91 6.88 3.77 2.88 2.49 1.95 1.08 
Percentage of variance explained 15.41 14.45 13.28 10.70 9.63 9.19 6.63 
Percentage of cumulative variance 
explained 
15.41 29.86 43.13 53.83 63.46 72.65 79.28 
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Table 4-10 Results of Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Construct Measurement Items 
Factor 
Loading T-value 
Managerial political ties  
  (AVE = 0.84; CR = 0.94) Spending time dealing with gov't affairs 0.93 19.91 
 
Investing in building relationships with gov't officials 0.91 (Fixed) 
 
Maintaining good relationships with gov't officials 0.91 18.99 
Managerial Financial Ties  
  (AVE = 0.63; CR = 0.90) Mutual funds 0.83 (Fixed) 
 
Bank of Ghana 0.78 11.06 
 
Commercial banks 0.77 10.93 
 
Pension funds 0.76 10.78 
Access to Finance  
  (AVE = 0.85; CR = 0.96) Access to finance is adequate 0.93 (Fixed) 
 
Discouraged to apply for loans  0.93 23.29 
 
Full loan amounts given by banks 0.92 22.2 
 
Access to finance is insufficient  0.91 21.38 
Firm Performance  
  (AVE = 0.69; CR = 0.94) Growth in net income 0.88 13.97 
 
Growth in sales 0.87 13.82 
 
Growth in productivity 0.86 13.62 
 
Return on assets 0.86 13.54 
 
Return on sales 0.83 12.88 
 
Growth in market share 0.81 (Fixed) 
 
Return on equity 0.68 9.98 
Institutional Holding  
  (AVE = 0.75; CR = 0.95) Shares held by Pension funds 0.94 (Fixed) 
 
Shares held by Insurance companies 0.92 22.73 
 
Shares held by Endowment funds 0.88 20.09 
 
Shares held by Mutual funds 0.86 18.76 
 
Shares held by Charities 0.81 15.93 
 
Shares held by Private equity firms 0.77 14.44 
Financial Reporting Quality  
   (AVE = 0.73; CR = 0.91) Financial reporting done timely 0.89 12.97 
 
Revenues deferred until verified 0.88 12.69 
 
Expenses and losses recognised immediately 0.86 12.4 
 
Financial reports meet acceptable standards 0.77 (Fixed) 
Non-financial Disclosure  
  (AVE = 0.60; CR = 0.86) Disclosure of conflicts of interest  0.81 10.64 
 
Disclosure of related party transactions 0.78 (Fixed) 
 
Disclosure of anti-corruption policy  0.78 10.32 
 
Disclosure of external and business risk assessments  0.72 9.51 
Social Network Expansion  
  (AVE = 0.90; CR = 0.96) Banks utilizing  network of company executives 0.98 32.06 
 
Banks soliciting company assistance on policy issues 0.95 (Fixed) 
  Banks soliciting referrals from company executives 0.91 23.15 
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Chapter 5 Managerial Political Ties, Access to Finance and Cost 
of Debt 
This chapter presents empirical evidence to address the first research question of the thesis: 
What is the impact of managerial political ties on access to finance and cost of debt? It 
explores the impact of government connections on the ease of obtaining loans and the interest 
rates charged on loans. As argued in the literature review (chapter 2), there is scanty research 
on this topic. There is also a lack of management research focusing on Africa (Mellahi and 
Mol, 2015; Klingebiel and Stadler, 2015). Subsequently, not much is known about the role of 
political ties in credit markets, particularly in emerging countries in sub-Saharan Africa. This 
chapter therefore fills a gap in the literature, and examines very important issues affecting 
most firms in Ghana and Africa – access to finance and cost of borrowing (Beck and 
Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Beck et al., 2006a; Aboagye et al., 2008; African Development Bank, 
2013; Adomako et al., 2016). In the next sections, I develop the hypotheses, define the 
general estimation models, present and discuss the results. 
5.1 Hypotheses Development 
In this section, I develop hypotheses predicting relationships between political ties, access to 
finance and cost of debt. The hypotheses do not only speculate the direct relationship 
between political ties and the outcome variables, but they also predict moderation effects of 
CEO duality, managerial financial ties, borrowing from government banks, financial 
representation on boards and the appointment of Big Four auditors. 
Managerial Political Ties, Managerial Financial Ties and Access to Finance 
Prior research shows that politically connected firms are highly leveraged (Khwaja and Mian, 
2005; Saeed et al., 2015). These firms have large loan books (Claessens et al., 2008; Chen et 
al., 2014), with a larger proportion of their loans obtained from government banks (Dinc, 
2005; Saeed et al., 2015). The extent of bank leverage typically varies with the strength, 
intensity or depth of the political connections (Khwaja and Mian, 2005). In this respect, firms 
connected to high-ranking politicians such as Presidents, Prime Ministers and Ministers of 
State get more loans from banks. Politically connected firms also face less financing 
constraints (Chan et al., 2012; Yen et al., 2014) as they are able to fund investments using 
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external sources of financing (Cull et al., 2015). Essentially, they do not rely on internally 
generated funds or retained earnings to fund future growth and innovation (Song et al., 2015). 
Based on aforementioned evidence, I argue that if politically connected firms are highly 
leveraged, then they must have easy access to finance. They must have sufficient loan finance 
to fund their operations, which indicates that their loan applications are usually successful 
and the full loan amounts they seek are given by the banks. Additionally, I argue that these 
firms do not fear bank rejection and are therefore not discouraged to apply for loans. The 
ability of political connections to improve firms’ bottom-line (Rajwani and Liedong, 2015) or 
the tendency for politicians to coerce banks to give financing favours to connected firms 
(Khwaja and Mian, 2005) are significant reasons that could make banks yield to the credit 
demands of connected firms. In Ghana, there is anecdotal evidence that political connections 
influence credit allocation decisions (Osabutey, 2012). I therefore hypothesize that: 
 H1: There is a positive relationship between managerial political ties and access to 
finance 
Political ties are just one type of social capital (Acquaah, 2007). In emerging countries, 
business ties also shape firm performance (Boso et al., 2013). These ties can influence the 
extent to which firms are able to exploit entrepreneurial opportunities (London and Hart, 
2004), hence they affect firm performance (Luo et al., 2008; Chung, 2012). In this regard, 
connections to managers in the financial services industry can be useful for obtaining loans. 
There is a body of literature about relationship lending (Charumilind et al., 2006; Beck et al., 
2006b; Zambaldi et al., 2011), and the general conclusion from this literature is that 
relationships with bank executives reduces information asymmetry, enhances 
creditworthiness and increases the likelihood of firms getting credit (Uzzi, 1999). In Ghana 
and many other sub-Saharan countries, “who” you know is more important than “what” you 
know (Takyi-Asiedu, 1993). Essentially, connections to others within the business 
environment can be useful and value-adding (Florin et al., 2003; Boso et al., 2013), and for 
the purposes of debt financing, ties to bankers offer a channel for unparalleled access to 
credit. Thus, I argue that 
H2: There is a positive relationship between managerial financial ties and access to 
finance 
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Managerial Political Connections, CEO Duality and Access to Finance  
There are arguments and counter-arguments about the impact of CEO duality on corporate 
governance. Nevertheless, there are many who discourage the practice, including regulators 
and governance activists who pressure firms to separate the roles of CEO and Board Chair 
(Yang and Zhao, 2014). Opponents of CEO duality argue that the oversight responsibility of 
the Board is compromised when an individual holds both CEO and board chair positions 
(Bliss and Gul, 2012; Fama and Jensen, 1983), and this leads to conflicts of interest and 
agency problems (Berg and Smith, 1978). Research shows that duality is associated with 
insufficient or poor voluntary disclosure (Samaha et al., 2015), value-eroding conglomeration 
(Kim et al., 2009), high levels of executive compensation (Conyon and Peck, 1998; Chen et 
al., 2010), low dividend pay-out (Abor and Fiador, 2013), CEO power entrenchment 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Goyal and Park, 2002) and poor firm performance (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997; De Jonghe et al., 2012; Fiador, 2013).  
In Ghana where corporate governance is poor and credit is rationed accordingly (Ahiawodzi 
and Sackey, 2010; Robson et al., 2013; Awunyo-Vitor et al., 2014), CEO duality is expected 
to negatively affect access to loan finance. Concentration of power in dual CEOs leaves 
corporate boards largely ineffective to monitor and supervise the activities of Management 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Bliss et al., 2011). Abuses of power or misappropriation by 
CEOs go unchecked because board members become captives of inside executives (Rashid, 
2013). As a result, lenders’ perceptions of risk increases (Bliss and Gul, 2012) and 
creditworthiness declines for firms that do not separate the offices of the CEO and the Board 
Chairperson. I therefore hypothesize that: 
 H3a: There is a negative relationship between CEO duality and access to finance 
Additionally, I argue that CEO duality will be particularly harmful to politically connected 
firms that want to borrow money from banks. Two reasons underpin my argument. First, 
there are concerns that CEOs of politically connected firms can use corporate resources to 
pursue their personal political agendas to the detriment of shareholder value (Aggarwal et al., 
2011; Hadani and Schuler, 2013). These CEOs can also use their connections to help their 
firms fly under the radar of regulatory bodies (Yu and Yu, 2011). Second, duality worsens the 
already fragile governance architecture in politically connected firms. Concentrating power in 
a politically connected CEO weakens the internal structures that could put him/her in check. 
Specifically, the board becomes a “vessel of endorsement”, making it easy for executives to 
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extract economic rent. The “invincibility” of political connections, coupled with weak 
oversight and poor monitoring in firms with CEO duality makes connected firms riskier in 
the eyes of lenders. I therefore hypothesize the following:  
H3b: The positive relationship between political connections and access to finance is 
weakened when connected firms have CEO duality. 
Managerial Political Ties and Cost of Debt  
Political ties enable firms to exploit their policy environments (Niessen and Ruenzi, 2010) 
and obtain factor and capital resources critical to their survival and growth (Nee, 1992a; 
Capron and Chatain, 2008). Ties to government enable firms to obtain key resources (Wu et 
al., 2012a) which help them to develop their competitive capabilities (Xin and Pearce, 1996) 
and facilitate their recognition of institutional entrepreneurial opportunities (Guo et al., 2014). 
Stock markets are particularly very responsive to these connections as firms that establish 
them witness appreciations in their stock values (Hillman et al., 1999; Goldman et al., 2009). 
Increase in stock value is indicative of positive performance expectations, suggesting that 
investors associate political connections with profitability or superior firm performance 
(Boubakri et al., 2012b). Banks and other financial institutions are attracted to profitable 
ventures and financially sound clients. They penalize poorly performing firms by increasing 
the price of loans or by requesting high-value collaterals or loan guarantees (Francis et al., 
2005). As political ties improve firms’ bottom lines, banks perceive politically connected 
firms as creditworthy, and hence lend to them at low rates.  
Through political ties, firms are able to take control of their environments and alter most of 
the dynamics.  Political ties also enable firms to know the intentions and behaviours of policy 
makers and politicians (Hadani and Schuler, 2013) and facilitate easy access to information 
that is otherwise costly to obtain. The consequent reduction of information asymmetry 
lessens the risks to which firms are exposed and reduces default risk, culminating in low 
interest rates. Moreover, the high propensity for government to bail out politically connected 
firms provides an implicit guarantee (Faccio et al., 2006). Credit guarantees are obviously the 
most critical indicator of a borrower’s credit rating (Honohan, 2010; Kuo et al., 2011), and 
such guarantees coming from government are highly accepted. In finance literature, 
government securities are the popular proxies for risk-free assets. This is undoubtedly 
because there is a belief that governments can raise taxes or print more money to meet their 
financial obligations. Hence, the implicit government guarantees that politically connected 
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firms receive from politicians make them less risky and enable them to access credit at low 
cost.  
The quest for political access can also motivate banks to lend cheaply to politically connected 
firms in exchange for favours from politicians (Houston et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2014). 
Sometimes too, politicians coerce banks into lending cheaply to connected firms (Khwaja and 
Mian, 2005). Even the quest for political invisibility can encourage banks to use cheap loans 
to strengthen relations with connected firms, use these firms to gain indirect access to 
politicians and covertly exert political influence. Hence, I hypothesize that political ties 
reduce the interest rate firms are charged by banks when they borrow. 
H4: Managerial political ties are negatively related to interest rates  
The Moderating Effect of Managerial Financial Ties 
Management literature reveals that managerial business ties improve firm performance (Peng 
and Luo, 2000; Sheng et al., 2011) through the acquisition of knowledge, exploitation of 
strategic resource complementarities and effective governance (Dyer and Singh, 1998). This 
suggests that cost of debt can be influenced not only by political ties but also by financial ties 
to managers in the financial services industry, especially in emerging countries where inter-
organizational transactions are underpinned by social ties (Khanna and Rivkin, 2006). Indeed, 
research shows that social capital with managers of banks and private equity firms has an 
impact on bank financing and access to private equity (Batjargal and Liu, 2004; Talavera et 
al., 2012). 
According to Peng and Luo (2000), emerging markets have a fascinating context where social 
capital compensates for the lack of market supporting institutions. The ineffectiveness of 
market institutions in facilitating information access and economic exchange strengthens the 
significance of social capital in emerging countries (Acquaah, 2007). The absence of strong 
institutions creates what some researchers call “relationship-based capitalism” (Fraser et al., 
2006; Adhikari et al., 2006; Sun et al., 2011; Bliss and Gul, 2012) whereby social capital 
influences outcomes in economic markets.  
Social capital facilitates access to novel information (Moran, 2005). It also facilitates the 
sharing of high quality information and tacit knowledge between firms (Uzzi, 1999; Rowley 
et al., 2000). Through frequent interactions and the sharing of information, firms learn about 
each other and become increasingly interdependent. This improves transparency and reduces 
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information asymmetry (Cheng et al., 2014). As information asymmetry is reduced through 
close personal ties, mutual trust and reciprocity are fostered (Larson, 1992; Gulati, 1995; 
Moran, 2005). Extending the aforementioned arguments to lending relationships suggests that 
a firm’s cost of debt should vary with the strength of its financial ties. As corporate 
governance is weak in emerging countries, information asymmetry between lenders and 
borrowers is predominant. It is important to note that information asymmetry presents one of 
the greatest obstacles in lending transactions (Zambaldi et al., 2011). In most circumstances, 
it leads to credit rationing (Jaffee and Russell, 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) as banks are 
more comfortable to expand credit or extend favours to firms whose information they have 
accumulated overtime or can easily obtain through relationships (Rauch and Hendrickson, 
2004). Financial ties are therefore able to secure cheap debt in weak institutional contexts 
where corporate governance culture is poor and transparency is low.  
Additionally, social capital plays a controlling role in lending transactions, especially when 
the propensity for opportunism is high. Opportunistic behaviour is a common problem in 
partnerships and arms-length transactions (Kale and Singh, 2000). Even though formal 
contractual agreements are used to govern partner behaviour and curb opportunism, these 
agreements are often ineffective as they do not cover all possible contingencies (Rowley et 
al., 2000). Consequently, loan agreements, which are arms-length in nature, are liable to 
exploitation. However, it is believed that strong financial ties can serve as social control 
mechanisms for lenders to govern the behaviour of borrowers. The trust that results from 
financial ties places a psychological onus on borrowing managers to respect and abide by 
loan terms. As banks executives believe that they can control the behaviour of borrowing 
firms through social ties and hence have little or no fear of default (Uzzi, 1999), they are able 
to charge low interest rates. A dense network of financial ties can also enable firms to access 
loan market information from different sources. This information can then be used to bargain 
for cheaper debt from a preferred lender (Baker, 1990; Petersen and Rajan, 1994). In essence, 
financial ties can lead to loan deals predicated on trust rather than on performance 
information contained in financial statements. The foregoing arguments indicate that 
managerial financial ties are able to secure cheap debt in weak institutional contexts where 
corporate governance culture is poor, transparency is low and opportunism is high. These ties 
reduce information asymmetry, promote trust and support social control in credit markets – 
functions not served by political ties.  I therefore hypothesize that when political and 
financial ties are combined, cost of debt is lower.  
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H5: Managerial financial ties strengthen the negative relationship between managerial 
political ties and interest rates 
The Moderating Effect of Borrowing from Government-owned Banks  
The argument that government-owned banks accord debt financing favours to politically 
connected firms is common in the literature (Sapienza, 2004; Dinç, 2005; Charumilind et al., 
2006; Jackowicz et al., 2013; Lashitew, 2014; Chen et al., 2014). In most government-owned 
banks, politicians appoint members of the management team (Khwaja and Mian, 2005), and 
they often appoint elected officials and other people with political backgrounds to the boards 
of the banks (Fan et al., 2007; Wang and Qian, 2011). In such organizational structures, bank 
executives become political puppets and sycophants who are expected to obey the 
instructions of politicians. Failure to comply with political directives is met with threats of 
transfer, demotion or removal (Khwaja and Mian, 2005). It is therefore not surprising that 
politically connected firms are highly leveraged (Yeh et al., 2013). In emerging countries 
such as Ghana, weak institutional development further strengthens the grip politicians have 
over State-owned enterprises, including government-owned and affiliated banks. A tight 
control over the operations of these banks allows politicians to strengthen their power using 
financial resource allocations (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Due to information asymmetry, it 
is often easy to disguise the political motivations behind loan decisions in weak institutional 
environments (Yeh et al., 2013).   
On the flip side, privately-owned banks are not expected to give preferential treatment to 
politically connected firms. The governance architecture of privately-owned banks might 
make it difficult for political ties to yield any undue benefits. In principle, the principal-agent 
relationship existing between politicians and government-owned banks does not apply to 
privately-owned banks. Privately owned banks are not expected to mix shareholder value 
with the pursuit of government objectives. They are also less likely to pursue politically 
motivated social lending because they have little or no obligations towards politicians or 
governments. In fact, because of the costs of political embeddedness (Okhmatovskiy, 2010; 
Sun et al., 2012), privately-owned banks might penalize politically connected firms with high 
interest rates. In Ghana, these banks do not have enough political “leverage” to pursue or take 
recovery actions against connected firms when loans go bad (see Osabutey, 2012), hence they 
are likely to charge high interest rates for the high risk. Thus I hypothesize the following: 
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H6a: The negative relationship between managerial political ties and interest rates is 
strengthened when firms borrow from government-owned banks. 
H6b: The negative relationship between managerial political ties and interest rates is 
weakened when firms borrow from private-owned banks. 
The Moderating Effect of Financial Representation 
Outside directors play an important role in firms (Boyd, 1990; Hillman, 2005). They provide 
advice and counsel to firms; offer communication channels between firms and the external 
environment; facilitate preferential access to resources; and confer legitimacy on firms 
(Selznick, 1949; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Daily and Dalton, 1994). The composition of 
corporate boards, to a very large extent, also impacts performance. Financial representation 
or the presence of bankers on corporate boards reduces cost of debt and increases firm’s use 
of debt financing (Stearns and Mizruchi, 1993; Sisli-Ciamarra, 2012; Slomka-Golebiowska, 
2014). It reduces information asymmetry and facilitates corporate monitoring, which make it 
possible for banks to comfortably grant loan favours to firms.  
In Ghana, corporate governance practices are weak and have led commercial banks to ration 
credit (Ahiawodzi and Sackey, 2010). The Companies Code (1963) which regulates all firms 
in the country, and the Securities Industry Law (PNDCL 333) which regulates listed firms, 
are not strictly followed. For instance in 2012, two firms were suspended from the Ghana 
Stock Exchange for not holding Annual General Meetings. Corporate Boards, which should 
protect the interests of shareholders, have become “instruments of management” as members 
mainly seek the favours and financial benefits associated with board membership. Because 
managers’ and Board members’ compensation rarely includes stock options, there is hardly 
any genuine alignment of managerial and shareholders’ interests (Tsamenyi et al., 2007). 
These governance problems are more serious in politically connected firms which can use 
their political ties to cover up malfeasance or avoid penalization by regulators (Yu and Yu, 
2011). Financial representation on boards can therefore be a good strategy for banks to 
monitor and ensure that firms are well governed so that they do not default in loan 
repayments. Such representations also reduce information asymmetry, reduce credit risk and 
enable firms with political ties to acquire low-rate loans. Even when financial representatives 
are retired or not affiliated to the bankers of their firms, their clout and social capital within 
the financial services industry can be valuable in the credit market. I hypothesize that: 
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H7: The negative relationship between managerial political ties and the interest rate is 
strengthened when firms have financial representation on their boards. 
The Moderating Effect of Big Four Auditors 
Among the many corporate governance concerns regarding politically connected firms is the 
high propensity of these firms to falsify their financial reports and mislead outside investors. 
Political connections increase the perception that corporate insiders could exploit and plunder 
corporate resources (Guedhami et al., 2014) and conceal their malfeasance by distorting 
financial information (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) to suppress corruption and politically 
motivated diversionary practices. Firms rarely report their corporate political investments 
(Hadani and Schuler, 2013), which suggests that managers could tunnel funds into 
unprofitable or self-aggrandizing schemes (Ansolabehere et al., 2004; Aggarwal et al., 2011). 
A recent study (Chaney et al., 2011) found that the quality of earnings information reported 
by politically connected firms is poorer than that of non-connected firms. Yet, fraudulent 
politically connected firms that distort or conceal financial information are not detected early 
enough. These firms also experience less monitoring by regulators (Yu and Yu, 2011). The 
foregoing arguments suggest that transparency and corporate governance in politically 
connected firms is poor. Yet, these firms strive to create positive perceptions of their 
governance practices in order to show that they are not abusing or exploiting their ties to 
politicians. 
The appointment of a Big Four auditor sends positive signals to the outside world that 
financial reports are accurate. Big Four auditors have a global presence and a global 
reputation to protect (Humphrey et al., 2009). Their quest for good reputation motivates them 
to apply uniform standards in discharging their duties (Guedhami et al., 2014). Such high 
standards lead to stricter monitoring which prevents suppression or distortion of financial 
information (Gul, 2006; Effiezal et al., 2011). As previously mentioned, corporate 
governance standards are often weak in emerging markets. For politically connected firms in 
emerging countries, these governance standards are perceived to even be weaker because of 
the diversionary and cover-up potential of political ties. I therefore hypothesize that the 
appointment of a Big Four auditor could improve perceptions of governance, enhance 
reputation and consequently lower cost of debt of politically connected firms.  I propose that:       
H8: The negative relationship between managerial political ties and the interest rates 
is strengthened when firms appoint a Big Four auditor. 
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Figure 5-1 shows the research model for examining the relationship between political ties and 
access to finance while Figure 5-2 shows the model for examining the relationship between 
political ties cost of debt. The sign next to each hypothesis indicates the predicted direction of 
the relationship. For moderation, (+) represents a strengthening effect while (–) represents a 
weakening effect. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 5-1 Research Model - Political Ties and Access to Finance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 5-2 Research Model - Political Ties and Cost of Debt 
 
 
 Managerial Financial Ties (H5, +) 
 Borrowing from government-owned banks (H6a, +) 
 Borrowing from privately-held banks (H6b, -) 
 Financial Representation (H7, +) 
 Big Four Audit (H8, +) 
Managerial Political Ties Cost of Debt 
H4 (-) 
CEO Duality (H3b, -) 
Managerial Political Ties 
Access to Finance 
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CEO Duality 
H3a (-) 
Managerial Financial Ties 
H2 (+) 
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5.2 Data, Analysis and Descriptive Statistics 
Mentioned and discussed in Chapter 4, data for this study comes from a survey of firms 
operating in Ghana. Where possible, the primary data was triangulated with secondary data. 
In the sample of 179 firms, 55.3% of the firms are locally owned. Also, majority of the firms 
borrow from privately-owned banks. These banks are the majority in the country (26 private 
banks versus 3 State-owned banks). CEO duality is prevalent as 54.2% of the firms do not 
have separate roles for CEO and Board Chairperson. With respect to ties, firms have stronger 
ties to politicians than they have to bank executives (interpreted using the mean statistic). 
This is not surprising considering that politicians command enormous influence in emerging 
countries (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Saeed et al., 2015). Cost of borrowing is high as firms 
can be charged interest rates as high as 35%. 21 industries, ranging from mining to textiles, 
are represented in the sample. On the average, the firms have been operating in Ghana for 19 
years.  
Measures were taken to address common method variance, validity and reliability of the 
scales and variables. As some of the constructs in this study are new and have not been 
validated by previous studies, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was done to identify the 
factor structure of the data. Thereafter, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was done to test 
and confirm the constructs. The results of the CFA, which include the items, their respective 
loadings and T-values, average variance extracted (AVE) and composite reliability (CR), are 
shown in Table 5-1. As can be seen, the AVE and CR scores exceed the minimum thresholds 
of 0.50 and 0.70 respectively (Fornell and Larcker, 1981; Hair et al., 1998). 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5-1 here. See page 130 
------------------------------------------------ 
To examine the relationship between the independent and dependent variables, multiple 
moderated hierarchical regression analyses were performed. The following model was used 
to estimate the relationship between managerial political ties and access to finance. 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑆 = 𝑏1  𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 + 𝑏2  𝐴𝐺𝐸 +  𝑏3  𝑂𝑊𝑁 + 𝑏4  𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝑏5  𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹 +  𝑏6  𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑃
+  𝑏7  𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 +  𝑏8  𝑀𝐹𝑇 +  𝑏9  𝑀𝑃𝑇 
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Where: 
ACCESS = Access to finance 
INST = Institutional holding (shares held by institutional investors) 
AGE = Age of firm  
OWN = Firm ownership (dummy coded) 
SIZE = Size of firm (logarithm of number of employees) 
PERF = Firm performance (7-point Likert scale)  
FINREP = Financial representation on corporate boards (dummy coded) 
DUAL = CEO Duality (dummy coded) 
MFT = Managerial financial ties (7-point Likert scale) 
MPT = Managerial political ties (7-point Likert scale) 
 
The dependent variable of this regression equation is access to finance (ACCESS) and the 
main independent variables are political ties (MPT) and financial ties (MFT). CEO duality 
(DUAL) moderates the relationship between MPT and ACCESS. Firm age, firm size, 
financial representation, institutional holding, and firm performance are treated as controls 
and are expected to be positively associated with ACCESS. Ownership is also included to 
capture the likelihood of foreign liability in the Ghanaian credit market. A detailed 
description of these variables and their anticipated impact on the outcome variables of this 
study can be found in Chapter 4.  
Prior to estimating the association between political ties, access to finance and cost of debt, I 
followed prior studies (Murray et al., 2005; Boso et al., 2013; White et al., 2015) and used 
SPSS AMOS to specify the measurement model by performing a confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) on the main variables. I first run a two-factor model on the latent variables: access to 
finance and political ties. I then run a five-factor model by adding financial ties, firm 
performance and institutional holding to the two-factor model. The results, shown in Table 5-
4, show a good fit for the two-factor model (CFI = 0.99, NFI = 0.99, IFI = 0.99, RMSEA = 
0.05) and for the five-factor model (CFI = 0.98, NFI = 0.96, IFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.06).  
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5-4 here. See page 132 
------------------------------------------------ 
To examine the relationship between managerial political ties and cost of debt - measured 
using interest rates charged on loans, I used the following estimation model. 
𝐼𝑁𝑇 = 𝑏1  𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 + 𝑏2  𝐴𝐺𝐸 +  𝑏3  𝑂𝑊𝑁 +  𝑏4  𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝑏5  𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹 +  𝑏6  𝐶𝑂𝐿 +  𝑏7  𝑅𝐸𝐿
+ 𝑏8  𝐺𝑂𝐵 +  𝑏9  𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑃 +  𝑏10  𝐵𝐼𝐺𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑅 + 𝑏11  𝑀𝐹𝑇 + 𝑏12  𝑀𝑃𝑇 
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Where: 
INT = Interest rate 
INST = Institutional holding (shares held by institutional investors) 
AGE = Age of firm  
OWN = Firm ownership (dummy coded) 
SIZE = Size of firm (logarithm of number of employees) 
PERF = Financial performance (7-point Likert scale) 
COL = Value of collateral pledged for loans (7-point Likert scale) 
REL = Credit relationships 
GOB = Borrowing from government-owned banks (dummy coded) 
FINREP = Financial representation on corporate board (dummy coded) 
BIGFOUR = Appointment of Big Four auditors (dummy coded) 
MFT = Managerial financial ties (7-point Likert scale) 
MPT = Managerial political ties (7-point Likert scale) 
 
Here, the dependent variable is the interest charged on loans (INT). As in the model for 
access to finance, institutional holding, firm age, ownership, firm size, and firm performance 
are the control variables. The only additions to the controls are collateral value (COL) and 
credit relationships (REL) which are expected to impact cost of loans. Managerial financial 
ties, borrowing from government-owned banks and private banks, financial representation 
and Big Four auditors are treated as contingency/moderator variables. The main independent 
variable is political ties (MPT).  
5.3 Results 
Table 5-2 reports the means, standard deviations and correlation coefficients among the 
variables used in examining access to finance and cost of debt. The correlation matrix reveals 
significant correlations between the dependent and independent variables. However, it shows 
no unreasonably large correlations (r =.9 or above) (Berry, 1993; Tabachnick and Fidell, 
2014). The largest correlation coefficient is 0.66. This “ball park” method suggests that 
multicollinearity does not affect the robustness of the findings (Field, 2013). Moreover, the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance statistics support the absence of 
multicollinearity (Myers, 1990). I followed the approach of Ambos et al (2010) and checked 
discriminant validity by comparing the square root of the average variance explained (AVE) 
of each construct (Table 5-3) with the squared correlation between construct pairs. As the 
AVE values are consistently larger than the correlations between the constructs, it can be 
firmly concluded that each construct has more internally extracted variance than the variance 
it shares with other constructs (Fornell and Larcker, 1981), thus indicating satisfactory 
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discriminant validity. In effect, each construct is undeniably different from the other 
constructs.    
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 5-2 and 5-3 here. See page 131 and 132 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 5-5 presents the results of the hierarchical regressions used to estimate the association 
between political ties and access to finance, and test hypotheses 1 to 3 accordingly. In Model 
1, which tests the association between control variables and access to finance, institutional 
holding has a significant positive relationship (Model 1: β = 0.32, p < 0.01) while foreign 
ownership has a significant negative relationship (Model 1: β = -0.72, p < 0.05) with access 
to finance. These results suggest that firms whose shares are held by institutional investors 
have greater access to loan finance. However, foreign firms have reduced access to loans 
from banks in Ghana. All the other control variables are insignificant. Specifically, financial 
representation, firm size, firm age and financial performance do not affect access to finance. 
This contradicts the findings of Ahiawodzi and Sackey (2010) who found that profitability 
significantly influences credit rationing.  
In Model 2, where the contingency variables are introduced, the results show that CEO 
duality is negatively related to access to finance (Model 2: β = -1.81, p < 0.01) while having 
ties to managers in the financial services industry has a positive effect on ease of obtaining 
loans (Model 2: β = 0.39, p < 0.01). These results are highly significant at the 1% level. 
Moreover, the inclusion of these two variables improved the Model F from 4.28 to 24.73. 
Essentially, the findings suggest that having an individual who serves as both CEO and Board 
Chairperson constrains access to finance; hence I find support for Hypothesis 3. The result 
reflects the negativity or riskiness of CEO duality (Berg and Smith, 1978; Fiador, 2013). On 
the flipside, developing and maintaining strong social ties with officials at the central bank, 
commercial banks, mutual and pension funds enhances access to credit. I therefore find 
support for Hypothesis 2. This finding is consistent with the arguments of social capital 
theorists and with previous studies which found that business ties improve firm performance 
(Luo et al., 2008; Acquaah, 2011; Boso et al., 2013) and increase access to bank loans (Uzzi, 
1999). 
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In Model 3, I test hypotheses 1, which predicts that political ties are positively associated 
with access to finance. The results show that political ties are, indeed, positively related to 
credit (Model 3: β = 0.19, p < 0.01). I find support for hypothesis 1. This finding reflects the 
general sentiment that connected firms receive preferential treatment and are thus highly 
leveraged (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Claessens et al., 2008; Saeed et al., 2015). The inclusion 
of MPT also improved the R
2
 (56%) and Model F (25.96), thus suggesting the significant 
impact this variable has on access to finance. In Model 4 however, the result for the 
moderating impact of CEO duality is not significant and perhaps not worth discussing (Model 
4: β = 0.09, p > 0.1). Nonetheless, the result provides “partial” support for hypothesis 3b. 
This is because CEO duality actually weakens the significant positive effect political ties 
alone have on access to finance (Model 4: β = 0.15, p < 0.05).   
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5-5 here. See page 132 
------------------------------------------------ 
Based on the finding that CEO duality weakens the positive effect that political ties have on 
access to credit, I conducted further tests to examine the association between political ties and 
CEO duality. The rationale is to establish whether politically connected firms are aware of 
the negative impact of duality, and to determine the likelihood that these firms have a dual 
CEO. If connected firms know about the repercussions of duality, they are more likely to 
separate the positions of CEO and board Chair. Hence a negative relationship is expected to 
exist between political ties and duality. I performed a binary logistic regression to test this 
hypothesis. Logistic regression is chosen because the dependent variable (CEO duality) is 
binary (yes or no). Table 5-6 shows the correlation matrix for all the regressors. Correlations 
between the variables are significant, but they are not large to suggest that there is a 
multicollinearity problem (Berry, 1993). Since SPSS does not produce collinearity 
diagnostics for logistic regressions, I followed the recommendations of Field (2013) and re-
run the logistic Models as linear Models. The variance factors (VIF) are below the cut-off 
threshold of 10 (Myers, 1990) and tolerance is above 0.1 (Field, 2013). Also, the residuals 
and distance scores did not reveal any multicollinearity problems. 
 ----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5-6 here. See page 133 
------------------------------------------------ 
The results of the logistic regression are shown in Table 5-7. Panel A captures the predictive 
effects of the control variables on CEO duality. While the directions of the coefficients are 
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not surprising, almost all the relationships are not significant, except ownership (Panel A: β = 
-0.83, p < 0.05) which has an odds ratio of 0.44. The interpretation is that foreign firms are 
less likely to have CEO duality. In Panel B, the political ties variable was added to the model 
and a significant negative relationship was observed (Panel B: β = -0.37, p < 0.01). The odds 
ratio of 0.69 suggests that as political ties become stronger or deeper, CEO duality is less 
likely to manifest. These findings indicate that connected firms perhaps know about the 
negative perceptions or effect of CEO duality, and are therefore less likely to give absolute 
control and power to one individual.  
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5-7 here. See page 133 
------------------------------------------------ 
Moving on from examining access to finance, I investigated the impact of political ties on 
cost of debt. Indeed, the ease of accessing loan finance differs from the cost of loan finance. 
It is therefore important to consider both in order to capture an elaborative picture about the 
effect of political ties in credit markets. The results for hypotheses 4 to 8 are shown in Table 
5-8. 
In Model 1, where I test the relationship between the control variables and interest rates, four 
results are significant. First, institutional ownership is negatively associated with interest 
rates (Table 5-8 Model 1: β = -0.006, p < 0.05). This result suggests that firms whose shares 
are held by institutional investors are charged low interest rates. The result also supports the 
hypothesis that institutional shareholders are able to effectively monitor managers, ensure 
good governance practices in firms (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and reduce cost of borrowing 
(Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Elyasiani et al., 2010). Second, foreign ownership is also 
negatively associated with interest rates (Table 5-8 Model 1: β = -0.017, p < 0.01), 
suggesting that foreign firms are charged low rates. Third, value of collateral is positively 
related to interest rates. This result is counter-intuitive, but it is not very surprising because 
some theoretical models of collateral and credit guarantees demonstrate that collateral is 
associated with risky borrowers (Boot et al., 1991; Boot and Thakor, 1994; Berger and Udell, 
1995). It is therefore consistent with previous studies that argue that collateral is positively 
related to cost of borrowing (Berger and Udell, 1990; Booth, 1992; Hernández-Cánovas and 
Martínez-Solano, 2010). Fourth, a strong association exists between credit relationships and 
interest rates (Table 5-8 Model 1: β = 0.010, p < 0.01), indicating that firms with multiple 
creditors are charged higher rates. This finding is consistent with the information monopoly 
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hypothesis which argues that the cost of monitoring incurred by banks increases when firms 
borrow from multiple creditors, hence the high interest rates on loans (Rajan, 1992; Von 
Thadden, 1994; Dygryse and Van Cayseele, 2000)  
In Model 2, where the contingency variables are included, the results show that borrowing 
from government-banks and having financial representation on boards are negatively related 
to interest charges (Table 5-8 Model 2: β = -0.037, p < 0.01 for government-owned bank; and 
β = -0.017, p < 0.05 for financial representation). These findings are consistent with previous 
studies (Stearns and Mizruchi, 1993; Slomka-Golebiowska, 2014). Surprising and contrary to 
expectation, financial ties are positively associated with interest rates (Table 5-8 Model 2: β = 
0.009, p < 0.01). This result contradicts the theory of relationship lending (Berger and Udell, 
1995; Uzzi, 1999), and suggests that financial ties alone are not enough to secure cheap loans. 
The result for Big Four auditors is not significant.  
Model 3 tests hypothesis 4 which predicts that political ties are negatively related to interest 
charged on debt. On the contrary, the results show that political ties are positively related to 
interest rates (Table 5-8 Model 3: β = 0.007, p < 0.01), indicating that firms with political 
connections are charged high interest rates. This finding does not support hypothesis 4, but it 
is consistent with Bliss and Gul (2012) who reported a positive association between political 
connections and cost of debt in Malaysia. It is worth noting that inclusion of the managerial 
political ties variable in the Model improved the amount and change in variance explained 
(Table 5-8 Model 3: adjusted R
2 
= 0.58; change in adjusted R
2 
= 0.09, p < 0.01), indicating 
that political ties are significantly related to cost of debt.  
To test the moderating effect of the contingency variables on cost of debt (hypotheses 5-8), I 
incorporated interaction terms into Models 4-8. In Model 4, the interaction between political 
ties and financial ties has a significant negative relationship with interest rate (Table 5-8 
Model 4: β = -0.003, p < 0.05). This result supports hypothesis 5, and shows that financial 
ties strengthen the negative effect of political ties on cost of debt. Following Puck et al. 
(2013) and White et al. (2014), I further probed the nature of the interaction by performing 
simple slopes analysis (Aiken and West, 1991). The results (Figure 5-3) show a significant 
change in the slope of the regression lines (growing negatively steeper) as financial ties 
change from low (mean-1SD) to high (mean+1SD), thus supporting hypothesis 5. 
In models 6, 7 and 8, I included interaction terms that have lower-order binary and 
continuous variables. Before discussing the results, it is important to note that the coefficients 
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of these interaction terms represent the difference between the groups for each binary 
variable. In essence, the coefficients of the interaction terms are not interpreted as the final 
effect. Rather, their statistical significance will indicate whether the coefficient of the 
continuous lower order term (managerial political ties in this study) is worth reading. 
Hypothesis 6a predicts that firms with political ties benefit low interest rates when they 
borrow from government-owned banks while hypothesis 6b predicts that firms with political 
ties are charged high interest rates when they borrow from private-owned banks. In Model 5, 
the coefficient of MPT*GOB is significant (re-worded MPT*POB for easy reading; Table 5-
8 Model 5: β = -0.006, p < 0.05). This result indicates that there is a significant difference in 
the effect of political ties when borrowing from government-owned banks versus borrowing 
from private-owned banks.  Following the guidelines for the interpretation of interaction 
terms involving dummies (Hardy, 1993)
4
, I read the beta for MPT which represents the effect 
of political ties on interest rates when GOB = 0 (i.e. borrowing from private-owned banks). 
This result is significant (Model 5: β = 0.008, p < 0.01) and shows that politically connected 
firms are charged high rates when they borrow from private-owned banks, hence providing 
support for hypothesis 6b. To test hypothesis 6a, I followed the approach of Hadani & 
Schuler (2013) and created a new dummy called POB by recoding of the government-owned 
bank variable so that borrowing from government banks = 0 and borrowing from private-
owned banks = 1. This way, I could observe the effect of political ties when firms borrow 
from government-owned banks. The interaction MPT*POB is significant (re-worded 
MPT*GOB for easy reading; Table 5-8 Model 6: β = -0.006, p < 0.05) but the coefficient for 
MPT is insignificant (Table 5-8 Model 6: β = 0.003, p > 0.1). Thus, I find no support for 
hypothesis 6a.  
In Model 7, I performed the reverse-coding described above and included the interaction term 
MPT*FINREP to test hypothesis 7. The interaction term is significant (β = 0.007, p < 0.05), 
but the coefficient for MPT is insignificant (Table 5-8 Model 7: β = -0.001, p > 0.1), thus 
providing no support for the hypothesis. In Model 8, I test hypothesis 8 which predicts that 
the effect of political ties on cost of debt will be strengthened when firms appoint a Big Four 
auditor. The reverse-coded interaction term MPT*BIGFOUR is significant (Table 5-8 Model 
8: β = -0.011, p < 0.01). The coefficient for MPT is also significant (Table 5-8 Model 8: β = 
0.016, p < 0.01), surprisingly indicating that the effect of political ties on cost of debt is 
                                                 
4
 When a model contains an interaction term which is the product of a continuous variable and a dummy 
variable, coefficients on the lower-order continuous term are interpreted as the effect of the continuous variable 
only and only when the dummy variable is 0. The results correspond with the group = 0  
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weakened by the appointment of Big Four  auditors and hence providing no support for 
hypothesis 8. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5-8 here. See page 134 
------------------------------------------------ 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 5-3 here. See page 136 
------------------------------------------------ 
5.4 Robustness Check 
To further check the robustness of the models and to avoid any negative implications of 
violating normality and homoscedasticity assumptions, I re-run the regressions by performing 
bootstrapped regressions using 1000 bootstrapped samples and estimating a 95% bias 
corrected and accelerated confidence interval for the coefficients (Elfron and Tibshirani, 
1993; Wright et al., 2011). Bootstrapping does not rely on assumptions of normality of the 
data (Field, 2013). The results of the bootstrapped Models are presented in Table 5-9. 
Compared with the non-bootstrapped Models, the significance levels of a few variables 
changed in the bootstrapped Models, but not dramatically. For instance, in Models 1 and 4, 
the significance of ownership and institutional holding changed from 1% to 5%. No 
previously significant coefficients became insignificant and no previously insignificant 
coefficient became significant in the bootstrapped Models. In sum, findings from the robust 
regression suggest that the coefficients are an accurate estimate of the true population (Field, 
2013) 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5-9 here. See page 135 
------------------------------------------------ 
5.5 Discussion of Findings 
This chapter presented empirical findings about the impact of managerial political ties on 
access to finance and cost of debt in Ghana. It also examined the extent to which this impact 
is contingent on CEO duality, financial ties, borrowing from government-owned banks, 
financial representation on corporate boards, and the appointment of Big Four auditors. 
Consistent with social capital theory, the findings reveal the value-adding potential of 
networking relationships in credit markets. Networking relationships enable firms to develop 
social capital, a dominant resource that substantially shapes business activity in emerging 
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countries (Acquaah, 2011; Boso et al., 2013). Ties to politicians and managers of lending and 
supervising agencies of the financial services sector open doors to loans through varied ways. 
For instance, political ties allow firms to exploit the dependency relationship between banks 
and politicians, with the former either subdued into acquiescence (Khwaja and Mian, 2005) 
or willingly accepting to give credit to connected firms in return for favours from the latter 
(Houston et al., 2014). Also, ties to financial industry managers reduce information 
asymmetry, avail private information of firms to banks and consequently improves 
creditworthiness (Berger and Udell, 1995; Uzzi, 1999). Although banks treat social capital 
favourably, they are wary of CEO duality. In effect, duality erodes the value of political ties. 
Absolute control resulting from duality raises serious governance questions, particularly in 
weak institutional environments (Fiador, 2013).   
A major and interesting revelation of this study is that while political ties enhance access to 
credit, they do not reduce interest rates. Contrary to prediction, the results indicate that 
political ties are associated with high cost of debt. However, firms that develop financial ties 
in addition to political ties experience low interest rates. The results also show that firms with 
political ties are charged high interest rates when they appoint Big Four auditors. Next, I offer 
explanations for these counterintuitive findings. 
First, studies have documented the harmful effect of CPA on firm performance (Fan et al., 
2007; Aggarwal et al., 2011). Political activity leads to unwarranted risks-taking which 
makes corporate failure more likely (Faccio et al., 2006). Also, politically connected firms 
are highly leveraged (Fraser et al., 2006) and are susceptible to financial distress or low 
profitability (Yazdanfar and Ohman, 2015). They are therefore penalized in the debt market 
either through high interest rates or impaired access to credit (Opler and Titman, 1994). 
Research has shown that distress has significant repercussions for firms. For instance, 
distressed firms typically incur costs of reorganization and restructuring, and of course 
damage to their reputation (Almeida and Philippon, 2008). They also experience low market 
values, loss of sales and low profitability as customers and business partners shun them 
(Andrade and Kaplan, 1998). Moreover, political activity opens up opportunity for managers 
to use corporate resources to pursue self-serving interests (Hadani and Schuler, 2013), a 
situation that can lead to distrust of the firm by external stakeholders (Liedong et al., 2015). 
These arguments suggest that lenders are cautious when dealing with politically connected 
firms. They compensate the risk of dealing with “failure-prone” politically connected firms 
through high loan pricing or stringent covenants.  
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Second, there is a high likelihood that government will bailout firms with political ties 
(Faccio et al., 2006; Blau et al., 2013). This likelihood provides an implicit guarantee of 
survival and protection for connected firms, culminating in a moral hazard problem whereby 
connected firms take less caution in their dealings because of their belief that government 
will come to their rescue in times of need. This moral hazard problem could cause banks to 
charge higher rates when lending to firms with political ties. 
Third, a common institutional void in Ghana and other emerging countries is weak regulatory 
structures (Henisz and Zelner, 2010) and selective application of the “Rule of Law”.  In these 
countries, the enforcement of creditor rights is weak (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). 
Generally, in environments where there is weak enforcement of creditor rights, banks charge 
high loan rates (Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009). For firms with political ties, 
banks may charge higher rates because in emerging countries, litigants rarely win legal 
battles against parties with government backing. Government support for firms with political 
ties further weakens the negligible rights banks have to enforce loan obligations.  
The problem of weak creditor rights is more serious for private-owned banks. These banks, 
by their governance structure, do not have ties to politicians and hence do not have political 
backing as compared to government-owned banks. The immense power of government 
coupled with a poor corporate governance culture in Ghana may cause the banks to charge 
higher rates to firms with political ties because their debt recovery power could be curtailed 
by politicians in events of default (see Osabutey, 2012). Moreover, as they do not encounter 
coercion as compared to government-owned banks (Khwaja and Mian, 2005), private-owned 
banks do not accord undue value to political ties. 
While the literature generally agrees that politically connected firms have preferential access 
to finance and are thus highly leveraged (Yeh et al., 2013), same agreement has not been 
reached with respect to the impact of political ties on cost of debt (Rajwani and Liedong, 
2015). It is therefore deductible that access to finance does not necessarily lead to low cost of 
debt. Politicians may be able to help firms acquire loans, but they are not always able to get 
the firms low interest rates. Bank executives who do not belong to the same political party or 
share the same political ideologies with incumbent politicians may agree to advance loans to 
politically connected firms, but penalize the firms with high interest rates to compensate for 
being coerced or “persuaded” to create the loans. In sub-Saharan Africa, this situation is 
exacerbated by the acrimony, violence and tensions that fraught political rivalry. Financial 
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ties, mostly social in nature, permeate the animosity of political diversity and enable firms to 
acquire low cost debt. Moreover, the effect of political ties on cost of debt is distant because 
politicians do not directly lend to firms. This distance may not lead to a strong effect of 
political ties on cost of debt because political agents may not or cannot always see to the 
interests of politicians. Since bank executives create loans, financial ties may have a direct 
effect on cost of debt. The directness of financial ties therefore compensates the indirectness 
of political ties, hence leading to low loan rates. 
The appointment of Big Four auditors was expected to reduce cost of debt for connected 
firms, but the results proved otherwise. Politically connected firms are more likely to appoint 
Big Four auditors (Guedhami et al., 2014). These Big Four auditors charge high fees when 
dealing with connected firms because of the high risk of financial malfeasance inherent in 
these firms and the extra work they have to do (Gul, 2006; Effiezal et al., 2011). I argue that 
such high fees could harm the financial performance of the firms and culminate in high 
interest rates. Also, the appointment of a high-fee-charging Big Four auditor could make 
banks hold perceptions of extravagance by firms. Moreover, Big Four audit firms, such as 
PwC and Ernst & Young, are among the largest lobbyists in the United States, based on 
lobbying expenditure
5
. Having developed their own political capabilities, these audit firms 
are able to connect with the governments of their host countries. In fact, these firms are 
engaged in advisory roles by governments, especially on tax policy. Owing to their political 
activity, Big Four auditors may be lax with politically connected firms and stringent with 
non-connected firms. Such ties to government make it likely for banks to see the possibility 
of Big Four audit firms being sympathetic to firms with political ties. The effect is that 
financial malfeasance could still be hidden or misrepresented, hence high interest rates for the 
high risk.  
Generally, the findings of this study are consistent with studies that document the “dark side” 
of social capital (Gu et al., 2008; Li et al., 2009; Chung, 2012). The obligations social 
networks place on organizations and the resources organizations commit to build and 
maintain network relationships can have adverse effects on performance (Park and Luo, 
2001; Luo et al., 2008). The findings also show that the value of social capital in weak 
institutional environments is moderated by corporate governance. In essence, the findings 
reflect how perceptions of governance in institutionally-voided settings are worsened by 
                                                 
5
 Reported by the Center for Responsive Politics 
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political ties. By integrating social capital and institutional theories with governance insights, 
this study makes significant contributions which are discussed in Chapter 8.    
5.6 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter
6
, I presented empirical findings about the relationships between managerial 
political ties, access to finance and cost of debt. I developed four hypotheses to test the 
association between political ties and access to finance and six hypotheses to test the 
association between political ties cost of debt. The results show that political ties enhance 
access to finance. They also show that CEO duality weakens this enhancing effect. In 
essence, when duality is present in firms, political ties are unable to improve access to credit. 
Further analysis revealed that politically connected firms are less likely to have CEO duality, 
suggesting that these firms are, perhaps, aware of the negative consequences of duality. On 
the topic of cost of debt, I found a positive relationship between political ties and interest 
rates. This positive relationship is, however, weakened by managerial financial ties, 
indicating that while political ties alone increase cost of debt, the combination of political and 
financial ties reduces interest rates. I also found that borrowing from private banks and the 
appointment of Big Four auditors have negative effects on the interest rates charged to 
politically connected firms.  
In sum, the results show that even though political ties can increase access to loan finance, 
they do not reduce the cost of loans. In that sense, this study reveals both the value and 
liability of political ties in the Ghanaian credit market, and in doing so it captures the 
moderating effects of corporate governance and institutional dynamics.  
                                                 
6
 A paper from this chapter was published in the 2015 Academy of Management Best Paper 
Proceedings. Same paper was a finalist for Best Student Paper of the Social Issues in Management 
(SIM) Division at the Academy of Management. Another paper from this chapter was presented at the 
2015 Strategic Management Society (SMS) Conference in Denver. At this conference, the paper was 
nominated for three prizes - Best Paper Prize, Best Student Paper Prize and Best Paper for Practice 
Implications. Currently, a manuscript based on the content of this chapter is being developed for 
submission to Academy of Management Journal (ABS 4*). 
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Table 5-1 Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Measures 
Construct Measurement Items SFL T-value 
Managerial political ties  
  (AVE = 0.84; CR = 
0.94) Spending time dealing with gov't affairs 0.93 19.91 
 
Investing in building relationships with gov't officials 0.91 (Fixed) 
 
Maintaining good relationships with gov't officials 0.91 18.99 
Managerial Financial Ties  
  (AVE = 0.63; CR = 
0.90) Ties to Mutual funds 0.83 (Fixed) 
 
Ties to Bank of Ghana 0.78 11.06 
 
Ties Commercial banks 0.77 10.93 
 
Ties Pension funds 0.76 10.78 
Access to Finance  
  (AVE = 0.85; CR = 
0.96) Access to finance is adequate 0.93 (Fixed) 
 
Discouraged to apply for loans  0.93 23.29 
 
Full loan amounts given by banks 
0.92 22.2 
 
Access to finance is insufficient  0.91 21.38 
Firm Performance  
  (AVE = 0.69; CR = 
0.94) Growth in net income 0.88 13.97 
 
Growth in sales 0.87 13.82 
 
Growth in productivity 0.86 13.62 
 
Return on assets 0.86 13.54 
 
Return on sales 0.83 12.88 
 
Growth in market share 0.81 (Fixed) 
 
Return on equity 0.68 9.98 
Institutional Holding  
  (AVE = 0.75; CR = 
0.95) Shares held by Pension funds 0.94 (Fixed) 
 
Shares held by Insurance companies 0.92 22.73 
 
Shares held by Endowment funds 0.88 20.09 
 
Shares held by Mutual funds 0.86 18.76 
 
Shares held by Charities 0.81 15.93 
  Shares held by Private equity firms 0.77 14.44 
    
Note: AVE = Average Variance Extracted; CR = Composite Reliability  
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Table 5-2 Correlation Matrix: Political Ties, Access to Finance and Cost of Debt 
 
  Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 
Access to 
Finance 3.44 1.58 1                               
2 Interest Rate 0.24 0.04 .27*** 1                             
3 
Managerial 
Political Ties 
(MPT) 3.90 2.19 .50*** 0.45*** 1                           
4 
Managerial 
Financial Ties 
(MFT) 3.03 0.95 .40*** 0.28*** 0.54
***
 1                         
5 
Government 
Bank (GOB) 0.38 0.49 -0.15 
-
0.57*** 
-
0.20*** -0.14** 1                       
6 
Big Four 
Auditor 
(BIGFOUR) 0.22 0.41 -0.06 0.13* 0.01 0.11 -0.19** 1                     
7 Ownership 0.45 0.50 
-
0.20*** 
-
0.33*** -0.05 -0.05 0.32*** 0.04 1                   
8 
Financial 
Representation 
(FINREP) 0.22 0.42 -0.10 
-
0.44*** -0.10 
-
0.27*** 0.35*** -0.06 0.38*** 1                 
9 
Credit 
Relationships 3.82 1.57 0.03 0.42*** 0.11 0.21*** 
-
0.29*** 0.24*** -0.13* 
-
0.25*** 1               
10 
Value of 
collateral 4.91 1.71 0.07 0.22*** 0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.08 
-
0.29*** 0.06 0.06 1             
11 Loan Duration 16.74 14.49 0.15** 0.38*** 0.26*** 0.23*** -0.15** 0.26*** -0.05 0.00 0.10 -0.17** 1           
12 
Firm 
Performance 4.96 1.13 0.06 -0.01 0.09 -0.09 0.02 -0.12 -0.10 0.26*** -0.10 0.27*** 0.11 1         
13 
Institutional 
Holding 2.08 1.51 0.24*** 
-
0.23*** 0.06 0.13* 0.10 
-
0.26*** 0.13* 0.24*** 
-
0.28*** -0.04 
-
0.23*** .29*** 1       
14 Firm Age 19.17 12.62 0.04 -0.02 0.22*** 0.11 0.10 -0.01 0.12 0.07 -0.16** -0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 1     
15 Firm Size 4.56 0.62 0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.20** 0.09 0.01 0.13* 0.19** 
-
0.03 0.14* 1   
16 
CEO Duality 
(DUAL) 0.54 0.50 
-
0.66*** 
-
0.21*** 
-
0.37*** 
-
0.26*** 0.19** 0.05 0.17** 0.09 -0.05 -0.02 -0.08 -0.05 
-
0.07 -0.10 
-
0.03 1 
 
                   
N = 179; ***Correlation is significant at the 1% level (2-tailed); **Correlation is significant at the 5% level (2-tailed); *Correlation is significant at the 10% level (2-tailed)                    
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Table 5-3 Constructs, Reliability and Discriminant Validity 
Construct Average Variance 
Extracted (AVE) 
Square Root of 
AVE 
Composite 
Reliability (CR) Cronbach Alpha 
Managerial Political Ties 0.84 0.92 0.94 0.94 
Managerial Financial Ties 0.63 0.79 0.9 0.87 
Access to Finance 0.85 0.92 0.96 0.96 
Firm Performance 0.69 0.83 0.94 0.93 
Institutional Holding 0.75 0.87 0.95 0.94 
 
Table 5-4 Measurement Model 
Model X
2 
DF X
2
/DF RMSEA NFI IFI CFI P-value 
Two-factor 19.4 13 1.49 0.05 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.11* 
Five-Factor 86 41 2.09 0.06 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.02** 
 
Note: 
Two-factor: Access to Finance; Managerial Political Ties. Five-factor: Access to Finance; Managerial Political 
Ties; Managerial Financial Ties; Firm Performance; Institutional Holding 
RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; NFI = Normed Fit Index; IFI = Incremental Fit Index 
CFI = Comparative Fit Index 
* = Not significant at 10% level 
** = Not significant at 1% level 
 
Table 5-5 Results - Managerial Political Ties and Access to Finance 
Variables Access to Finance 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Control Variables         
Institutional Holding 0.32*** 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 
Firm Age 0.01 -0.01 -.010 -0.01 
Firm Size 0.23 0.16 0.18 0.16 
Ownership -0.72** -0.41** -0.42** -0.44** 
Firm Performance -0.07 -0.05 -0.10 -0.09 
Financial Representation -0.36 0.07 0.04 0.10 
Contingency Variables 
    
CEO Duality (DUAL) 
 
-1.81*** -1.61*** -1.61*** 
Managerial Financial Ties (MFT) 
 
0.39*** 0.17 .17 
Predictor Variable 
    
Managerial Political Ties (MPT) 
  
0.19*** 0.15** 
Interaction 
    
MPT*DUAL 
   
0.09 
Model Statistics 
    
Adjusted R
2 0.10 0.52 0.56 0.56 
Change in R
2 0.13*** 0.41*** 0.04*** .000 
Model F 4.28*** 24.73*** 25.96*** 23.53*** 
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Table 5-6 Correlation Matrix: Managerial Political Ties and CEO Duality 
  Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 CEO Duality .54 .50 1                 
2 
Managerial 
Political Ties 
3.90 2.19 -0.37*** 1               
3 
Institutional 
Holding 
2.08 1.51 -0.07 0.06 1             
4 Firm Size 4.56 .62 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 1           
5 Firm Age 19.17 12.62 -0.10 0.22*** 0.03 0.14* 1         
6 
Non-executive 
Directorship 
.72 .61 0.14* -0.15** 
-
0.28*** 
0.39*** 
-
0.02 
1       
7 Board Size 4.50 2.02 -0.02 0.14* -0.10 0.58*** 0.04 0.62*** 1     
8 Regulation .42 0.49 -0.02 .090 -0.07 0.10 
-
0.05 
0.06 0.07 1   
9 Ownership .45 0.50 .17** -.050 0.13* 0.11 0.12 0.02 
-
0.06 
-
0.17*** 
1 
N = 179; ***Correlation is significant at the 1% level (2-tailed); **Correlation is significant at the 5% level (2-tailed); *Correlation 
is significant at the 10% level (2-tailed) 
 
Table 5-7 Logistic Regression Results: Managerial Political Ties and CEO Duality  
Panel A 
    
  
CEO Duality 
Odds Ratio 
95% C.I. Odds Ratio 
  Lower Upper 
Institutional Holding -0.08 0.93 0.74 1.15 
Firm size -0.18 0.84 0.45 1.55 
Firm Age -0.02 0.98 0.95 1.01 
Non-Executive Directorship 0.73 2.08 1.05 4.12 
Board Size -0.12 0.89 0.71 1.11 
Regulation -0.02 0.98 0.51 1.86 
Ownership -0.83** 0.44 0.23 0.84 
Note: ** p < 0.05         
X2 = 14.89, p < 0.05; R2 = 0.08 (Cox & Snell), 0.11 (Nagelkerke) 
     Panel B 
    
  
CEO Duality 
Odds Ratio 
95% C.I. Odds Ratio 
  Lower Upper 
Institutional Holding -0.09 0.92 0.73 1.16 
Firm size -0.40 0.67 0.35 1.30 
Firm Age -0.01 0.99 0.96 1.02 
Non-Executive Directorship 0.30 1.35 0.63 2.86 
Board Size 0.06 1.06 0.83 1.36 
Regulation -0.20 0.82 0.41 1.63 
Ownership -0.90** 0.40 0.20 0.82 
Managerial Political Ties -0.37*** 0.69 0.58 0.82 
Note: ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
X2 = 14.89, p < 0.05; R2 = 0.18 (Cox & Snell), 0.24 (Nagelkerke) 
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Table 5-8 Results - Managerial Political Ties and Cost of Debt 
Variables Interest Rate a 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Control Variables                 
Institutional Holding -0.006** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Ownership -0.017*** -0.002 -0.00 -0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.006 
Size -0.003 .000 .001 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.001 
Financial Performance 0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.001 
Value of collateral 0.004* 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
Credit relationships 0.010*** 0.004* 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.005*** 0.006*** 
                  
Contingency Variables                 
Government-owned banks 
(GOB)   -0.037*** -0.031*** -0.027*** -0.031*** -0.034*** -0.029*** -0.035*** 
Financial Representation 
(FINREP)   -0.017** -0.020*** -0.025*** -0.017** -0.017** 0.025*** -0.019*** 
Big Four Audit (BIGFOUR)   -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
Managerial Financial Ties 
(MFT)   0.009*** -0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 
Predictor Variable                 
Managerial Political Ties 
(MPT)     0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.003 0.001 0.016*** 
Interactions b                 
MPT*MFT       -0.003*         
MPT*POB         -0.006**       
MPT*GOB 
  
      0.006**     
MPT*FINREP 
     
  0.007**   
MPT*BIGFOUR 
     
    -0.011*** 
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.49 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.62 
Change in R2 0.29*** 0.23*** 0.09*** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01*** 0.04*** 
Model F 9.49 15.65 20.15 19.12 19.54 19.54*** 19.36*** 21.91*** 
Note: 
N = 179. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 (two-tailed significance tests). VIF scores are below 10 
a   Interest rate is unstandardized, hence all values are unstandardized coefficients expressed in three decimal places in order to reveal small 
differences. Expressing coefficients in two decimal places will suppress effects. 
b   Before creating the interactions terms, the lower-order terms were mean centred. Where necessary, reverse-coding was done before creating 
interaction terms that include dummy variables 
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Table 5-9 Bootstrapped OLS Regression: Managerial Political Ties and Cost of Debt 
c 
Variables Interest Rate 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Control Variables                 
Institutional Holding -0.006** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.006** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.005*** 
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Ownership -0.017** -0.002 -0.00 -0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.006 
Size -0.003 .000 .001 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.001 
Financial Performance 0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.001 
Value of collateral 0.004* 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004** 0.004*** 
Credit relationships 0.010*** 0.004* 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.005** 0.006*** 
                  
Contingency Variables                 
Government-owned banks 
(GOB)   -0.037*** -0.031*** -0.027*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.029*** -0.035*** 
Financial Representation 
(FINREP)   -0.017** -0.020*** -0.025*** -0.017** -0.017** 0.025*** -0.019*** 
Big Four Audit (BIGFOUR)   -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
Managerial Financial Ties 
(MFT)   0.009** -0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 
Predictor Variable                 
Managerial Political Ties 
(MPT)     0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.003 0.001 0.016*** 
Interactions                 
MPT*MFT       -0.003*         
MPT*POB         -0.006**       
MPT*GOB 
  
      0.006**     
MPT*FINREP 
     
  0.007***   
MPT*BIGFOUR 
     
    -0.011*** 
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.49 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.62 
Change in R2 0.29*** 0.23*** 0.09*** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01*** 0.04*** 
Model F 9.49 15.65 20.15 19.12 19.54 19.54*** 19.36*** 21.91*** 
Note: 
N = 179. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 (two-tailed significance tests). VIF scores are below 10 
a   Interest rate is unstandardized, hence all values are unstandardized coefficients expressed in three decimal places in order to reveal small 
differences. Expressing coefficients in two decimal places will suppress effects. 
b   Before creating the interactions terms, the lower-order terms were mean centred. Where necessary, reverse-coding was done before creating 
interaction terms that include dummy variables 
c  Bootstrapped results are based on 1000 bootstrapped sample 
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Figure 5-3 Managerial financial ties as a moderator 
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Chapter 6 Managerial Political Ties and Institutional Risk 
The proposition that CPA reduces the exposure of firms to risk or uncertainty has existed in 
the non-market strategy literature for decades (Baysinger, 1984; Hillman et al., 1999). As 
argued in Chapter two, there are numerous studies that have theorized the mediating or 
moderating role of risk in the outcomes of CPA and the impact of uncertainty on CPA (White 
et al., 2015). However, little empirical research has been conducted to prove or disprove the 
theory that CPA reduces the exposure of firms to risk. In this chapter, I address this 
significant gap in the literature by presenting empirical findings on the association between 
political ties and institutional risk exposure. As this thesis aims to explore the mediating role 
of risk in the relationship between political ties and cost of debt, I found it imperative to give 
adequate attention to this important topic that has been overlooked for a long time. In the next 
sections, I develop testable hypotheses, define the general estimation model for the analyses, 
and discuss the findings.   
6.1 Hypotheses Development 
In developing the hypotheses, moderation effects are considered. Specifically, the moderating 
roles of PA functions, regulation and CSR on the relationship between political ties and risk 
exposure are proposed. With CSR in the framing, this study hypothesizes and tries to 
operationalize well-reasoned calls for research to advance our understanding of the link 
between non-market strategy and organizational outcomes by integrating both CPA and CSR 
activities (Hond et al., 2014; Liedong et al., 2015; Mellahi et al., 2016). Indeed, there is a lack 
of empirical research that focus on the complementarity or combinative effect of the two 
strands of non-market strategy.  
Political Ties and Institutional Risk 
Firms and governments exhibit a typical principal-agent relationship whereby the former are 
principals and the latter are agents (Getz, 1997). This relationship might be implicit and 
informal but as noted, not all principal-agent contracts are formalized (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). That said, governments are expected to act in the best interest of their constituents 
(including firms) but this does not always happen owing to several reasons such as high costs 
of monitoring government and lack of information by politicians (Lord, 1995). In emerging 
countries, firms face even greater institutional risks owing to the volatility and fragility of the 
institutions in these countries (Luo, 2004). However, agency problems between firms and 
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government are surmountable through political activity (Keim and Baysinger, 1993; Getz, 
1997). For instance, Jayachandran (2006) argues that firms target their contributions towards 
politicians whose interests are aligned with theirs. This ensures that when elected, politicians 
invariably pursue the interests of supportive firms. In federal agency rule making, firms 
comment and petition in order to make their policy preferences known to policy agencies. To 
avoid litigations, the agencies align final policies with the interests of the commenters 
(McKay and Webb-Yackee, 2007).  
The alignment of business and government interests reduces uncertainty as firms would not 
have to worry about unexpected policy or regulatory developments (Hillman et al., 1999). 
The ability to use political connections to shape government policies or influence the vote on 
legislations (Steagall and Jennings, 1996; Liebman and Reynolds, 2006) empowers firms to 
take control of their environments. Through political ties, firms get to know the intentions of 
policymakers (Hadani and Schuler, 2013). They also gain access to information that is 
otherwise costly or difficult to obtain. The consequent reduction of information asymmetry 
lessens the risks to which firms are exposed and facilitates futuristic planning. When firms 
have access to politicians, they are able to support policies that promote their business 
interests or prevent the passage of detrimental regulations (Doh et al., 2012).  
Moreover, the high propensity for governments to bail out politically connected firms (Faccio 
et al., 2006; Blau et al., 2013) serves as an implicit guarantee of protection from shocks or 
voids in the environment. Politically connected firms may perform poorly, but their 
probability of bankruptcy is low because they receive government support (Kostovetsky, 
2015). This highlights the issue of moral hazard whereby firms perceive low exposure to risk 
because they receive political insulation. In emerging countries such as Ghana where the 
number or power of independent veto players is typically low (Henisz, 2004; Henisz and 
Delios, 2004), the “rules of the game” are unclear, and legal frameworks are premature (Li, 
2005; White et al., 2015), politicians can fast track snail-paced bureaucratic processes and 
clear up major institutional obstacles that affect firms. I therefore hypothesize that:  
H1: In emerging countries, managerial political ties are negatively related to 
institutional risk exposure  
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The Moderating Effect of Corporate Social Responsibility 
In essence, most political strategies are targeted at politicians. While this choice of target is 
rational, it is problematic. Regardless of the fact that governments are powerful, engaging 
with politicians only will not address every risk in the business environment. According to 
Miller (1992), uncertainty can arise from social causes – the public and society. For instance, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and their supporters can pressure firms, especially 
MNEs, to make “satisfactory” contributions to society if they perceive these firms are not 
doing enough (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Puck et al., 2013). NGOs are influential and 
instrumental in policy making, as highlighted by multi-stakeholder initiative (MSI) studies 
(Rasche, 2012; Mena and Palazzo, 2012; Moog et al., 2015). Moreover, communities and the 
public can revolt against firms they believe are unethical, irresponsible or untrustworthy 
(Liedong et al., 2015). In democratic countries where politicians get their mandate from the 
electorate, the will of the public becomes the cause of government as politicians will struggle 
to grant policy favours to firms in the face of overwhelming public resentment. Indeed, the 
discretion politicians have in policymaking is curtailed when policy issues become salient 
among voters (Schuler, 2008). Hence, when firms are plagued by public dislike, political ties 
cannot do much to reduce institutional risk exposure.  
To strengthen the effectiveness of political ties in reducing risk exposure, CSR could be 
instrumental. There are little legal obligations for firms to engage in CSR activities in 
emerging or developing economies (Hamann et al., 2005). Thus CSR fulfils a moral 
obligation and has a better chance of appealing to the sensibilities of the public. It enhances 
corporate reputation (Hond et al., 2014; Hur et al., 2014) and confers legitimacy on firms 
(Park et al., 2014). Because of its strong emphasis on philanthropy and social welfare, CSR 
fills development gaps, especially in developing countries (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011). 
Socially responsible firms are therefore trustworthy (Pivato et al., 2008; Hillenbrand et al., 
2013), have large and strong constituencies and are less likely to face resentment (Liedong et 
al., 2015). They are also more likely to be perceived as well governed due to their high 
visibility (Hond et al., 2014).  
Within the last decade, political CSR – which refers to CSR with intended or unintended 
political impact (Frynas and Stephens, 2015) - has received significant attention from 
management scholars (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011; Morsing and Roepstorff, 2015). Beyond 
providing basic infrastructure for communities, and contributing to national and global 
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regulation (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007; Margolis and Walsh, 2003), CSR enables firms to 
develop trustworthy relationships with community actors and politicians (Liedong et al., 
2015). This resultant trust does not only facilitate the entry of firms into political arenas 
(Wang and Qian, 2011), but it also builds social capital and reduces the exposure of firms to 
negative institutional effects, particularly adverse policy, discrimination, witch-hunting or 
community revolts. 
CSR therefore has a positive impact on the risk exposure of firms, regardless of whether this 
risk is politically or socially driven. At worst, CSR will make managers feel insulated from 
institutional constraints because of the public goodwill associated with benevolent practices. 
In developing countries such as Ghana, public perceptions of firms are positively influenced 
by the level of support and moral obligations the firms have towards communities (Ofori and 
Hinson, 2007; Kuada and Hinson, 2012). At best, CSR will give managers the audacity to 
push institutional boundaries or the impetus to engage with relevant stakeholders in order to 
overcome institutional voids. The chance of success in policy influence or risk reduction is 
higher for firms that are socially responsible (Hond et al., 2014; Liedong et al., 2015). 
But more importantly, CSR can complement political ties by addressing the social roots of 
institutional risk. As noted previously, political ties address political and policy uncertainties. 
Yet there are instances when these uncertainties are initiated by the public or when corporate 
influence in policymaking is abhorred by society (Milyo et al., 2000), especially in emerging 
countries where the dark side of political activity – corruption, bribery, nepotism, etc. - is 
more likely to manifest (Lawton et al., 2013a). Strong public resentment renders political ties 
ineffective in institutional risk reduction.  
In emerging economies, a firm’s engagement in CSR activities sends a signal that it possesses 
slack resource to address social problems. This signals the health of the organization. 
Drawing on resource dependency logic, Mellahi et al. (2016, p.158) argued that the positive 
performance effects from the CSR and political ties complementarities “are pronounced when 
governments control critical resources on which the organization is dependent”. It is 
reasonable to argue that CSR moderates the negative effects of political ties on institutional 
risk exposure for several reasons. First, recent research on the link between CSR and CPA in 
emerging economies suggests that engagement in CSR activities helps firms obtain political 
legitimacy, and thereby increases their chances of obtaining government subsidies and 
support (Lin et al., 2015). Second, political actors in emerging economies tend to reward 
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firms for their CSR activities (Rehbein and Schuler, 2015a). Third, as argued by Mellahi et 
al. (2016), strong political ties may help firms legitimise and publicise their CSR activities 
Having a high profile politician opening a CSR initiative is likely to attract media coverage, 
thereby increasing firms’ visibility and ratings by key stakeholders (Lawton et al., 2014). 
Similarly, CSR may “serve as a buffer” to the potentially risky effects of political 
connections (Mellahi et al., 2016) and may amplify the positive effects of political ties (Sun 
et al., 2012). I therefore argue that combining CSR and political ties helps firms to develop 
trust with political and social stakeholders, quell public resistance, and consequently reduce 
their risk exposure. Thus, I hypothesize that: 
H2a: Corporate social responsibility is negatively related to institutional risk exposure 
H2b: In emerging countries, the negative relationship between managerial political 
ties and institutional risk exposure strengthens with higher levels of social 
responsibility. 
The Moderating Effect of Public Affairs Function 
Corporate public affairs departments (PAs) offer channels for interaction between firms and 
their external environments (Griffin and Dunn, 2004). PAs focus on the creation and 
maintenance of a specific set of external stakeholder relationships (Lawton et al., 2014). A 
PA serves as a window in and a window out of firms (Adams, 1976). As a window in, it 
increases transparency and trust between a firm and its stakeholders. As a window out, it 
shapes the opinions of experts, politicians, and the public at large. PA departments therefore 
act as the internal-external links for firms (Griffin and Dunn, 2004). Firms with PA 
departments have formalized their interaction with the environment and have included the PA 
function into their organizational structures. Such formalization leads to strategic planning, 
implementation, coordination, execution, and evaluation of the firms’ political strategies. 
Indeed, when firms are properly designed or structured, they will be more effective in 
managing external dependency (Kotter, 1979) and risk (Dieleman and Boddewyn, 2012). 
For firms with PA functions, their interaction with politicians and the general public is not ad 
hoc or transactional but planned and relational. They are more likely to ensure that their 
political activity yields favourable outcomes, as research suggests that the presence of PAs 
contribute to the influence and power firms exert in their environments (Lawton et al., 
2013b). Moreover, the existence of a PA indicates a firm’s recognition of the need to interact 
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with the environment and signals its commitment to engage with external stakeholders such 
as government (Griffin and Dunn, 2004). Indeed, the dynamism and significant influence of 
politics on economic environments and business performance has led some non-market 
scholars to suggest that firms should appoint Chief External Officers and task them with 
overseeing political and social issues (Doh et al., 2014). In emerging countries, the 
importance of PA functions is yet to be recognized as most firms, especially the locally 
owned ones, are not strategically organized to address external affairs. This implies that not 
all firms will be effective at managing institutional risk. Those with PA functions will be 
better at addressing the concerns of many stakeholders, including government, and hence will 
have low perceptions of institutional risk exposure. 
Agency problems have repercussions for corporate outcomes (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
and of course for institutional risk exposure. As previously noted, the imperfect agency 
relationship between firms and governments (Getz, 1997) is a problem that can be addressed 
by monitoring elected representatives (Lord, 1995). However, monitoring and enforcing 
agency contracts, implicit or explicit, require time and involve costs (Oviatt, 1988; Lord, 
1995), and hence cannot be done by all principal parties. As the efficacy of political strategies 
is dependent on organizational resource endowments (Oliver and Holzinger, 2008), including 
the formal organizational structures through which strategies are implemented (Keim and 
Baysinger, 1988), it is reasonable to expect that PA departments will be adequately resourced 
to monitor government policies and ensure that corporate risk exposure is reduced. 
Consequently I hypothesize that:  
H3: In emerging countries, the negative relationship between managerial political ties 
and institutional risk exposure strengthens with the presence of PA functions or 
departments in firms 
The Moderating Effect of Industry Regulation 
Regulation has been noted to be one of the strongest impetus for corporate political activity 
(Mitchell et al., 1997; Hansen and Mitchell, 2000). Firms in highly regulated industries have 
high stakes in government policy (Lang and Lockhart, 1990), and hence are actively involved 
in politics (Stigler, 1971). As regulations increase uncertainty and affect their profitability 
and competitiveness (Hillman et al., 2000), these firms have the motivation to ensure that 
government’s policies serve their interests (Hadani and Schuler, 2013). They are able to 
protect or promote their interests by establishing formal and informal relationships with 
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politicians (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Peng and Luo, 2000). Through these relationships, they 
gain access to the nexus of regulatory power and obtain first-hand information (Pfeffer, 1972) 
which enables them to manage their dependency on government (Keim and Zeithaml, 1986; 
Hillman and Hitt, 1999). The foregoing arguments suggest that political ties will be stronger 
for firms in regulated industries. Along this line, I argue that as ties are stronger for regulated 
firms, their exposure to institutional risk should be lower. Conversely, it is possible that high 
uncertainty in regulated industries could set-off perceptions of high risk exposure, even if 
firms are strongly connected to politicians. After all, uncertainty exhorts the development of 
political ties (Hillman, 2005; White et al., 2015). Taking these different viewpoints into 
account, I hypothesize the following:  
H4a: In emerging countries, the negative relationship between political ties and 
institutional risk exposure strengthens with high levels of regulation 
H4b: In emerging countries, the negative relationship between political ties and 
institutional risk exposure weakens with high levels of regulation 
Figure 6-1 presents the research model for examining the relationship between managerial 
political ties and institutional risk exposure. The sign next to each hypothesis indicates the 
predicted direction of the relationship. For moderation, (+) represents a strengthening effect 
while (–) represents a weakening effect. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 6-1 Research Model - Managerial Political Ties and Institutional Risk 
 
 
 Corporate Social Responsibility (H2b, +) 
 Public Affairs Function (H3, +) 
 Regulation (H4a, +; H4b, -) 
Managerial Political Ties 
Institutional Risk Exposure H1 (-) 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
H2a (-) 
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6.2 Data and Analysis  
The data for this study comes from a survey of firms operating in Ghana. Details of the 
sources of data and the collection process are contained in Chapter 4. During design and 
administration of the survey, measures were taken to address common method variance 
(CMV), validity and reliability of the scales and variables. Additionally, statistical tests were 
conducted after the data was collected to ensure CMV does not affect the results. In the 
sample, 55.3% of the firms are locally owned. Also, majority of the firms have a public 
affairs department or function. In an emerging country such as Ghana, this finding may be 
surprising but considering that majority of the firms in the sample are medium and large scale 
enterprises, it is not strange. 21 industries, ranging from mining to textiles, are represented in 
the sample. On the average, the firms have been operating in Ghana for 19 years.  
To examine the relationship between the independent and dependent variables, multiple 
moderated hierarchical regression analyses were performed. Where interaction terms are 
used, the continuous lower-order terms/variables were mean-centred prior to the creation of 
the interactions (Aiken and West, 1991). The following model was used to estimate the 
relationship between managerial political ties and institutional risk exposure. 
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 = 𝑏1  𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 + 𝑏2  𝐴𝐺𝐸 +  𝑏3  𝑂𝑊𝑁 +  𝑏4  𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝑏5  𝑃𝐴 +  𝑏6  𝐶𝑆𝑅 +  𝑏7  𝑅𝐸𝐺
+  𝑏8  𝑀𝑃𝑇 
Where: 
RISK = Institutional Risk 
INST = Institutional holding (shares held by institutional investors) 
AGE = Age of firm  
OWN = Firm ownership (dummy coded) 
SIZE = Size of firm (logarithm of number of employees) 
PA = Public Affairs Function (dummy coded)  
CSR = Corporate social responsibility (7-point Likert scale) 
REG = Regulated industries (dummy coded) 
MPT = Managerial political ties (7-point Likert scale) 
 
Institutional risk (RISK) is the dependent variable of the regression model above while the 
main independent variable is political ties (MPT). Public affairs function (PA), social 
responsibility (CSR) and regulation (REG) are treated as moderators of the relationship 
between MPT and RISK. Detailed argumentations of how these moderations are expected to 
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work can be found in the hypotheses. Firm age, firm size, ownership, and institutional 
holding are the control variables which are expected to have an impact on risk exposure. For 
example, older firms, through their acquisition of local knowledge and experience, can avoid 
risks while institutional shareholders, by virtue of their large stakes, may have a stronger 
motivation to help their firms overcome institutional constraints. Additionally, large firms 
have large exposures to the business environment while foreign firms are liable to the costs 
and hazards of foreignness.  
As some of the constructs in this study are new and hence have not been validated by 
previous studies, I performed a series of analyses to establish and confirm the factor 
structures and reliability of these new constructs. First, I followed conventional practice and 
performed a global exploratory factor analysis (principal components and Varimax rotation) 
to understand the factor structure of the latent items (Acquaah, 2007). As shown in Table 6-1, 
the exploratory analysis revealed five factors: 1) political ties; 2) institutional holding; 3) 
institutional risk – regulation; 4) institutional risk – administrative; and 5) institutional risk – 
controls. Together, these factors explained 81.18% of total variance in the data. The main 
highlight of the factor structure lies in the confirmation that risk is a multi-faceted construct 
(Puck et al., 2013), and as expected, three factors emerged for this construct. These factors 
capture institutional risk arising from regulatory and legal uncertainty, administrative 
obstacles, and direct controls.  
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6-1 here. See page 153 
------------------------------------------------ 
Following prior studies (Murray et al., 2005; Boso et al., 2013; White et al., 2015), I 
confirmed the factor structure of these constructs by performing a confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA). Additionally, CFA allowed me to calculate further measures of reliability 
such as the average variance extracted (AVE) and composite reliability (CR). Table 6-2 
shows the constructs and their reliability measures, as derived from the CFA. As can be seen, 
the AVE and CR scores exceed the minimum thresholds of 0.50 and 0.70 respectively 
(Fornell and Larcker, 1981; Hair et al., 1998). Subsequently, a three-factor CFA confirmed 
the existence of a single construct for institutional risk (CFI = 0.94, NFI = 0.92, IFI = 0.93, 
RMSEA = 0.05, p > 0.05), hence the three types of risk were combined into an overall risk 
exposure construct (α = 0.90) as was done by Puck et al. (2013). The high factor loadings, as 
shown in Table 6-2, support convergent validity (Hair et al., 1998). Also, the fit statistics 
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(CFI = 0.95, NFI = 0.96, IFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.05, p > 0.05) show that the measurement 
model fits the data well.   
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6-2 here. See page 154 
------------------------------------------------ 
6.3 Results 
Table 6-3 reports the means, standard deviations and correlation coefficients among the 
variables. The correlation matrix reveals significant correlations between the dependent and 
independent variables. Even though the correlations are significant, the coefficients are not 
very large (above 0.90) to suggest a problem of multicollinearity (Tabachnick and Fidell, 
2014). The table also shows the largest variance inflation factor (VIF) for each variable. The 
VIFs are less than 10, which confirm that the analyses are not affected by multicollinearity 
(Myers, 1990). More precisely, the highest VIF is 1.42. As the square-root of the average 
variance extracted (AVEs) for the constructs are larger than the correlations between 
construct pairs, I found strong support for discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker, 1981; 
Murray et al., 2005; Ambos et al., 2010). Finally, the Cronbach alphas for the constructs are 
well above the minimum threshold of 0.70 (Nunnally, 1978), and thus support internal 
consistency and reliability. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6-3 here. See page 155 
------------------------------------------------ 
In Table 6-4, Model 1 shows the associations between the control variables and institutional 
risk exposure. The Model reveals that institutional holding is negatively associated with 
institutional risk exposure (Model 1: β = -0.15, p < 0.01). It also shows that firm size is 
positively associated with risk exposure (Model 1: β = 0.15, p < 0.1). When interpreted, these 
results suggest that institutional holders are able to reduce the exposure of firms to risk. They 
also suggest that large firms have a high exposure to investment constraints. In Model 2 
where the contingency variables are added, the results show that PA functions and CSR are 
negatively associated with institutional risk exposure (Model 2: β = -0.52, p < 0.01 for PA 
functions; and Model 2: β = -0.10, p < 0.1 for CSR). The findings suggest that firms with 
public affairs departments and firms that are socially responsible perceive low risk exposure. 
The findings also show that regulation is positively associated with risk exposure (Model 2: β 
= 0.47, p < 0.1), indicating that firms operating in highly regulated industries such as mining, 
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pharmaceuticals, and petroleum are susceptible to uncertainties arising from weak 
institutional frameworks. In Model 3, I test H1 which predicts that political ties are negatively 
associated with risk exposure. The results show that political ties have a positive but 
insignificant association with risk exposure (Model 3: β = 0.04, p > 0.1), hence providing no 
support for H1. This finding, though consistent with previous studies (Puck et al., 2013), 
casts doubts over the positive postulations about the effectiveness of CPA in reducing 
uncertainty (Hillman et al., 1999; Hillman et al., 2004).  
In Models 4, 5 and 6, I tested for interaction effects. The moderation effect of CSR on the 
relationship between political ties and risk exposure is insignificant (Model 4: β = 0.04, p > 
0.1) and thus warrants no further analysis. I therefore find no support for H2. In models 5 and 
6, I follow the interpretation of interaction terms that have dummy variables as lower-order 
terms (Hardy, 1993)
7
. The interaction term MPT*PA (PA coding reversed) is significant 
(Model 5: β = -0.18, p < 0.01) and the coefficient for MPT is also significant (Model 5: β = 
0.10, p < 0.05), indicating that firms that are politically connected and have public affairs 
functions perceive high risk exposure. Hence I find no support for H3. Similarly, the 
variables MPT*REG and MPT are significant (Model 6: β = -0.20, p < 0.01 and Model 6: β = 
0.15, p < 0.01 respectively). While these results do not support H4a which proposes that 
politically connected firms operating in regulated industries are exposed to lower risk, they 
support H4b which predicts that industry regulation weakens the negative relationship 
between political ties and institutional risk exposure. In effect, connected firms in regulated 
industries perceive high exposure to investment climate constraints. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6-4 here. See page 156 
------------------------------------------------ 
Subsequently, I conducted further tests to examine the association between political ties, 
CSR, public affairs and regulation and the three types of institutional risk – regulatory, 
administrative and controls. The rationale is to investigate whether these variables, 
particularly political ties, has a significant relationship with a specific type of risk. 
Additionally, disaggregation of the risk construct might reveal nuances that are concealed by 
the combined institutional risk measure. Indeed, the results reveal interesting nuances. In 
Table 6-5, the results for the three types of institutional risk are shown. It can be seen that 
                                                 
7
 When a model contains an interaction term which is the product of a continuous variable and a dummy variable, 
coefficients on the lower-order continuous term are interpreted as the effect of the continuous variable only and only 
when the dummy variable is 0. The results correspond with the group = 0 
148 | P a g e  
 
institutional holding (β = -0.13, p < 0.05) and public affairs function (β = -1.03, p < 0.01) 
have a negative association with regulatory institutional risk, indicating that these variables 
can enable a firm to buffer or bridge regulatory obstacles or uncertainties. However, the main 
predictor variable, managerial political ties, has no significant association with this type of 
risk (β = -0.003, p > 0.1), though the direction of the coefficient is negative. While CSR has a 
significant impact on the combined risk construct, it plays an insignificant role in regulatory 
risk. The results also show that foreign firms have less exposure to administrative risk (β = -
0.59, p < 0.01). Similarly, socially responsible firms have less exposure to administrative risk 
(β = -0.30, p < 0.01). In contrast, firms in highly regulated industries have a high exposure to 
this risk ((β = 0.70, p < 0.01). With respect to exposure to direct controls, only institutional 
holding is significant (β = -0.18, p < 0.01).       
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6-5 here. See page 156 
------------------------------------------------ 
Robust regression techniques were employed to test the rigour of the Models. Specifically, I 
re-run the Models using 1,000 bootstrapped samples and estimating a 95% bias corrected and 
accelerated confidence interval for the coefficients (Elfron and Tibshirani, 1993; Wright et 
al., 2011). The results did not change in any dramatic fashion as no previously significant 
variables became insignificant. Table 6-6 shows the bootstrapped Models. Compared with the 
non-bootstrapped Models (Table 6-4), the only changes include CSR becoming significant at 
the 10% level (Table 6-6 Model 5: β = -0.08, p < 0.1) and the significance of political ties 
changing from 1% to 5% (Table 6-6 Model 6: β = 0.15, p < 0.05). It is worth mentioning that 
the change in significance of CSR is not important because a similar result was established in 
Model 2 when the variable was first introduced to the analysis. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6-6 here. See page 157 
------------------------------------------------ 
6.4 Discussion of the Findings 
The CPA literature is replete with claims that political strategies reduce firms’ exposure to 
uncertainty (Baysinger, 1984; Hillman and Hitt, 1999). These postulations are deeply rooted 
in beliefs that political connections enable firms to obtain exclusive and first-hand 
information about policy (Pfeffer, 1972) or gain access to the corridors of regulatory power 
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(Hillman, 2005). In emerging countries, the postulations are based on the belief that political 
ties can replace inefficient and insufficiently developed market supporting institutions (Peng 
and Luo, 2000; Acquaah, 2007; Acquaah, 2011). Unfortunately, I did not find evidence to 
support the efficacy of political ties in institutional risk reduction. Political ties had no 
significant association with the combined institutional risk measure or the three types of 
institutional risk – regulatory, administrative, and controls. Essentially, the argument that 
political connections reduce uncertainty is unsupported. The surprising results of this study, 
particularly the insignificant relationships and the significantly positive moderation effects, 
merit profound attention. I draw on institutional insights to explain the findings.  
Considering the fact that the elements of institutional risk in emerging countries are mostly 
policy oriented (hence macro), I argue that political strategies with a strong focus on 
institutional entrepreneurship (DiMaggio, 1988; Dacin et al., 2002) will be more effective for 
the creation of new institutions or the transformation of existing institutions in emerging 
countries, and hence will be more suitable to reduce institutional risk exposure. Such political 
strategies are informational in form and include lobbying and petitioning. Unfortunately, they 
have limited scope and application in emerging countries where the structures for private 
sector participation in policymaking are lacking (Rajwani and Liedong, 2015). Rather, 
relational strategies such as political ties are predominant (Dieleman and Sachs, 2008). 
Though political ties can facilitate access to the polity, they may not effective for addressing 
institutional voids. In essence, political access is not the same as political influence (Kim, 
2008; Liedong et al., 2015). I argue that more is required, beyond access, to instigate 
institutional entrepreneurship. Political ties may not be useful for buffering against 
investment climate constraints because managers fail to further exploit their access to the 
polity. In highly regulated industries which are characterised by high uncertainty, perceptions 
of the helplessness of political ties in risk reduction are even stronger. For firms in these 
industries, the need to file frequent paper work results in their managers having frequent 
interactions or making frequent visits to public offices, thus exposing them to the exploitative 
demands of public officials. It is therefore not surprising to find that highly regulated firms 
have a high exposure to administrative risk – bribery, corruption, and bureaucratic red tape.  
Additionally, political ties are more likely to offer idiosyncratic benefits which cannot be 
assured or guaranteed in the future. As institutional voids become entrenched and political 
ties are ineffectual for institutional entrepreneurship, firms may only use their ties to 
overcome or avoid institutional lapses every time they are encountered, but the lapses will 
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remain and will recur in the future. Consequently, all recurring lapses will present new 
situations in which firms have chances of success and failure. In effect, firms survive by the 
day. Such surviving-by-the-day mentality of managers obviously accounts for the 
insignificant association between political ties and institutional risk exposure. Moreover, 
political strategies are largely targeted at government officials and are therefore less effective 
for engaging with other stakeholders who can influence business environments. This 
argument may create the impression that combining political ties with CSR - which addresses 
non-political stakeholders - will significantly reduce risk exposure. Yet, the attempt to 
establish an integrated non-market strategy for risk reduction failed as no moderating effect 
of CSR was found. Hence a strong argument of complementarity cannot be supported. The 
significant effect of CSR on risk exposure did not bear on the interaction of MPT and CSR, 
highlighting the assertion of a trade-off from combining social responsibility and political 
activity (Liedong et al., 2015). Essentially, the positive perceptions associated with CSR 
become tainted by the negative perceptions of political ties. Social capital with the public 
(through CSR) is viewed positively than social capital with politicians (through political ties), 
arguably because in most developing countries such as Ghana, CPA is associated with 
corruption (Lawton et al., 2013a). 
The MPT*PA result is very surprising, but explicable. PA functions increase the visibility of 
firms. This visibility can increase transparency and reduce risk exposure as this study shows, 
but it can also expose firms to scrutiny by a wide range of stakeholders and thus increase risk 
exposure (Meznar and Nigh, 1995; Puck et al., 2013). CPA has a dark side i.e. bribery, 
corruption, etc. (Doh et al., 2012; Lawton et al., 2013a), hence public perception of political 
ties is not always positive and most managers know this. Once public resentment builds and 
politicians become prompted to respond accordingly, government policy change becomes 
possible and likely. Therefore, perceptions of risk exposure will increase when politically 
connected firms become visible to many stakeholders through their PA activities. Moreover, 
the overwhelming power of politicians in emerging countries, as a result of poor checks and 
balances (Henisz and Delios, 2004), may lure managers into thinking that developing ties 
with politicians is enough. Such thinking could lead to less dedication towards PA activities 
which are more effective in institutional risk reduction. On the flipside, the visibility PA 
activities give to CSR does not increase risk exposure. In fact, the direction of the CSR*PA 
result is negative, as expected, but only insignificant. These findings highlight the different 
effect of visibility on CSR and CPA. Essentially, visibility of political ties has negative 
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consequences for firm outcomes in weak institutional environments. These findings also have 
implications for the theorized complementarity of CPA and CSR. The big question that arises 
is whether the gains of CSR are eroded by CPA.  
Another very interesting thing this study reveals is the differential impact CSR, public affairs 
and industry regulation have on the three types of institutional risk – regulatory, 
administrative and controls. Non-market scholars argue that PA activities can buffer the 
environment and affect regulatory issues (Lawton et al., 2014). This is because they create 
channels of influence through communication with important external stakeholders such as 
government officials (Adams, 1976), and therefore offer an opportunity for firms to influence 
public policy. Unsurprisingly, I found empirical support for these arguments. However, PA 
functions are not effective in reducing other types of institutional risk such as administrative 
risk and controls.  
CSR, as expected, has no direct effect on regulatory issues (Liedong et al., 2015), but it 
reduces firms’ exposure to administrative obstacles such as corruption, bribery, informal 
payments and bureaucratic red tape. CSR signals that a firm is well governed and well 
behaved in society (Hond et al., 2014), and thus discourages extortions and demands for 
informal payments. Moreover, positive public perceptions towards socially responsible firms 
in Ghana (Ofori and Hinson, 2007; Kuada and Hinson, 2012) suggest that public officials, 
who are part of the general public, will be willing to fast-tract administrative processes for 
these firms, hence a low exposure of socially responsible firms to bureaucratic red tape.  
On a different note, highly regulated firms are highly exposed to regulatory and 
administrative risks. These firms have impetus to develop strong political connections 
(Hillman et al., 2004; Lux et al., 2011) which should reduce their exposure to risk, but as this 
study finds, political connections are ineffective. The turbulence that is associated with new 
regulations, coupled with the extortions and bureaucracy associated with frequent filings at 
public agencies do not help the cause of these firms. In sum, CSR and PA functions reduce 
overall institutional risk, but they do not reduce all three types of institutional risk. Similarly, 
regulation increases exposure to overall institutional risk, but it does not increase exposure to 
risk from controls. Managerial political ties have no effect on either type of institutional risk.  
Integrating social capital and institutional theories, this study makes significant contributions 
to non-market strategy literature. Generally, the findings show that political ties are unable to 
buffer constraints in weak institutional environments, and thus resonate with studies that 
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show that political ties and social capital could be harmful to organizational outcomes (Li et 
al., 2009; Chung, 2012). The findings also fail to support the notion of complementarity 
between CSR and CPA (Hadani and Coombes, 2015; Liedong et al., 2015).  
6.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter explored and presented results on the association between managerial political 
ties and institutional risk exposure
8
. Though prior studies postulated the effectiveness of CPA 
on uncertainty reduction, I found no empirical evidence to back those claims. The results 
suggest that political ties have an insignificant association with risk. Even when institutional 
risk is disaggregated into its constituent elements (regulatory, administrative, and controls), 
political ties are still insignificant. These findings lead to a plausible conclusion that the 
conjectured ability of CPA to reduce risk may only be illusional, not real. CSR, PA functions 
and industry regulation were hypothesized to strengthen the effectiveness of political ties in 
risk reduction, but the findings revealed no effects at best and negative effects at worse. To be 
specific, the interaction between CSR and political ties is insignificant and thus raises 
questions about the complementarity between CSR and CPA (Hond et al., 2014; Liedong et 
al., 2015). Moreover, instead of interacting with political ties to reduce risk, PA functions and 
regulation rather increase the risk exposure of politically connected firms, hence highlighting 
how regulatory vulnerability and visibility affect perceptions of susceptibility to institutional 
risk.  
    
                                                 
8
 A theoretical paper from the content of this chapter was published in Group & Organization 
Management (ABS 3*) and was selected into the Editor’s Choice Collections, a list of noteworthy 
manuscripts of the journal. Another paper out of this chapter was presented at the 2015 Strategic 
Management Society (SMS) Conference in Denver. The paper was nominated for three prizes - Best 
Paper Prize, Best Student Paper Prize and Best Paper for Practice Implications. A revised version of 
this same paper is currently under consideration for publication (2
nd
 Round) at British Journal of 
Management (ABS 4). 
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Table 6-1 Global Exploratory Factor Analysis  
  
Factor 
1 
Factor 
2 
Factor 
3 
Factor 
4 
Factor 
5 
Institutional Holding           
Shares held by Pension Funds .921 -.129       
Shares held by Mutual Funds .915         
Shares held by Insurance companies .906 -.139       
Shares held by Endowment Funds .895   .131 -.135   
Shares held by Charities and Foundations .849 -.120       
Shares held by Private Equity Firms .812 -.168   .269   
Institutional Risk - Regulations           
Obstacles posed by labour regulations   .917   .105 .104 
Obstacles posed by licensing and permit 
requirements 
-.189 .887     .217 
Obstacles posed by customs and trade regulations -.104 .880     .140 
Obstacles posed by judicial system -.108 .841   .218   
Obstacles posed by tax regulations -.123 .803 .119 .184 .215 
Managerial Political Ties           
Investing in building relationships with gov’t 
officials 
    .939     
Spending time dealing with gov’t affairs     .936     
Maintaining good relationships with gov’t officials     .933     
Institutional Risk - Administrative           
Obstacles posed by corruption and bribery   .243 -.138 .839   
Obstacles posed by bureaucracy or red tape   .145   .824 .148 
Obstacles posed by contract repudiation .212 .145   .724 .291 
Institutional Risk - Controls           
Obstacles posed by price controls -.109 .138   .253 .830 
Obstacles posed by import and export controls   .427 .132 .249 .745 
Obstacles posed by currency controls -.145 .415 .334   .668 
      Eigen value 6.45 4.3 2.78 1.75 1.29 
Percentage of variance explained 24.26 21.58 14.23 11.23 9.86 
Percentage of cumulative variance explained 24.26 45.85 60.09 71.32 81.18 
      
Note: Principal component Analysis; Varimax Rotation 
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Table 6-2 Results of Confirmatory Factor Analysis  
Construct Measurement Items 
Factor 
Loading T-value 
Managerial political ties  
  (AVE = 0.84; CR = 0.94) Spending time dealing with gov't affairs 0.93 19.91 
 
Investing in building relationships with gov't officials 0.91 (Fixed) 
 
Maintaining good relationships with gov't officials 0.91 18.99 
Institutional Risk - Regulation 
  (AVE = 0.73; CR = 0.94) Obstacles posed by licensing and permit requirements 0.93 16.54 
 
Obstacles posed by labour regulations 0.9 15.66 
 
Obstacles posed by customs and trade regulations 0.87 14.85 
 
Obstacles posed by judicial system 0.83 (Fixed) 
 
Obstacles posed by tax regulations 0.81 13.25 
Institutional Risk - Administrative 
  (AVE = 0.60; CR = 0.88) Obstacles posed by corruption and bribery 0.82 (Fixed) 
 
Obstacles posed by bureaucracy or red tape 0.77 8.04 
 
Obstacles posed by contract repudiation 
0.65 7.58 
Institutional Risk - Controls 
  (AVE = 0.61; CR = 0.90) Obstacles posed by import and export controls 0.96 (Fixed) 
 
Obstacles posed by currency controls 0.76 9.58 
 
Obstacles posed by price controls 0.65 8.46 
Institutional Holding  
  (AVE = 0.75; CR = 0.95) Shares held by Pension funds 0.94 (Fixed) 
 
Shares held by Insurance companies 0.92 22.73 
 
Shares held by Endowment funds 0.88 20.09 
 
Shares held by Mutual funds 0.86 18.76 
 
Shares held by Charities 0.81 15.93 
  Shares held by Private equity firms 0.77 14.44 
    
Note: AVE = Average Variance Extracted; CR = Composite Reliability  
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Table 6-3 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations  
    Mean SD 
Cronbach 
Alpha 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Highest 
VIF 
1 Institutional Risk 2.92 0.97 0.90 1               
  
 
2 Managerial Political Ties (MPT) 3.90 2.19 0.94 0.16** 1             
  
1.19 
3 Social Responsibility (CSR) 4.99 1.37 0.80 0.03 0.19** 1           
  
1.44 
4 Public Affairs (PA) 0.62 0.49 - -0.19** -0.09 -0.11 1         
  
1.33 
5 Regulation (REG) 0.42 0.49 - 0.23*** 0.09 0.12 0.08 1       
  
1.07 
6 Institutional Holding 2.08 1.51 0.94 -0.19*** 0.06 -0.23*** 0.28*** -0.07 1     
  
1.19 
7 Firm Age 19.17 17.14 - 0.06 0.36*** 0.00 0.26*** -0.05 0.27*** 1   
  
1.42 
8 Firm Size 4.56 0.91 - 0.14* 0.12* 0.10 0.33*** 0.06 0.11 0.26*** 1 
  
1.21 
9 Foreignness 0.45 0.50 - -0.11 -0.05 -0.37*** 0.15** -0.17** 0.13* 0.19** 0.03 
1 
1.23 
Note: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 (Two-tailed significance) 
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Table 6-4 Regression Results - Managerial Political Ties and Institutional Risk  
Variables Institutional Risk Exposure 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Control Variables             
Institutional Holding -0.15*** -0.12** 0.13** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.14*** 
Firm Age 0.01 0.01** 0.01 0.01** 0.01 0.01 
Firm Size 0.15* 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.20** 0.23*** 
Foreignness -0.22 -0.19 -0.19 -0.17 -0.16 -0.06 
Contingency Variables             
Public Affairs (PA)   -0.52*** -0.49*** -0.47*** -0.48*** -0.51*** 
Social Responsibility (CSR)   -0.10* -0.11* -0.06 -0.08 -0.08 
Regulation (REG)   0.47*** 0.46*** 0.48*** 0.43*** 0.44*** 
Predictor Variable             
Managerial Political Ties (MPT)     0.04 0.01 0.10** 0.15*** 
Interactionsa             
MPT*CSR       0.04     
MPT*PA 
  
    -0.18***   
MPT*REG 
    
  -0.20*** 
Model Stats 
    
    
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.20 
Change in R2 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.01 0.01 0.03*** 0.04*** 
Model F 3.90*** 5.66*** 5.10*** 4.80*** 5.53*** 5.80*** 
Note: 
N = 179. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 (two-tailed significance tests). VIF scores are below 10 
a Before creating the interactions terms, the lower-order terms were mean centred. Where necessary, reverse-coding was 
done before creating interaction terms that include dummy variables 
 
Table 6-5 Managerial Political Ties and Disaggregated Risks 
Variables Institutional Risk Exposure 
  Regulatory Administrative Control 
Control Variables       
Institutional Holding -0.13** -0.02 -0.18*** 
Age 0.01* 0.004 0.002 
Size 0.30*** 0.14 0.15 
Ownership 0.06 -0.59*** -0.04 
Contingency Variables 
   Public Affairs (PA -1.03*** 0.13 -0.21 
Social Responsibility (CSR) -0.002 -0.30*** 0.006 
Regulation (REG) 0.56*** 0.70*** 0.04 
Predictor Variable 
   Managerial Political Ties 
(MPT) -0.003 0.012 0.14 
    Model F 6.93*** 5.80*** 3.43*** 
Note: 
N = 179. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 (two-tailed significance tests). VIF scores are below 10 
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Table 6-6 Bootstrapped Regression Results: Political Ties and Institutional Risk
a
 
 
Variables Institutional Risk Exposure 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Control Variables             
Institutional Holding -0.15*** -0.12** 0.13** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.14*** 
Age 0.01 0.01** 0.01 0.01** 0.01 0.01 
Size 0.15* 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.20** 0.23*** 
Ownership -0.22 -0.19 -0.19 -0.17 -0.16 -0.06 
Contingency Variables             
Public Affairs (PA   -0.52*** -0.49*** -0.47*** -0.48*** -0.51*** 
Social Responsibility (CSR)   -0.10* -0.11* -0.06 -0.08* -0.08 
Regulation (REG)   0.47*** 0.46*** 0.48*** 0.43*** 0.44*** 
Predictor Variable             
Managerial Political Ties (MPT)     0.04 0.01 0.10** 0.15** 
Interactionsb             
MPT*CSR       0.04     
MPT*PA 
  
    -0.18***   
MPT*REG 
    
  -0.20*** 
Model Stats 
    
    
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.20 
Change in R2 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.01 0.01 0.03*** 0.04*** 
Model F 3.90*** 5.66*** 5.10*** 4.80*** 5.53*** 5.80*** 
Note: 
N = 179. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 (two-tailed significance tests). VIF scores are below 10 
a  Bootstrapped results are based on 1000 bootstrapped sample 
b Before creating the interactions terms, the lower-order terms were mean centred. Where necessary, reverse-coding was 
done before creating interaction terms that include dummy variables 
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Chapter 7 Mediation: Managerial Political Ties-Cost of Debt 
Relationship 
The relationship between CPA and firm performance has received attention, but the 
mediating mechanisms of this relationship have remained under-explored (Guo et al., 2014; 
Rajwani and Liedong, 2015; Mellahi et al., 2016). At best, researchers resort to mere 
conjecture to explain mediation in their empirical findings. While this is a good step towards 
theorization, the lack of empirical verification or proof starves us of deep understanding of 
the mechanisms through which CPA translates into value-adding or value-eroding outcomes 
(Lux et al., 2011). Consequently, this chapter seeks to transcend conjecture by hypothesizing 
and testing mediation in the relationship between managerial political ties and cost of debt. 
Such analysis will broaden knowledge of the role of political ties, or CPA in general, in credit 
markets.  
7.1 Hypotheses Development 
The hypotheses developed and presented in this section predict financial reporting, voluntary 
non-financial reporting, institutional risk exposure, social network expansion, and board 
independence as mediators that underlie the effect of political ties in credit markets. 
The Mediating Role of Social Network Expansion 
Banking is one of the most highly regulated industries (Hadani and Schuler, 2013). Studies 
have shown that highly regulated industries are politically active (Grier et al., 1994; Hillman, 
2005). This is because firms in these industries have high stakes in government action (Kim, 
2008). Banks would therefore need political connections to be able to influence the 
regulations and policies that affect them. But as there is heterogeneity in the strength, 
intensity or scope of political ties (Meznar and Nigh, 1995; Hillman et al., 2004; Mathur and 
Singh, 2011; Lux et al., 2011), all banks will not have same level of connections to 
politicians. Consequently, the political networks of banks will differ in size or strength. 
Banks that need to expand their social network of politicians could nurture closer ties to 
politically connected firms in order to effectively access and utilise the already-existing 
political networks of those firms. Access to politicians is necessary for political influence 
(Bonardi et al., 2005; Hadani, 2011; Liedong et al., 2015), hence less connected banks will be 
willing to develop close ties to connected firms by using cheap loans (Houston et al., 2014). 
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Cheap loans may promote the development of cordial relationships. These cordial 
relationships will facilitate the development of trust (Gulati, 1995), and culminate in the firms 
granting the banks access to their political networks. Connected firms may therefore serve as 
conduits for banks to establish indirect connections to arenas of political and regulatory 
power. 
The argument above does not assume that banks will lend cheaply to gain political access 
only when they do not have connections of their own. In fact they might be connected, but 
the opportunity to expand their political network would be attractive. After all, large 
constituencies are effective in policy influence (Baysinger et al., 1985; Hillman and Hitt, 
1999; Keim and Zeithaml, 1986). Besides access to the political networks of firms, banks 
could also get connected firms to support their policy programs. As “powerful” players in 
policy arenas, connected firms can support banks’ policy petitions or even lobby regulations 
that affect banks. Essentially, banks desire to expand their own social networks and build 
large political constituencies for influencing policy issues can motivate them to lend cheaply 
to politically connected firms. I therefore hypothesize that: 
H1: Social network expansion mediates the relationship between managerial political 
ties and cost of debt 
The Mediating Role of Institutional Risk Reduction 
Exposure to institutional constraints such as bribery, corruption, policy uncertainty, and 
import/ export controls harm business performance. In emerging countries, these constraints 
are abundant (Khanna et al., 2005; Acquaah, 2007; Puck et al., 2013), implying that business 
performance in these countries is constantly under threat. Proponents of non-market strategy, 
particularly CPA, argue that firms’ participation in policy processes reduces exposure to 
institutional constraints and uncertainty (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Hillman and Hitt, 1999; 
Hillman et al., 2004), and consequently improves performance (Hillman, 2005). Building off 
this argumentation, I posit that the exposure of politically connected firms to institutional risk 
has a strong bearing on cost of debt. 
Banks consider the future performance of firms in their credit decisions. Essentially, it is not 
only backward-looking financial reports that are taken into account. Future prospects are also 
important as they are used to gauge repayment ability. It is for this reason that banks typically 
lend to firms with viable future projects or strong proposals (Adomako et al., 2016). But 
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future prospects very much depend on prevailing external conditions, and hence are 
dependent on firms’ capability to buffer or bridge threats or uncertainty in the external 
environment (Meznar and Nigh, 1995; Adler and Kwon, 2002; Hillman, 2005). Political 
connections mitigate threats, reduce the likelihood of corporate failure or dissolution, and 
increase sales growth (Zheng et al., 2015). As politically connected firms can use their ties to 
reduce threats and uncertainty facing their businesses, there is a high chance that these firms 
will survive, be competitive and successful. Consequently, banks will treat politically 
connected firms favourably, since their lower exposure to institutional risk signals positive 
future prospects. This expectation is stronger in developing countries such as Ghana where 
uncertainty is high and barriers in the business environment are many.     
H2: Institutional risk exposure mediates the relationship between managerial political 
ties and cost of debt 
The Mediating Role of Financial Reporting Quality 
In developed countries, the expectation that firms will prepare financial reports according to 
acceptable standards can be taken for granted. In emerging countries however, it could be 
wrong to have such an expectation. Prior research shows that in countries with bank-based 
financial systems, there is low relevance and demand for financial information (Ali and 
Hwang, 2000). Also, in countries where there is low investor protection and concentrated 
ownership, the quality of financial reporting is poor (Ball et al., 2000). Unfortunately, 
developing countries such as Ghana exhibit all of these traits – bank-oriented financial 
systems, low investor protection and concentrated ownerships (Chen et al., 2011).  
Poor financial reporting can affect the ability of firms to raise debt capital. Recent evidence 
shows that high quality financial reporting is positively related to investment efficiency 
(Chen et al., 2011), a quality valued by investors. When assessing credit applications, banks 
usually want to see properly prepared financial reports which comply with acceptable 
disclosure standards. They also like to see that the reports are audited regularly and annual 
returns are filed with the Registrar General. However in Ghana and many other countries 
around the world, most firms are closely held by individuals or families (Nagar et al., 2011), 
so the need to prepare financial reports is low. Mentioned previously, rampant non-
compliance in filing annual returns by firms in Ghana compelled the Registrar to launch a 
nation-wide inspection in 2015 (Registrar General's Department, 2015). Banks are 
knowledgeable about the poor book-keeping culture in emerging countries and thus scrutinize 
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the financial reports of loan applicants. Those with poor accounting information have high 
agency and information risk (Lin et al., 2014), and are either denied credit, charged high 
interest rates or made to pledge huge collateral (Rajan and Winton, 1995; Bharath et al., 
2008)    
The advantage for politically connected firms comes from evidence that they are more likely 
to appoint reputable and global audit firms to evaluate their financial records (Guedhami et 
al., 2014), and they have the resources to meet the high fees charged by these audit firms. The 
appointment of top auditors is intended to address questions about the quality of financial 
reporting in politically connected firms (Gul, 2006; Chaney et al., 2011; Effiezal et al., 2011). 
Such appointments also increase transparency and ensure that financial disclosure meets 
national and international standards. In politically connected firms, directors’ compensation is 
an avenue for tunnelling corporate funds (Arlen and Weiss, 1995), but around the world, this 
information is either not reported or not comprehensive (Adithipyangkul et al., 2011; Melis et 
al., 2015). However, a recent study in China showed that CEO compensation is both 
disclosed and lower in politically connected firms (Chizema et al., 2015). This finding 
suggests that there is transparency and little or no self-aggrandizement in connected firms, 
partly because these firms are more aligned with governments’ social and equity policies 
(Chizema et al., 2015) and partly because they appoint quality and top auditors to screen their 
books and manage their financial reporting, which leaves no room for corruption or financial 
malfeasance.  
Moreover, research on the role of financial literacy in financing and investment (Yoong, 
2011; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011; Tokar, 2015; Allgood and Walstad, 2016) suggest that 
people with financial knowledge are more likely to engage in recommended financial 
practices (Hilgert et al., 2003). They are also able to prepare budgets (Greenspan, 2002), 
prepare quality financial reports (Drexler et al., 2014) and manage debt effectively (Lusardi 
and Tufano, 2009). As a result, financial literacy is a factor that influences banks’ credit 
decisions in emerging countries (Miller et al., 2009; Adomako et al., 2016). Taking these 
facts into account, I argue that resource endowments in politically connected firms suggests 
that these firms are capable of recruiting qualified and experienced financial management 
experts who will not only be able to evaluate the viability of projects, but will also be able to 
prepare accurate financial reports. I therefore hypothesize that:  
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H3: Financial reporting quality mediates the relationship between managerial political 
ties and cost of debt 
The Mediating Role of Non-Financial Disclosure 
Non-financial disclosures allow for an overall picture of firm performance to be painted. 
These disclosures cover environmental matters, respect for human rights, anti-bribery and 
corruption (EU, 2016). Currently in the EU, only listed firms with more than 500 employees 
are mandated to disclose non-financial information. For all other firms, such disclosures are 
voluntary. In emerging countries where majority of the firms are privately held, voluntary 
disclosures are not common (Ta, 2012). In Ghana, corporate governance structures, related 
party transactions, risk evaluation, internal and external assessments are rarely disclosed by 
firms (World Bank, 2005; Agyei-Mensah, 2016). Similarly, new developments that have 
implications for firm performance are either not reported at all or not reported timely. This 
weak non-financial disclosure culture in Ghana and other emerging countries can be 
attributed to the failure or inability of firms to create and maintain corporate websites and 
other channels of disclosure. Banks and other investors usually look up corporate information 
prior to making loan decisions (Bharath et al., 2008), hence having an online site where 
information or updates can be posted augers well for loan applicants. In very risky 
environments and for highly leveraged firms, past financial information may not be 
informative of future cash flows, hence banks use non-financial and governance information 
to support decision making (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003).   
Politically active firms are large and resourceful (Hersch and McDougall, 2000; Masters and 
Keim, 1985; Hillman, 2003), and therefore have the capacity to maintain and update 
corporate websites. Moreover, they are likely to have press offices, public affairs departments 
or government affairs directorates (Lawton et al., 2014), and hence are likely to frequently 
interact with external stakeholders. These interactions with external stakeholders increase 
visibility and recognition, reduce information asymmetry and boost investor confidence 
(Huang and Wei, 2012). Furthermore, connected firms are more likely to operate in highly 
regulated industries, and hence may be bound by mandatory non-financial disclosure 
requirements. The foregoing arguments are supported by evidence that large firms and firms 
with internet visibility are more likely to make risk disclosures (Allini et al., 2016). 
Consequently, banks are expected to be positively influenced by the high level of visibility 
and non-financial disclosure by politically connected firms. I therefore hypothesize that: 
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H4: Non-financial disclosure mediates the relationship between managerial political 
ties and cost of debt 
The Mediating Role of Board Independence 
Board size and board composition have been explored by prior studies (Boyd, 1990; Hillman 
et al., 2000; Hillman, 2005; Harris and Raviv, 2008), so is the link between firm size and 
board diversity (Boone et al., 2007; Lehn et al., 2009). It is argued that large firms have an 
increased demand for administrative and supervisory roles in order to ensure organizational 
efficiency. Similarly, large firms need more linkages to various elements of the external 
environment (Pfeffer, 1972; Hillman et al., 2000), and thus have larger boards (Arnegger et 
al., 2014). In emerging countries where property rights protection is weak, firms have larger 
boards in order to buffer institutional voids (Chen, 2015). The advantages of large boards are 
not far-fetched. For example, they are able to secure critical resources (Goodstein et al., 
1994) and provide quality counsel to CEOs and Management teams (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989). A large board also increases the number of board interlocks (Bazerman and 
Schoorman, 1983), facilitates capital acquisition (Stearns and Mizruchi, 1993), and reduces 
risk taking (Wang, 2012; Huang and Wang, 2015). More importantly, a large board enables a 
firm to create committees to monitor different aspects of its operations. Additionally, a large 
board is more likely to have independent/outside directors than a small board.      
In finance literature, a large proportion of non-executive directors is associated with low 
spreads and bond yields (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Lin et al., 2014). This is because these 
outside directors provide effective monitoring. For example, it is argued that firms with 
outside directors can make more efficient corporate decisions (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; 
Cotter et al., 1997), control CEO compensation (Boyd, 1994), and easily fire an under-
performing CEO (Weisback, 1988). Also, the likelihood of financial statement fraud is lower 
in these firms (Beasley, 1996; Aliyu and Ishaq, 2015). Because of the information 
disadvantage of outside directors, they pay more attention to defaults than project pay-offs, 
and their decisions tend to favour creditors (Lin et al., 2014). Consequently, board 
independence is associated with lower cost of debt (Francis et al., 2012). Bringing the 
discussion above into context, politically connected firms are typically large (Lux et al., 
2011), and are therefore likely to have larger boards and benefit from multiple board 
interlocks. Their large boards also imply they may have more non-executive, independent or 
outside directors to monitor activities and operations. As was shown in Chapter 5, connected 
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firms are less likely to have CEO duality. These positive governance attributes translate into 
lower cost of debt (Lin et al., 2014). I therefore hypothesize that: 
H5: Board independence mediates the relationship between managerial political ties 
and cost of debt  
Figure 7-1 presents the research model for the examining mediation in the relationship 
between managerial political ties and cost of debt. These mediators are hypothesized to 
reduce the cost of debt of politically connected firms. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-1 Research Model for Mediation 
 
7.2 Data and Analysis 
As with the previous chapters, and indeed, the entire thesis, the data for this study comes 
from a survey of 179 firms operating in Ghana. In Chapter 4, details of the sources of data 
and the collection process were presented. Measures to address common method variance 
(CMV), validity and reliability of the scales and variables during design and administration of 
the survey are also explained in Chapter 4. In the sample, 55.3% of the firms are locally 
owned. Also, majority of the firms have a public affairs department or function. In an 
emerging country such as Ghana, this finding may be surprising but it is expected considering 
that majority of the firms in the sample are medium and large scale enterprises. 21 industries, 
ranging from mining to textiles, are represented in the sample. On the average, the firms have 
been operating in Ghana for 19 years. Also, majority of the firms borrow from privately-
owned banks. These banks are the majority in the country (26 private banks versus 3 State-
owned banks). Cost of borrowing is high as firms can be charged interest rates as high as 
35%. 
 Social Network Expansion (H1) 
 Institutional Risk Reduction (H2) 
 Financial Reporting Quality (H3) 
 Non-financial Disclosure (H4) 
 Board Independence (H5) 
 
Managerial Political 
Ties 
Cost of debt 
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To examine whether institutional risk, financial reporting quality, non-financial disclosure, 
social network expansion and board independence mediate the relationship between political 
ties and cost of debt, I followed the approach of Guo et al. (2013) and performed mediation 
tests using hierarchical regression techniques. Going by this regression approach, I followed 
the general recommendations of Baron and Kenny (1986), Judd and Kenny (1981) and James 
and Brett (1984) and did the analyses in four stages. In the first stage, I checked whether the 
independent variable (political ties) is significantly related to the dependent variable (interest 
rate). In the second stage, I checked if there were significant relationships between the 
independent variable (political ties) and the mediator variables (institutional risk, financial 
reporting quality, non-financial disclosure, social network expansion, and board 
independence). In the third stage, I regressed each of the mediator variables on the dependent 
variable (interest rates) while controlling for the independent variable (political ties) to check 
whether any significant relationships exist. In the final stage, I combined the mediator 
variables that were significant in the third stage with the independent variable (political ties) 
in a single regression Model to check whether the effects of the mediators on the dependent 
variable (interest rates) are independent of one another.  These four stages are illustrated in 
Figure 7-2.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-2 Stages of Mediation Tests 
Stage 1 Political Ties Interest Rates 
Stage 2 Political Ties 
Institutional risk 
Financial reporting quality 
Non-financial disclosure 
Board Independence 
Social network expansion 
Stage 3 
Interest Rates 
Stage 
4 
Interest Rates 
Institutional risk 
Financial reporting quality 
Non-financial disclosure 
Board Independence 
Social network expansion 
 
Political Ties 
Institutional risk 
Financial reporting quality 
Non-financial disclosure 
Board Independence 
Social network expansion 
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A variable must be significant in a previous stage in order to be included in a subsequent 
stage. This particularly applies to the mediator variables. To illustrate, if the relationship 
between political ties and a mediator variable is insignificant, that mediator variable is 
omitted from further analyses. In the same vein, if the relationship between any of the 
mediator variables and interest rates is insignificant, that mediator variable is omitted from 
further tests. This implies that by the time a researcher reaches stage 4, only significant 
mediator variables should remain in the analysis. 
Prior to testing for mediation, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was done to check the 
factor structure of constructs, with specific interest in the mediator constructs because they 
are new and have not been previously validated. A global factor analysis of the independent 
construct and invalidated mediator constructs returned five factors. The constructs, as 
conceptualized, were not different from the individual EFA structures. All five factors 
accounted for a cumulative variance of 82.12%. Table 7-1 shows the results. 
 ----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7-1 here. See page 173 
------------------------------------------------ 
Thereafter, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was performed to confirm the factor 
structure of the constructs. The results of the CFA, which include the items, their respective 
loadings and T-values, average variance extracted (AVE) and composite reliability (CR), are 
shown in Table 7-2. As can be seen, the AVE and CR scores exceed the minimum thresholds 
of 0.50 and 0.70 respectively (Fornell and Larcker, 1981; Hair et al., 1998), thus confirming 
reliability of the constructs. High factor loadings combined with satisfactory fit indices (CFI 
= 0.96, NFI = 0.95, IFI = 0.97, RMSEA = 0.05, p > 0.05) indicate that the measurement 
model fits the data well. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7-2 here. See page 174 
------------------------------------------------ 
7.3 Results 
The means, standard deviations, correlation coefficients and other statistics are shown in 
Table 7-3. The correlation matrix reveals significant correlations between the variables. 
However, there are no large correlations above 0.90. The largest correlation coefficient is 
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0.65. This “ball park” method suggests that multicollinearity does not affect the robustness of 
the findings (Berry, 1993; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2014). Moreover, the Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) scores are less than 10, and hence support the absence of multicollinearity 
(Myers, 1990; Field, 2013). Furthermore, the Cronbach alphas for the constructs are well 
above the minimum threshold of 0.70 (Nunnally, 1978), and thus support internal consistency 
and reliability. I followed the approach of Ambos et al (2010) and checked discriminant 
validity by comparing the square root of the average variance extracted (AVE) of each 
construct (Table 7-3) with the correlation between construct pairs. The AVE values are 
consistently larger than the correlations between the constructs, indicating that each construct 
has more internally extracted variance than the variance it shares with other constructs 
(Fornell and Larcker, 1981). This indicates satisfactory discriminant validity and confirms 
that each construct is different from the other constructs. 
Results for the first and second stages of the mediation test are shown in Table 7-4. In this 
Table, it can be seen that the relationship between political ties and interest rate is significant 
(Model 1: β = 0.008, p < 0.01). Similarly, the relationship between political ties and each of 
the mediator variables is significant (Models 2 to 6). Peering deeper, the results show that 
political ties are positively associated with risk exposure (Model 2: β = 0.069, p < 0.05) and 
social network expansion (Model 5: β = 0.405, p < 0.01), suggesting that stronger ties lead to 
increased perceptions of risk exposure and high utilization of the political connections of 
firms by banks. However, political ties are negatively related to financial reporting quality 
(Model 3: β = -0.096, p < 0.05), non-financial disclosure (Model 4: β = -0.169, p < 0.01), and 
board independence (Model 6: β = -0.009, p < 0.05), suggesting poor governance in 
connected firms.  
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 7-3 and 7-4 here. See pages 175 and 176 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
As the mediator variables are significantly related to the independent variable, they are 
included in the next stages where their association with interest rates is tested. The results for 
these next stages (stages three and four) are shown in Table 7-5. Here, only institutional risk 
exposure (Model 6: β = 0.005, p < 0.1) and financial reporting quality (Model 6: β = -0.006, 
p < 0.01) have a significant association with interest rate. The directions of their coefficients 
are also interesting. Obviously, a high exposure of risk is expected to make banks seek 
additional return in the form of high interest rates, hence the positive relationship. Also, when 
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financial reporting is accurate, information asymmetry is reduced and cost of debt is expected 
to be lower. In Model 6 where the significant moderators (institutional risk and financial 
reporting quality) and political ties are regressed on interest rates, the results are significant, 
and hence show that both variables mediate the relationship between political ties and cost of 
debt. I therefore find support for H2 and H3. However, only partial mediation is present as 
political ties are still significant in the Model. In effect, strong political ties lead to increased 
risk exposure, hence the high interest rates charged to connected firms. Similarly, strong 
political ties lead to poor financial reporting quality, hence the high interest rates charged to 
connected firms.  
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7-5 here. See page 177 
---------------------------------------------- 
7.4 Discussion of the Results 
Mediation in the relationship between political ties and cost of debt was tested using five 
variables. Of these five variables, only two are significant. Nevertheless, this study has 
explored a nascent topic and the findings reveal how the impact of political ties in credit 
markets is realized, and by doing so, has shed light on the under-explored mechanisms of 
CPA (Lux et al., 2011; Rajwani and Liedong, 2015).  
The first thing worth mentioning is the negative relationship between political ties and very 
important governance variables, namely financial reporting quality, non-financial disclosure 
and board independence. Politically connected firms are usually large and resourceful 
(Masters and Keim, 1985; Meznar and Nigh, 1995; Hansen and Mitchell, 2000; Hillman, 
2003), hence they are expected to appoint very reputable auditors (Guedhami et al., 2014) to 
evaluate their financial records. They are also expected to have corporate websites or 
maintain highly effective public affairs departments to engage with external stakeholders and 
disclose non-mandatory information. Moreover, evidence that most connected firms operate 
in highly regulated industries (Hansen and Mitchell, 2000) suggests that these firms may be 
mandated to disclose non-financial information. Therefore, positive relationships between 
political ties and the corporate governance variables were hypothesized, but the results 
showed otherwise. The findings are, however, consistent with prior studies in three ways. 
First, concerns have been documented about the proneness of politically connected firms to 
financial manipulations (Gul, 2006; Guedhami et al., 2014). These firms are more likely to 
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misreport their accounts in order to conceal politically motivated malfeasances (Effiezal et 
al., 2011). Second, evidence shows that the quality of accounting information disclosed by 
connected firms is lower when compared to that of non-connected firms (Chaney et al., 
2011). Third, politically connected firms make donations to political parties and candidates 
but do not report this spending in their financial statements or even disclose it to their 
shareholders (Aggarwal et al., 2011), a phenomenon that can culminate in personal 
managerial imperatives influencing CPA (Igan et al., 2011; Hadani and Schuler, 2013). In 
sum, the poor governance in connected firms is explicable. 
The result that is perhaps very surprising is the positive mediating effect of institutional risk 
exposure. While the relationship between political ties and risk was insignificant in the 
previous chapter (Chapter 6), it is positive and significant in this chapter (most likely because 
of the different controls used), suggesting that political ties increase cost of debt by 
increasing the risk exposure of firms. Essentially, strong political ties lead to high risk 
exposure, culminating in high interest rates. Two conclusions derive from this result. First, 
politically connected firms are exposed to high institutional risk, perhaps because they 
operate in highly regulated industries where the environment is turbulent (Hansen and 
Mitchell, 2000). This turbulence motivates the development of political ties. Second, as was 
established in Chapter 6, the development of political ties does not reduce the risk exposure 
of firms. In essence, the postulated effectiveness of political ties in risk reduction (Hillman 
and Hitt, 1999) cannot be empirically supported. Whether firms with strong political ties 
operate in industries fraught with uncertainty or whether high uncertainty triggers the 
development of strong political ties is inconsequential to the conclusion that the role of CPA 
in risk reduction could be illusionary. This is because the data covered a window of three 
years, and thus captured the lagged effect political ties are expected to have on organizational 
outcomes. Banks seem to be wary about the likelihood of contract repudiation and political 
witch-hunting suffered by connected firms when there is a change of government, and hence 
use high interest rates to compensate for the risk. Considering that the time frame of the 
responses (2011-2013) covers Ghana’s 2012 general election (November 2012) and the death 
of a sitting president (July 2012), it is not strange that banks’ evaluation of uncertainty and 
the potential liabilities of politically connected firms perhaps influenced the pricing of loans.      
Non-financial disclosure, board independence and social network expansion were 
insignificant mediators. Considering the institutional and governance challenges in Ghana, it 
is perhaps still early to expect banks to factor non-mandatory information into their loan 
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pricing decisions. Low internet penetration in Africa and lack of resources make it difficult 
for firms to run websites where they can disclose non-financial information and publish press 
releases about their businesses. Hence, even though connected firms do not disclose non-
financial information, banks rarely take this into account when setting interest rates. 
Similarly, board independence is generally low among firms in most African countries (Abor 
and Biekpe, 2007a; Bokpin and Isshaq, 2009; Abor and Fiador, 2013), and therefore does not 
seem to be an important factor influencing the way banks price their loans. Also, it seems 
banks do not consider opportunities for political network expansion when making loan 
decisions. Operating in arguably the most regulated industry in the world, it is plausible to 
expect banks to develop their own political connections in order to influence the policy issues 
they face. Consequently, the political networks of connected firms are not valuable in their 
loan decisions. This finding challenges the dependency hypothesis (e.g. Houston et al. 2014) 
and suggests that firms in regulated industries have no motivations to accord favours to 
connected firms in return for access to the political networks of the connected firms or for 
favours from politicians.     
In sum, only institutional risk exposure and financial reporting quality mediate the political 
ties-cost of debt relationship. The significant negative relationship between political ties and 
interest rates arises because political ties increase risk exposure and reduce the quality of 
financial information. This study makes important contributions to the literature. It provides 
deep insights by integrating social capital and institutional theories with corporate 
governance insights to demonstrate mediation in the relationship between CPA and cost of 
debt in a weak institutional environment.  
7.5 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I examined and presented findings on mediation in the relationship between 
managerial political ties and cost of debt. A mix of institutional, social capital and 
governance related variables were hypothesized as the mechanisms through which CPA 
exerts an influence in credit markets. Employing hierarchical regressions and following the 
guidelines for testing mediation (Judd and Kenny, 1981; Baron and Kenny, 1986), I found 
that institutional risk exposure and financial reporting quality play significant mediating roles 
in the pricing of loans given to politically connected firms. In specific terms, political ties are 
associated with high exposure to investment climate constraints which subsequently lead to 
high interest rates. Similarly, political ties are associated with low quality financial reporting. 
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Low reporting quality increases information asymmetry between banks and firms, and leads 
to high interest rates on loans. These findings do not support any of the hypotheses of this 
study, but they are consistent with prior literature.  
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Table 7-1 Global Factor Analysis  
  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
Institutional Holding           
Shares held by Pension Funds .926         
Shares held by Mutual Funds .913         
Shares held by Insurance companies .908 .106 .107     
Shares held by Endowment Funds .884       .113 
Shares held by Charities and Foundations .864         
Shares held by Private Equity Firms .841   -.109     
Financial Reporting Quality           
Financial reporting done timely   .896 -.140     
Expenses and losses recognised immediately   .892   .174 -.109 
Revenues deferred until verified   .892       
Financial reports meet acceptable standards .176 .843   .110   
Social Network Expansion           
Banks soliciting company assistance on policy 
issues     .928 -.129 .222 
Banks utilizing political contacts and network of 
company executives 
    .913 -.134 .294 
Banks soliciting political referrals from company   -.139 .884 -.110 .299 
Non-Financial Disclosure           
Disclosure of conflicts of interest to shareholders   .123 -.123 .840   
Disclosure of related party transaction to 
shareholders   .137 -.184 .810 -.104 
Disclosure of external and business risk 
assessments to shareholders       .801 -.205 
Disclosure of anti-corruption policy to shareholders 
  .106 -.119 .792 -.227 
Managerial Political Ties           
Maintaining good relationships with gov’t officials     .292 -.209 .885 
Spending time dealing with gov’t affairs     .381 -.289 .811 
Investing in building relationships with gov’t 
officials     .417 -.334 .767 
            
Eigen value 5.89 4.89 2.77 1.98 1.34 
Percentage of variance explained 24.05 16.07 15.11 14.86 12.01 
Percentage of cumulative variance explained 24.05 40.12 55.24 70.1 82.12 
      
Note: Principal Component Analysis; Varimax Rotation 
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Table 7-2 Results of Confirmatory Factor Analysis  
Construct Measurement Items 
Factor 
Loading T-value 
Managerial political ties  
  (AVE = 0.84; CR = 0.94) Spending time dealing with gov't affairs 0.93 19.91 
 
Investing in building relationships with gov't officials 0.91 (Fixed) 
 
Maintaining good relationships with gov't officials 0.91 18.99 
Institutional Holding  
  (AVE = 0.75; CR = 0.95) Shares held by Pension funds 0.94 (Fixed) 
 
Shares held by Insurance companies 0.92 22.73 
 
Shares held by Endowment funds 0.88 20.09 
 
Shares held by Mutual funds 0.86 18.76 
 
Shares held by Charities 0.81 15.93 
 
Shares held by Private equity firms 0.77 14.44 
Financial Reporting Quality  
   (AVE = 0.73; CR = 0.91) Financial reporting done timely 0.89 12.97 
 
Revenues deferred until verified 0.88 12.69 
 
Expenses and losses recognised immediately 0.86 12.4 
 
Financial reports meet acceptable standards 0.77 (Fixed) 
Non-financial Disclosure  
  (AVE = 0.60; CR = 0.86) Disclosure of conflicts of interest  0.81 10.64 
 
Disclosure of related party transactions 0.78 (Fixed) 
 
Disclosure of anti-corruption policy  0.78 10.32 
 
Disclosure of external and business risk assessments  0.72 9.51 
Social Network Expansion  
  (AVE = 0.90; CR = 0.96) Banks utilizing  network of company executives 0.98 32.06 
 
Banks soliciting company assistance on policy issues 0.95 (Fixed) 
  Banks soliciting referrals from company executives 0.91 23.15 
    
Note: AVE = Average Variance Extracted; CR = Composite Reliability 
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Table 7-3 Correlations and Descriptive Statistics  
    Mean SD 
Cronbach 
Alpha 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Largest 
VIF 
1 
Managerial Political 
Ties 
3.90 2.19 0.94 1                       
1.09 
2 Institutional Risk 2.92 0.97 0.9 0.16** 1                     1.35 
3 
Financial Reporting 
Quality 
5.83 1.19 0.91 -0.15** -.121 1                   
1.06 
4 
Non-financial 
Disclosure 
2.00 0.74 0.86 
-
0.50*** 
-0.15** 0.24*** 1                 
1.42 
5 
Social Network 
Expansion 
1.88 1.39 0.96 0.65*** -.020 
-
0.19*** 
-
0.30*** 
1               
1.95 
6 Board Independence 0.15 0.13 - -0.18** .130 .040 .090 -0.19** 1             1.14 
7 Institutional Holding 2.08 1.51 0.94 .060 
-
0.193*** 
.100 -0.04 .080 
-
0.28*** 
1           
1.1 
8 Firm Age 19.17 12.62 - 0.22*** .020 .030 -0.10 0.16** -0.05 .030 1         1.13 
9 Firm Size 4.56 0.62 - .002 -.010 .070 .040 -0.08 0.13* -0.03 0.14* 1       1.05 
10 Ownership 0.45 0.50 - -0.05 -.110 .002 .090 -0.09 .060 0.13* .120 .110 1     1.150 
11 Value of collateral 4.91 1.71 - .010 -0.38*** .010 -0.005 0.208*** -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 .010 
-
0.30** 
1   
1.07 
12 Credit Relationships 3.82 1.57 - .110 0.15** -0.05 -0.05 .080 .120 
-
0.28*** 
-
0.16** 
.090 -0.13* .060 1 
1.18 
Note: N = 179; ***Correlation is significant at the 1% level (2-tailed); **Correlation is significant at the 5% level (2-tailed); *Correlation is significant at the 10% level (2-tailed) 
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Table 7-4 Mediation Test - First and Second Paths
a 
  Dependent Variables 
  
Interest 
Rate 
(Model 1) 
Institutional 
Risk 
Exposure 
(Model 2) 
Financial 
Rep Quality 
(Model 3) 
Non-
financial 
Disclosure 
(Model 4) 
Social 
Network 
Expansion 
(Model 5) 
Board 
Independence 
(Model 6) 
Independent Variable 
      Managerial Political Ties 0.008*** 0.069** -0.096** -0.169*** 0.405*** -0.009** 
  
      Control Variables 
      Institutional Holding -0.007*** -0.108** 0.093 -0.007 0.051 -0.022*** 
Firm Age 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.000 0.004 0.000 
Firm Size -0.001 0.001 0.138 0.034 -0.198 0.024 
Ownership -0.016*** -0.403*** -0.082 0.108 0.008 0.020 
Value of collateral 0.004** -0.256*** 0.004 0.009 0.165*** -0.002 
Credit Relationships 0.007*** 0.057 0.003 0.005 0.021 0.005 
       Model Summary 
      F value 19.64*** 8.81*** 1.18 8.51*** 22.45*** 3.69*** 
Adjusted R
2 
0.44 0.24 0.01 0.23 0.46 0.10 
Note: 
N = 179. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 (two-tailed significance tests). VIF scores are below 2 
a 
The first path tests the relationship between the dependent and dependent variable (Model 1). The second path tests the 
relationship between the independent variable and the mediator variables (Models 2 – 6)  
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Table 7-5 Mediation Test – Third and Fourth Pathsa 
  Dependent Variable 
  
Interest Rate 
(Model 1) 
Interest Rate 
(Model 2) 
Interest Rate 
(Model 3) 
Interest Rate 
(Model 4) 
Interest Rate 
(Model 5) 
Interest Rate 
(Model 6) 
Independent Variables 
      Managerial Political Ties 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 
  
      Mediator Variables 
      Institutional Risk 0.005* 
    
0.004* 
Financial Reporting Quality 
 
-0.006*** 
   
-0.005** 
Non-financial Disclosure 
  
-0.003 
   Social Network Expansion 
   
-0.002 
  Board Independence 
    
-0.023 
   
      Control Variables 
      Institutional Holding -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.005*** 
Firm Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firm Size -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
Ownership -0.013** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.014*** 
Value of collateral 0.005*** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.005*** 
Credit Relationships 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
       Model Summary 
      F value 17.95*** 18.70*** 17.19*** 17.20*** 17.36*** 17.19*** 
Adjusted R
2 
0.45 0.46 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.47 
Note: 
N = 179. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 (two-tailed significance tests). VIF scores are below 2 
a 
The third path tests the relationship between the mediator variables and dependent variables while controlling for the 
independent variable (Models 1-5). The fourth path tests the relationship between the independence of the significant 
mediator variables (Model 6) 
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Chapter 8 Discussion and Contribution to Knowledge 
This PhD thesis focused on the outcomes of corporate political activity (CPA). Specifically, it 
examined the relationships between managerial political ties, cost of debt and institutional 
risk exposure in Ghana, sub-Saharan Africa. It also explored the mechanisms that mediate the 
relationship between political ties and cost of debt. As argued in Chapter 3, Ghana is an 
interesting context that presents opportunities for contributing to literature in the nascent 
fields of non-market strategy and corporate political activity. The entire thesis comprises of 
one systematic review and three empirical studies. The next paragraphs summarize and 
integrate these studies. 
The first part of the thesis is a systematic review of the literature on CPA and firm 
performance. This review applied the Context-Intervention-Mechanism-Outcome (CIMO) 
logic (Denyer et al., 2008; Pilbeam et al., 2012) to scrutinize the contexts within which CPA 
is done, the various strategies used by firms, the outcomes of the political strategies, and the 
mechanisms underpinning the outcomes. After meticulously reviewing peer-reviewed papers, 
I found that the impact of CPA on firm performance is mixed, though majority of the 
reviewed studies reported positive results. I also found that while the relationships between 
context, political strategies and performance outcomes are clear in the literature, the 
mechanisms underlying these relationships are less clear. Moreover, I found that most CPA 
studies are done in a few countries in Europe, the Americas and Asia, without much attention 
paid to the Middle East and Africa. The findings of this review set the trajectory for the rest 
of the thesis. Aiming to make a significant contribution to the literature, I framed the research 
questions and positioned the thesis to address the gaps I identified from the systematic 
review. Specifically, I found that the impact of CPA in credit markets and the mediating 
mechanisms of CPA are under-studied. Accordingly, I found these gaps worth exploring in 
an emerging market setting.  
Following the systematic review, I did three empirical studies. The first study is an 
examination of the relationship between managerial political ties and cost of debt in Ghana. 
Using survey data from 179 firms, I found that political ties are positively related to interest 
rates. This positive relationship is weakened by managerial financial ties, and strengthened by 
borrowing from private-owned banks and the appointment of Big Four audit firms. Detailed 
findings of this study are contained in Chapter 5. The second empirical study examines the 
popularly postulated effect of political ties on risk reduction. Among other things, I found an 
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insignificant association between political ties and institutional risk exposure. This 
association is moderated by visibility and regulatory vulnerability. I also found that the 
interaction between political ties and CSR is insignificant in risk reduction. The results of this 
study can be found in Chapter 6. The final study addresses the paucity of mediation in 
political strategy studies by empirically investigating the underlying mechanisms of the 
political ties-cost of debt relationship. The findings, which are detailed in Chapter 7, show 
that the political ties-cost of debt relationship is mediated by institutional risk exposure and 
financial reporting quality. The results for all hypotheses tested in the three empirical studies 
are summarized in Table 8-1. 
Figure 8-1 illustrates the overarching model of the thesis and shows the three empirical parts. 
Together, all the parts contribute to resolve paradoxes and deepen understanding of the 
outcomes of political ties.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8-1 Overall Research Model 
 
Access to finance & 
Cost of Debt 
*Public Affairs Function 
*Social Responsibility 
*Regulatory Vulnerability 
Managerial Political 
Ties 
*Managerial financial ties 
*Government-owned Banks 
*Big-Four Audit Firms 
*Financial Representation 
 
Institutional Risk 
Exposure 
-
- 
 
*Network Expansion 
*Board Independence 
*Reporting Quality 
*Non-fin Disclosure 
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Table 8-1 Summary of Hypotheses and Results 
Hypothesis Detail Outcome 
   Empirical Study 1 - Political Ties, Access to Finance & Cost of Debt 
 Hypothesis 1 Political ties are positively related to access to finance Supported 
Hypothesis 2 Financial ties are positively related to access to finance Supported 
Hypothesis 3a CEO duality is negatively related to access to finance Supported 
Hypothesis 3b CEO duality weakens the positive relationship between political ties and access to finance Unsupported 
Hypothesis 4 Political ties are negatively related to interest rates Unsupported 
Hypothesis 5 Financial ties strengthen the negative relationship between political ties and interest rates Supported 
Hypothesis 6a Borrowing from government owned banks strengthens the negative relationship between 
political ties and interest rates 
Unsupported 
Hypothesis 6b Borrowing from privately owned banks weakens the negative relationship between 
political ties and interest rates 
Supported 
Hypothesis 7 Financial representation strengthens the negative relationship between political ties and 
interest rates 
Unsupported 
Hypothesis 8 Appointment of Big Four auditors strengthens the negative relationship between political 
ties and interest rates 
Unsupported 
   
Empirical Study 2 - Political Ties and Institutional Risk Exposure  
Hypothesis 1 Political ties are negatively related to institutional risk exposure Unsupported 
Hypothesis 2a Corporate social responsibility is negatively related to institutional risk exposure Supported 
Hypothesis 2b CSR strengthens the negative relationship between political ties and institutional risk 
exposure 
Unsupported 
Hypothesis 3 PA functions strengthen the negative relationship between political ties and institutional 
risk exposure 
Unsupported 
Hypothesis 4a Regulation strengthens the negative relationship between political ties and institutional risk 
exposure 
Unsupported 
Hypothesis 4b Regulation weakens the negative relationship between political ties and institutional risk 
exposure 
Supported 
   
Empirical Study 3 - Mediation in Political Ties-Cost of Debt Relationship  
Hypothesis 1 Social network extension mediates the relationship between managerial political ties Unsupported 
Hypothesis 2 Institutional risk exposure mediates the relationship between managerial political ties Supported 
Hypothesis 3 Financial reporting quality mediates the relationship between managerial political ties Supported 
Hypothesis 4 Non-financial disclosure mediates the relationship between managerial political ties Unsupported 
Hypothesis 5 Board independence mediates the relationship between managerial political ties Unsupported 
 
 
 
 
 
 
182 | P a g e  
 
8.1 Contribution to Knowledge 
In this section, I discuss how this thesis contributes to knowledge. As the entire thesis is made 
up of distinct but interrelated studies which have overlapping implications for theory, I have 
organized my claims to knowledge according to themes, not studies. In this respect, the 
discussion in this section will focus on the thesis’ overall contribution to: 1) CPA and non-
market strategy literature; 2) social capital theory; and 3) institutional theory. 
8.1.1 Contributions to CPA and Non-market Strategy Literature    
This thesis makes important contributions to non-market strategy literature. First, the 
systematic review deepens understanding of the relationship between political ties and firm 
performance. It integrates and synthesizes highly fragmented literature to offer deep insights 
into the topic by contextualizing the outcomes of CPA and also exploring the often-ignored 
underlying mechanisms of those outcomes (Lux et al., 2011). This review, which was 
published in a highly ranked journal (ABS 4), is the first to systematically investigate the 
impact of CPA on firm performance. It is also the first to do so using the CIMO-logic 
(Denyer et al., 2008; Pilbeam et al., 2012). Applying the CIMO-logic revealed that CPA and 
its effect on firm performance vary in different institutional contexts.  
Second, this thesis extends political ties literature to emerging credit markets. The effect of 
political ties on cost of debt has not received adequate attention despite the importance of 
capital for firms. The few studies that have investigated this topic have reported mixed 
findings and have ignited an on-going debate (Bliss and Gul, 2012; Lashitew, 2014; Houston 
et al., 2014). My thesis joins this nascent debate and attempts to clarify the contested effect of 
political ties on access to finance and loan pricing. The results show that politically connected 
firms have easy access to loan finance and are therefore more likely to be highly leveraged 
(Fraser et al., 2006; Claessens et al., 2008). However, these firms are charged high interest 
rates by banks, a finding that is consistent with a previous study conducted in Malaysia (Bliss 
and Gul, 2012). Various governance factors, including CEO duality and Big Four auditors, 
moderate these results. This thesis therefore extends the contingency perspective of CPA 
(Peng and Luo, 2000; Li and Zhang, 2007; Sheng et al., 2011) and provides evidence to back 
not only the value-adding potential of CPA (Peng and Luo, 2000; Hillman, 2005; Hersch et 
al., 2008; Goldman et al., 2009) but also the cost of political embeddedness (Sun et al., 2010; 
Okhmatovskiy, 2010; Sun et al., 2012). Using same data, this thesis shows that CPA could be 
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a “double-edged” sword, capable of enhancing and capable of harming performance. 
Particularly, the findings depict that CPA has a differential impact on even very closely 
related outcomes such as access to finance and cost of debt.    
Third, this thesis contributes to the CPA literature by enhancing our understanding of the 
effect of political ties on risk exposure. Though researchers have postulated that CPA reduces 
uncertainty (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Hillman et al., 1999), empirical proof has been lacking. 
This study reveals no significant association between political ties and risk exposure. 
However, it shows that regulation and public affairs functions, depicting vulnerability and 
visibility respectively, increase the institutional risk exposure of politically connected firms. 
Consequently, this study shows that political ties lack the force of institutional 
entrepreneurship (Battilana et al., 2009). While they create access to the polity, they are not 
effective for addressing policy-related institutional voids. This thesis highlights the two-
pronged nature of CPA, which differentiates between access and effect (Kim, 2008; Liedong 
et al., 2015). This thesis also highlights the important role of visibility in the risk exposure of 
politically connected firms (Puck et al., 2013). Moreover, this thesis demonstrates that the 
conjectured ability of CPA to reduce risk exposure might only be illusional, not real.   
Furthermore, this thesis is among early studies to empirically examine the complementarity 
between CPA and CSR. These two strands of non-market strategy have been treated as 
“silos” which hardly interact (Mellahi et al., 2016), but researchers have posited that they can 
be integrated for high firm performance (Hond et al., 2014; Liedong et al., 2015; Hadani and 
Coombes, 2015). For instance, some scholars have suggested that CSR strengthens CPA 
(Marquis and Qian, 2014; Rehbein and Schuler, 2015b), reduces barriers to political entry 
(Wang and Qian, 2011) or weakens the negative effect of CPA (Liedong et al., 2015; Sun et 
al., 2012). In spite of these positive arguments, this thesis finds no evidence to support 
complementariness. The findings show that while CSR reduces perceptions of risk exposure, 
it becomes ineffective when combined with CPA, thereby suggesting the existence of 
“cannibalization” in an integrated non-market strategy whereby one activity erodes the gains 
of the other. The findings also demonstrate that in institutionally complex environments such 
as Ghana and similar countries, a proper alignment is required to realize the gains of CPA 
and CSR; otherwise value-erosion will occur (Hond et al., 2014). Taking everything into 
account, this study does not only fill the lack of insight into this interesting topic, but it also 
tests the proposition that CSR is a political act (Hillman et al., 2004; Morsing and Roepstorff, 
2015). Along this line, it makes a valuable addition to the political-CSR literature. 
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Fourth, this thesis enhances understanding of how political ties affect cost of debt. One of the 
notable shortcomings in the CPA literature is the limited treatise of mediating mechanisms 
(Lux et al., 2011; Guo et al., 2014). In the past, most researchers were mainly interested in 
answering the “what” questions but not the “how” questions (Liedong et al., 2015). In recent 
times however, studies have begun to explore the mechanisms through which CPA impacts 
firm outcomes (Mellahi et al., 2016), but most of these studies are theoretical. By empirically 
examining the mediating role of institutional risk, financial and non-financial disclosures, 
board independence and social network expansion in the political ties-cost of debt 
relationship, this thesis addresses a pertinent issue in the literature. It transcends simple 
conjecture of mediation as is commonly done in existing research, and uncovers two 
important mediators that translate political ties into high cost of debt: institutional risk 
exposure and financial reporting quality. Specifically, political ties lead to high interest rates 
because they either increase or fail to reduce the exposure of firms to institutional risk and 
also because they instigate financial misconduct and poor financial reporting. The results do 
not support the proposition that political ties can affect performance outcomes by reducing 
uncertainty in a firm’s environment (Hillman et al., 1999), but they are consistent with 
negative concerns about the quality of financial management and reporting in politically 
connected firms (Guedhami et al., 2014; Effiezal et al., 2011; Gul, 2006; Chaney et al., 
2011). They confirm the link between CPA and governance, and show how the two factors 
interplay to influence outcomes in credit markets. Altogether, this study provides new and 
deeper insights into the effect of political connections in credit markets by shifting the focus 
from contingency to process (Peng and Luo, 2000; Guo et al., 2014). 
8.1.2 Contributions to Social Capital Theory 
This study addresses important concerns about previous research on social capital and makes 
significant contributions to the literature. First of all, this thesis conceptually and empirically 
differentiates between two types of managerial ties which are relevant in credit markets – 
political ties and financial ties. The results show that these ties are associated with high 
interest rates. However, when they are compared (in terms of betas), it is revealed that 
political ties have a more devastating effect on cost of debt, indicating that banks in Ghana 
appear to adopt a stricter, tougher and negative stance on the creditworthiness of politically 
connected firms. On the average, political ties seem to be more important to firms in Ghana, 
just as they are in China (Peng and Luo, 2000), but they are associated with poor corporate 
governance. These results contradict the dominant view that social capital improves 
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organizational performance in emerging countries (Peng and Luo, 2000; Acquaah, 2007; 
Boso et al., 2013). Rather, they support the view that building and maintaining network 
relationships could involve considerable costs (Peng and Luo, 2000; Park and Luo, 2001; 
Chung, 2012) and may lead to negative perceptions about firms. More precisely, this thesis 
shows that in Ghana, the cost of maintaining network relationships exceeds the favours 
received in lending transactions. Similarly, network relationships do not buffer barriers or 
constraints in the environment. More importantly, this thesis highlights the negative 
connotations or perceptions associated with some types of social capital, particularly political 
ties, and demonstrates how visibility can exacerbate the negative effect of these ties in 
emerging countries. In sum, this thesis reveals a negative side of social capital and calls for a 
deeper examination of the value of different types of network relationships.  
Second, even though existing social capital studies have focused on the network relationships 
managers have with stakeholders in market and non-environment environments (e.g. 
competitors, suppliers, customers, financiers, government officials, etc.), these studies have 
treated the different types of social capital as stand-alone silos which either have a direct 
effect on organizational outcomes (Peng and Luo, 2000; Park and Luo, 2001; Acquaah, 2007; 
Yiu et al., 2007) or a moderating or indirect effect on other relationships (Luo et al., 2008; 
Chung, 2012). Rarely have studies examined the interaction between different types of social 
capital. This thesis follows the approach of Boso et al. (2013) who integrate business and 
social network ties in their examination of entrepreneurial and market orientations in Ghana. 
It provides fine-grained insights into the combinative effect of political ties and financial ties 
on cost of debt. The results show that political ties and financial ties have an unfavourable 
impact on cost of debt, but when they are combined the impact is favourable. Essentially, 
social capital from financial ties plays an important role in lending transactions not only by 
facilitating access to information, but also by downplaying political differences and reducing 
political animosity between politicians and lending managers. In emerging countries such as 
Ghana, the two types of social capital are complementary and necessary in the credit market. 
This study therefore captures unique moderation effects and extends knowledge about the 
dynamic value of social capital (Boso et al., 2013). In doing so, it flags up the need for 
research to seriously look into the interactive effects of different types of social capital.  
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8.1.3 Contribution to Institutional Theory 
The findings of this thesis add knowledge to institutional theory in two ways. First, it is 
widely held that in developing or emerging countries where legal and regulatory institutions 
are weak and commercial regulations are poorly enforced (Khanna et al., 2005; Henisz and 
Zelner, 2010; Puck et al., 2013), social capital plays an important role in market transactions 
(North, 1990; Acquaah, 2007; Luo et al., 2008). An extension of this view, and of course a 
key tenet of institutional theory, captures the belief that as market-supporting institutions 
become stronger, the relevance of social capital reduces (Sheng et al., 2011). This thesis 
acknowledges the aforementioned views, but departs from them.  
The results indicate that social capital does not reduce the cost of debt for firms operating in 
Ghana, an institutionally voided emerging country. The important argument that emanates 
from these results suggests that the ability of social capital to enhance organizational value is 
not dependent on the overall institutional development of a country, but on the extent of 
institutional advancement and quality of corporate governance in the industry from which the 
benefit or favour of network ties will be received. In other words, it is the level of 
institutional development of the industry to which the clients of a firm belong which matters 
for the value of social capital, not the general institutional development of the country. In 
advancing this argument, this thesis acknowledges that industries are always at different 
stages of development. In Ghana, just like other countries, the financial services industry is 
highly regulated (Hadani and Schuler, 2013). It is therefore institutionally stronger, has 
clearly stipulated rules and procedures, and is relatively well-governed compared to other 
industries in the country. As a result, political ties are not accorded undue favours from 
banks. To conclude on this contribution, this thesis refines a key tenet of institutional theory 
by de-scaling from a macro-view of institutional development to an industry-view of 
institutional development. Essentially, political ties are less valuable when favours are sought 
from clients or partners operating in institutionally stronger industries.  
Second, scholars argue that the development of political ties leads to the attainment of 
organizational legitimacy (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Hillman, 2005; Guo et al., 2014) whereby 
an organization’s behaviours are aligned with its institutional environment (Suchman, 1995; 
Scott, 2001; Deephouse and Carter, 2005). This alignment, which can be attained by 
transacting with external stakeholders (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Rao et al., 2008), is 
particularly more important for firms in weak institutional environments (Ahlstrom et al., 
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2008). However, this thesis argues that high legitimacy can result in maintenance of the status 
quo as firms become unwillingly to change business models and logics that are already 
accepted by stakeholders (Guo et al., 2014). This inertia to change stifles innovation and 
harms firm performance. Additionally, high legitimacy could be costly because it fosters 
frequent government intervention in the form demands to support public services or sponsor 
public programs beyond business sense (Barreto and Baden-Fuller, 2006). Consequently, 
banks’ assessment of the future prospects of politically connected firms is not positive, hence 
the high interest rates charged on loans given to these firms. This thesis therefore supports the 
view that high levels of institutional and regulatory legitimacy could have adverse effects on 
organizational outcomes. 
Bringing the bigger picture into perspective, this thesis recognizes the importance of 
institutional theory for conducting business in emerging countries (Hoskisson et al., 2000; 
Peng, 2003), as well as the complementarity between institutional theory and social capital 
theory (Peng and Luo, 2000; Acquaah, 2007). Importantly, it acknowledges the moderating 
and mediating roles corporate governance plays in the complementarity between social 
capital and institutional logics. In effect, this thesis interprets the effect of political ties on 
cost of debt and institutional risk exposure by blending social capital theory, institutional 
theory and governance insights.  
Finally, and to a lesser extent, this thesis makes a methodological contribution. It introduces 
new constructs - financial ties, institutional risk exposure, financial reporting quality, non-
financial disclosure and social network expansion – which could be used in future research. 
Furthermore, this thesis shows that survey scales are contextual. The popular and validated 
scale for CPA (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Hillman and Wan, 2005; Puck et al., 2013) failed to 
work in Ghana, demonstrating how institutional development and corporate governance 
affect the practice and measurement of CPA. Setting the precedence, I believe that future 
CPA studies in sub-Saharan Africa will find my thesis’ context-relevant measures useful.  
On a general note, this thesis extends political strategy research to sub-Saharan Africa where 
strategy and management research is lacking (Mellahi and Mol, 2015). There is stronger need 
for political ties in high uncertainty environments such as Ghana (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; 
Puck et al., 2013). Indeed, political ties are predominant in emerging countries (Rajwani & 
Liedong, 2015). However, most emerging-country political activity studies have been 
conducted in a few Asian countries, hence limiting generalizations across the developing 
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world. Heeding to the calls for strategy research to be extended to Africa and the Middle East 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000; Wright et al., 2005), this research is set in Ghana, a sub-Saharan 
Africa. Not only does the Ghanaian context allow for plausible generalization of the findings 
to other countries within the sub-region, but it also allowed for the introduction of new 
variables that contribute to knowledge through the exploration of African phenomena that are 
beyond the scope of extant theory (Klingebiel and Stadler, 2015).  
8.2 Implications for Practice 
Besides making theoretical contributions, this thesis also has implications for practice. First, 
it enlightens managers about the benefits and costs of political and financial ties. Evidence 
from the research suggests that politically connected firms in emerging countries are 
disadvantaged in credit markets because lenders hold negative perceptions about the way they 
are governed. Managers of politically connected firms should therefore strengthen corporate 
governance so as to quell the vile views of financial misconduct and corruption that are often 
associated with deep political embeddedness in weak institutional environments. Importantly, 
managers need to ensure that financial reports are accurate, informative and of good quality. 
This will improve information asymmetry between firms and banks, and drive down interest 
rates. Alternatively, firms could establish and nurture social ties with managers of financial 
institutions. Such ties will breed trust, reduce information asymmetry and enable politically 
connected firms to get cheap loans. They will also break political barriers and reduce the 
negative effects of political ties on loan decisions. 
Second, this thesis sensitizes managers about the ineffectiveness of political ties in reducing 
institutional risk exposure. Emerging countries have high-uncertainty environments (Henisz 
and Delios, 2004). Firms in these countries have a high exposure to risk which can be 
managed using political strategies (Getz, 1993; Hillman and Hitt, 1999). Yet, the findings 
show that not all strategies reduce uncertainty. Political ties are particularly ineffective 
because they either create access to the polity but have no influence or they yield short-term 
idiosyncratic benefits. In essence, political ties alone are not enough. I argue that managers 
who want to overcome the entrenched barriers and constraints in institutionally-voided 
countries should employ strategies that promote institutional entrepreneurship to enable them 
change their institutional environments (Maguire et al., 2004; Battilana et al., 2009). I suggest 
that firms use informational strategies such as lobbying or petitioning. They are effective for 
policy and regulatory influence and for shaping business environments. Though the policy-
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making process in most emerging countries does not offer many opportunities for firms to be 
involved (Rajwani and Liedong, 2015), this thesis encourages firms to comment on policy 
issues through petitions and press conferences. 
Third and related to the point above, this thesis identified three types of institutional risk: 
regulatory, administrative and controls. It is important for managers to understand the type of 
risk their firms are exposed to, as this will be the first step in determining the appropriate 
intervention to use in addressing the exposure. The findings of this study suggest that creating 
and maintaining vibrant public affairs departments is effective for reducing regulatory 
institutional risk, but not for reducing administrative institutional risk. They also show that 
doing CSR is effective for reducing administrative institutional risk, but not for reducing 
regulatory institutional risk. These findings imply that when firms find themselves constantly 
battling with changing and unpredictable regulatory environments, public affairs departments 
are needed to help manage dependency relationships with relevant external stakeholders. 
However, when firms are exposed to bribery and corruption, CSR is needed. This is because 
the positive public perceptions towards socially responsible firms in developing countries 
such as Ghana (Ofori and Hinson, 2007; Kuada and Hinson, 2012) suggest that public 
officials will be willing to fast-tract administrative processes for these firms without 
demanding informal payments. Because corruption is endemic and pervasive in developing 
countries, this thesis recommends that all firms should develop CSR strategies in order to 
overcome administrative obstacles. 
Fourth, this thesis has implications for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
multinational agencies such as The World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
United Nations (UN). These organizations advocate that corporate citizenship is necessary for 
socio-economic growth in emerging countries. To that effect, the private sector is encouraged 
to play an active role in policy making processes. While corporate citizenship is important, it 
could lead to CPA or the development of political connections (Alzola, 2013; Scherer et al., 
2013) which, as this thesis found, have a negative effect on firms’ debt financing. 
Considering that access to finance and cost of debt are important factors affecting the private 
sector in most developing countries, the implications of corporate citizenship could be dire. 
This thesis therefore suggests that the strengthening of State institutions and corporate 
governance should precede campaigns for corporate citizenship. This is because until 
institutions are strengthened, the repercussions of political activity will discourage corporate 
citizenship. Similarly, until corporate governance is improved, banks will continue to see 
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active corporate citizens as risky clients. The bottom line here is that development partners 
must first support institutional development and promote good corporate governance 
initiatives before calling on firms to get involved in policy making. 
Finally, this thesis has implications for national development policy. Public private 
partnerships (PPPs hereafter) have been christened as appropriate for facilitating socio-
economic development (Hayllar, 2010; Spielman et al., 2010). However, the potential of 
PPPs has not been realized in many other countries, especially in the very poor ones in 
Africa. While existing literature has noted causes of the abysmal performance and negligible 
impact of PPPs in developing countries (Poulton and Macartney, 2012; Golooba-Mutebi, 
2012), a very important issue has been left unaddressed. PPPs are a platform for business-
government interactions; hence they open up opportunities for businesses to develop political 
connections and wield political influence. While corporate political connections are good 
access to the polity, and perhaps for institutional entrepreneurship (Scherer and Palazzo, 
2011; Scherer et al., 2013), they have a dark side manifested through institutional lapses such 
as bribery, corruption and cronyism (Sun et al., 2012; Doh et al., 2012). These lapses stir up 
negative perceptions of PPP partner firms and expose the firms to adverse business effects 
and political liabilities such witch-hunting and discrimination from subsequent opposition 
governments. The success of PPPs in developing countries is therefore dependent on the 
extent to which State institutions and regulatory frameworks legitimize and control CPA. 
Enacting laws to control political campaign contributions and political directorships as well 
as maintaining public databases or websites detailing business involvement in politics will 
promote transparency (Jun et al., 2014), legitimize and brighten up the dark side of CPA, 
improve perceptions and reduce political witch-hunting. These would, in turn, make PPPs 
attractive to firms.  
8.3 Limitations  
Although this thesis presents findings that enrich our knowledge of CPA, it is subject to some 
limitations. First, as a survey-based study, I used cross-sectional and self-reported data. 
Survey restricted my ability to collect adequate data for sophisticated quantitative analysis 
such as instrumental variable (IV) regressions. However, using a survey allowed me to 
measure managerial ties which are “soft” in nature. Survey also allowed me to measure other 
variables for which no secondary data is available or accessible in Ghana. In the analyses, the 
absence of autocorrelation of the residual errors reduced endogeneity. However, endogeneity 
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from other sources such as measurement errors and omitted variables could still affect the 
results. I tried to collect objective data for some of the variables, but without success. It is 
worth noting that other studies have encountered a similar problem in emerging countries 
(Peng and Luo, 2000; Park and Luo, 2001; Acquaah, 2007). In Africa, access to financial 
information is limited (Klingebiel and Stadler, 2015). Despite this limitation, the inter-rater 
tests performed on the data indicated that the self-reported data is reliable. Also, triangulation 
of the primary data with secondary data was done for firms that are publicly listed on the 
Ghana Stock Exchange. Nonetheless, access to financial reports and objective information 
would have availed other important variables for the investigation of this financial topic. 
Additionally, even though the constructs used in this thesis were developed from the 
literature and were subjected to rigorous validity and reliability tests, they could still be 
affected by measurement errors. The results must therefore be interpreted with caution.  
Second, even though two questionnaires were delivered to two different managers of each 
sampled firm in order to address single-rater bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003), only 10 firms 
returned both questionnaires. As mentioned earlier, the kappa statistic for all ten firms was 
statistically significant and ranged from .818 to .944, indicating that responding managers 
had a “very good” agreement (Altman, 1991). However, common method variance (CMV) 
could affect the other 169 firms that returned a single questionnaire. Even though firm-level 
studies have shown that data from single respondents are reliable (Miller et al., 1997; Peng 
and Luo, 2000; Barden et al., 2005; White et al., 2015), I believe that the reliability of the 
data used in this thesis would have been stronger if all the firms returned both questionnaires. 
Third, this thesis may suffer from CMV because the data was collected using one 
questionnaire (Podsakoff et al., 2003).  In essence, the data was not collected in stages. Some 
previous studies employed a one-year or two-year lag when collecting survey data for 
dependent and independent variables (Acquaah, 2007; Boso et al., 2013). The main rationale 
for doing this is to account for the time it takes for the independent variable to have an effect 
on the dependent variable. Bringing this rationale into the context of this thesis, a lagged 
research design would have meant that enough room is allowed for political ties to influence 
risk exposure or interest rates. I could not use a lagged design for obvious reasons (limited 
registration time to finish the PhD), but I followed prior studies (Mesquita and Lazzarini, 
2008; White et al., 2015) and used a three-year frame for the questions (2011-2013) in order 
to capture lagged effects. This three year framing was also used to address causal ambiguity. 
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Nevertheless, I advise readers to take caution when interpreting the results because of 
potential reverse causality, particularly in the CPA-risk exposure study. 
Finally, this thesis is context-specific. In other words, it is focused on firms operating in 
Ghana only. Though Ghana shares similar characteristics with other developing countries 
(Acquaah, 2007; Boso et al., 2013), there are unique institutional and contextual elements 
across different developing countries. As a result, caution needs to be taken when 
generalizing the findings and conclusions to other developing countries in or out of sub-
Saharan Africa. Despite the afore-discussed limitations, this thesis makes valuable 
contributions to theory and practice.  
8.4 Directions for Future Research 
Examination of the relationship between political ties, access to finance, cost of debt and 
institutional risk exposure has opened up new avenues for future research into non-market 
strategy. First, as this thesis focuses solely on one political strategy (political ties), the effects 
of other strategies are missed. It would therefore be insightful for future studies to expand the 
scope of CPA and compare the impact of different political strategies on cost of debt and risk 
exposure. Even though campaign financing and lobbying have limited formal use in 
emerging countries (Rajwani & Liedong, 2015), it is possible for some firms to draw on them 
over time if they find that political ties are ineffective. In doing this comparative analysis, it 
will be particularly useful for researchers to conduct longitudinal analyses to track how firms 
may abandon or vary the intensity of their strategies to levels necessary and sufficient to 
obtain loan favours, start institutional entrepreneurship or reduce risk exposure. Additionally, 
future studies could conduct comparative analyses among developing countries. That way, 
institutions-based or nation-level effects can be tested. Obviously, nation-level 
macroeconomic factors such as exchange rates and inflation affect interest rates. Similarly, 
banking factors such as liquidity requirements, reserve ratios and policy rates affect access to 
finance and interest rates. Undisputedly, these factors differ from country to country. 
Therefore, studies that use cross-country samples and nation-level variables could 
significantly contribute to our knowledge of the effects of political ties in credit markets. 
Second, future studies are encouraged to extend the focus of this study to other measures of 
cost of debt, particularly non-rate terms. Previous studies have explored the impact of 
political connections on debt maturity (Chen et al., 2014) and collateral (Yeh et al., 2013), but 
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there is room to investigate the effect of political and financial ties on other interesting 
outcomes, such as restrictive lending covenants. Such extensions will significantly enhance 
the function of social capital in loan financing and augment the generalizability of the 
findings of this thesis. 
Third, other factors could be moderating the effect of political ties on cost of debt. In Ghana 
and sub-Saharan Africa, royalty is highly respected and valued. Kings and traditional rulers 
command great respect, even from politicians. Unlike political rulers who are limited to 
terms, traditional rulers rule for their lifetimes. It is therefore likely that royal ties, through 
their longevity and lasting value, could moderate the cost of debt for firms with political ties. 
I therefore encourage future studies to examine this moderator to enhance our understanding 
of the contingent value of political ties in Africa. Similarly, even though this study accounts 
for some factors that can affect risk perceptions or exposure of firms to investment climate 
constraints, it does not account for others. For instance, highly diversified firms encounter a 
broad range of policy issues whose management, often times, results in conflicts (Shaffer & 
Hillman, 2000). These firms may therefore have high risk perceptions. Also, firms with poor 
financial performance may be more sensitive to institutional lapses as these lapses further 
amplify their fragility. Future studies could examine the impact of these factors, including 
others, on institutional risk exposure. 
Fourth, considering the negative effect Big Four auditors have on politically connected firms 
in Ghana, it would be interesting for future studies to investigate whether this finding holds in 
other institutional contexts. It would also be insightful for future studies to explore the 
reasons why politically connected firms are more likely to appoint Big Four auditors  
(Guedhami et al., 2014) even when such appointments do not seem to be valuable in credit 
markets (Fortin and Pittman, 2007). To do this, a qualitative approach will be required to 
gather information about managers’ rationales and thought-processes.   
Fifth, previous studies have conceptualized the complementarity between CPA and CSR 
(Hond et al., 2014; Liedong et al., 2015; Hadani and Coombes, 2015). However, evidence 
from this thesis does not support complementarity between these two strands of non-market 
strategy. As research on the combinative effects of CPA and CSR is increasing (Mellahi et 
al., 2016), this thesis calls on researchers to look beyond the positive effects of combining 
CPA and CSR. Along this line, future research should begin to examine whether there is 
cannibalization, rather than complementarity, between the two activities. Does CSR or CPA 
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erode the gains of the other? Does the alignment of CSR and CPA matter for realizing any 
gains from their combination? Are CPA and CSR complements or substitutes? These 
questions should lie at the heart of future research agenda. I encourage empirical research to 
continue to explore this topic, not only in the examination of risk exposure, but in the study 
of other organizational outcomes.  
Sixth and related to the above, current research has touched on the impact of different types 
of social capital on organizational outcomes (Acquaah, 2007; Li et al., 2009; Chung, 2012), 
but only a few studies have investigated the combinative effects of the different types of 
social capital. As this thesis finds, the separate effects of different ties could be different from 
their combined effects. The interaction between types of social capital is therefore a viable 
agenda future research should explore to enrich our understanding of the dynamic and 
contingent value of network relationships.  
Seventh, this thesis adopted a positive approach with respect to the mediating mechanisms of 
the political ties-cost of debt relationship. However, there is a “dark side” of CPA (Lawton et 
al., 2013a) which can affect organizational outcomes. In this respect, future research could 
explore these “dark” mechanisms. For instance, prior research has noted that politically 
connected firms obtain favours from banks in Pakistan because bank officials are coerced and 
threatened to act according to the preferences of politicians (Khwaja and Mian, 2005). I 
encourage studies to investigate how such “dark” mechanisms mediate the performance of 
politically connected firms in credit markets.  
Finally, the results reveal that PA moderates institutional risk. Though the inclusion of PA is 
interesting, the measurement of this variable using a dummy leaves room for further 
investigation. A distinction must be made between having a PA department and performing 
PA functions. The efficacy of a PA, to a large extent, depends on its size and resource 
endowments (Lawton et al., 2013). In reality, firms may have PAs in their structures, but the 
PAs may not be functional or effective. I therefore encourage future studies to measure PA 
using a scale and not a dummy. If objective data is available, it will be better to measure this 
variable using the number of employees working in public affairs departments or the 
budgetary allocations for public affairs. Other dummy variables such as borrowing from 
government-banks could also be measured using informative scales or objective data. 
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Chapter 9 Concluding Remarks 
This thesis examined the relationship between managerial political ties, access to finance, 
cost of debt and institutional risk exposure in Ghana, sub-Saharan Africa. It also investigated 
the mediating mechanisms in the political ties-cost of debt relationship. The entire thesis was 
positioned following a systematic review of the literature (Rajwani and Liedong, 2015) which 
revealed the existence of inconsistencies in the outcomes of CPA (Hadani and Schuler, 
2013); the lack of research into cost of credit as an outcome of CPA; the paucity of studies 
looking into the mechanisms of CPA (Lux et al., 2011); and the lack of strategy studies in 
Africa and the Middle East (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Wright et al., 2005; Mellahi and Mol, 
2015; Klingebiel and Stadler, 2015). Integrating social capital theory (Granovetter, 1985; 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998a; Lin, 2001; Adler and Kwon, 2002), institutional theory (North, 
1990; Scott, 2001; Dieleman and Sachs, 2008; Doh et al., 2012) and corporate governance 
insights, this thesis hypothesizes interesting and nuanced relationships, uses survey data from 
179 firms operating in Ghana, and employs robust quantitative techniques to derive 
counterintuitive results, reach insightful conclusions, and make significant contributions to 
knowledge.   
On the topic of access to finance and cost of debt, the findings of this thesis show that 
political ties enhance access to finance. They also show that CEO duality weakens this 
enhancing effect. Further analysis revealed that politically connected firms are less likely to 
have CEO duality, suggesting that these firms could be aware of the negative consequences 
of duality. Contrary to prediction, the results show a positive relationship between political 
ties and interest rates. This positive relationship is, however, weakened by managerial 
financial ties, hence indicating that the combination of political and financial ties reduces 
interest rates. Borrowing from private banks and the appointment of Big Four auditors were 
found to have negative effects on the interest rates charged to politically connected firms. In 
sum, the results show that even though political ties can increase access to credit, they do not 
reduce the cost of credit. In that sense, this thesis reveals both the value and liability of social 
capital in credit markets, and in doing so it captures the moderating effects of corporate 
governance and institutional dynamics.   
With respect to institutional risk exposure, the results suggest that political ties have an 
insignificant association with risk. Though prior studies have postulated the effectiveness of 
CPA on uncertainty reduction (Hillman et al., 2004), this thesis found no empirical evidence 
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to back those claims. Even when institutional risk is disaggregated into its constituent 
elements (regulatory, administrative, and controls), political ties are still insignificant. These 
findings lead to a plausible conclusion that the conjectured ability of CPA to reduce risk may 
only be illusionary, not real. CSR, PA functions and industry regulation were hypothesized to 
strengthen the effectiveness of political ties in risk reduction, but the findings revealed 
opposite effects. Precisely, the interaction between CSR and political ties is insignificant and 
thus raises questions about the complementarity between CSR and CPA (Hond et al., 2014; 
Liedong et al., 2015). Moreover, instead of interacting with political ties to reduce risk, PA 
functions and regulation rather increase the risk exposure of politically connected firms, 
hence highlighting how regulatory vulnerability and visibility affect perceptions of 
susceptibility to institutional risk.       
Institutional risk exposure, social network expansion, financial reporting quality, non-
financial disclosure and board independence were hypothesized as the mechanisms through 
which CPA exerts an influence in credit markets. However, this thesis found that only 
institutional risk exposure and financial reporting quality play significant mediating roles in 
the pricing of loans given to politically connected firms. More precisely, political ties are 
associated with high exposure to investment climate constraints, which subsequently lead to 
high interest rates. Similarly, politically connected firms are associated with poor financial 
reporting, and are therefore penalized with high interest rates due to information asymmetry.  
Discussed in the previous chapter, this thesis makes significant contributions to knowledge. 
By integrating social capital and institutional theories with governance insights, it enhances 
our knowledge of the contingent value of social capital, the interactions between social 
capital, institutional and governance logics, the combinative effects of non-market strategies, 
and the mediating mechanisms of CPA. Because the contributions are very salient, some 
parts of this thesis have already been published in reputable journals. Others have been 
presented at conferences, nominated for prizes or have won prizes at conferences. The next 
section details the dissemination of this thesis.  
9.1 Research Dissemination 
Knowing very well that the “currency” of academia is publication, I have worked earnestly to 
disseminate my research since joining the PhD programme. My efforts have yielded some 
positive results. So far, working closely with my ever-supportive supervisor Dr Tazeeb 
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Rajwani, I have two papers published in high-impact journals (ABS 4 and ABS 3*) and many 
others accepted and presented at major conferences. I also have a paper under review at 
British Journal of Management (2
nd
 Round) and other manuscripts being developed for 
submission to reputable journals. The following sub-sections detail my publications, 
conference papers and research-related awards and honours. 
Peer-reviewed Publications 
Liedong, T.A., Rajwani, T. & White III, G.O. (2015) “The Contingent Value of Managerial 
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Nominated for Best Conference Paper Award, Best Conference PhD Paper Prize and Best 
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Saharan Africa: A study of Ghana” Strategic Management Society (SMS) Annual Conference, 
Denver, 3-6 October 2015 
Nominated for Best Conference Paper Award and Best Conference Paper Prize for 
Practice Implications 
 
Liedong, T.A. (2015). “Measuring the ethicality of corporate political activity: A scale 
development study” British Academy of Management Conference, Portsmouth, 8-10 
September 2015 
 
Liedong, T.A. (2015). “Political ties and cost of debt: Unpacking the relationship and 
mediating mechanisms” British Academy of Management Conference, Portsmouth, 8-10 
September 2015 
 
Liedong, T.A., Rajwani, T., & White III, G. (2015). “The Contingent Value of Managerial 
Political Ties in Private Debt Financing: Evidence from Ghana.” Academy of Management 
Annual Meeting, Vancouver, 7-11 August 2015. 
Selected for Best Paper Proceedings, Runner-Up for Best Student Paper Award – Social 
Issues in Management (SIM) Division of the Academy of Management 
 
Liedong, T.A. & Rajwani, T. (2015) “Political Connections and Preferential Access to 
Finance: A Conceptual Explication” 6th International Research Meeting in Business and 
Management, Nice (France), 2-3 July 2015 
Liedong, T.A. & Rajwani, T. (2015) “Is Corporate Political Activity Virtuous? An Empirical 
Exploration” 6th International Research Meeting in Business and Management, Nice 
(France), 2-3 July 2015 
Liedong, T.A. & Aghanya, D. (2015). “Regulatory Impact on Technological Development 
and Financial Inclusion: Evidence from Nigeria” 15th International Conference on 
Technology, Policy and Innovation, Milton Keynes (UK), 17-19 June 2015 
Liedong, T.A. & Aghanya, D. (2015). “Public-Private Partnerships, Corporate Political 
Activity and E-Governance: An Integrative Framework” 15th International Conference on 
Technology, Policy and Innovation, Milton Keynes (UK), 17-19 June 2015 
Liedong, T.A. & Rajwani, T. (2015). “Does the type of politician matter? Peering into the 
effect of political connections on firm performance” UEBS Strategy Conference, Edinburg, 
30 April -1 May 2015 
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Liedong, T.A. & Rajwani, T. (2015). “Answering the “how” question: Contingent mediation 
in the relationship between political connections and cost of debt” UEBS Strategy 
Conference, Edinburg, 30 April -1 May 2015 
 
Workshops  
 
2016 Studying Elites in Africa: Methodological Concerns and Solutions, ESRC Research 
Methods Festival, University of Bath (upcoming event on 6
th
 July, 2016) 
 
2015 Strategic Management Society (SMS) Junior Faculty/Doctoral Workshop, St Gallen, 
Switzerland 
 
Case Studies under Preparation 
 
Longevity at Fan Milk: This case study explores the dynamic capabilities that have enabled 
Fan Milk Ghana Limited to create value and endure for decades, even in the face of adverse 
market conditions.  
Dangote Group: The African Giant: This case tracks the growth and conglomeration of 
Nigeria’s Dangote Group, as well as the influence of the Group’s founder and CEO, Aliko 
Dangote.  
 
Research-Related Awards and Honours 
 
2015 Best Reviewer Prize, Business Ethics: A European Review 
2015 Nomination for Best Conference Paper Prize, Best Conference PhD Paper Prize and 
Best Conference Paper Prize for Practice Implications, SMS Annual Conference 
2015 Runner-Up, Best Student Paper Award, Social Issues in Management (SIM) Division 
of the Academy of Management 
2015 Outstanding Reviewer Award, Journal of Strategy & Management  
2015 Academy of Management Best Paper Proceedings  
2015 Editor’s Choice Collections (noteworthy manuscripts of the journal), Group & 
Organization Management 
2013 Director’s Prize for Overall Best Student, MRes Management Research, Cranfield 
School of Management 
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9.2 Personal Reflection - Challenges of the Field Work 
Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) posed a significant challenge during data collection. As 
mentioned previously, questionnaires were delivered on-site. Physical contact had to be made 
at the firms and this sometimes involved shaking hands with respondents in order to establish 
a relationship with them and gain their trust (and of course improve response rate). 
Handshaking is an important aspect of social interaction in Ghana. Even the EVD epidemic 
did not dissuade people from this practice and norm. I was therefore exposed to the deadly 
virus, but my fears were abated by the fact that there were no confirmed EVD cases in Ghana 
at the time.  
There were also issues of outright rejections as some firms refused to accept the 
questionnaire. A lack of secondary data in Ghana means that most researchers rely on 
interviews and surveys to collect information. This suggest that firms receive many surveys 
or interview requests within any given period of time, a situation that has resulted in 
respondent fatigue and caused many firms to lose interest in participating in research projects. 
It was therefore very difficult to get buy-in from the firms.  
Regardless of these challenges, I was able to collect the data and complete this thesis. The 
PhD has impacted my life in significant ways. First, I have learned to write for large 
audiences (through publications and conferences papers). Second, I have learned how to give 
constructive feedback to others (through reviewing for journals) and handle criticism of my 
own work (by addressing reviewer comments on my papers). Moreover, I have strengthened 
my interpersonal skills and have connected with academics in other institutions and countries 
(through co-authorships and collaborations). These skills, gained from the PhD, will open 
doors for me as I transition from studentship into academia.   
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Questionnaire 
CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY  
 
School of Management 
 
Corporate Non-Market Strategy Research  
 
*TO BE COMPLETED BY A MANAGER OR MEMBER OF THE MANAGEMENT TEAM* 
 
Research Overview and Consent Form:  
This research project aims to examine business-government relationships and investment climate 
constraints in Ghana. The findings of this study will provide Management with a deep and useful 
insight into strategies used by firms in Ghana. Policy recommendations will also benefit government 
and business/industry associations. 
I kindly request your cooperation in completing the attached survey which should take less than 30 
minutes. Your participation, while voluntary, is crucial to the success of this study. By returning this 
survey you are giving consent to participate. Should you choose to complete the questionnaire, I hope 
you will give your best effort and answer ALL questions. Your responses will be anonymous and 
confidential. An executive summary of the research findings will be sent to your firm upon 
completion of the project. 
If you want to know more about this research study, please call +44 (0) 1234 751122 (office), +44 (0) 
78 817 49715 (mobile), or email at tahiruazaaviele.liedong@cranfield.ac.uk (email). This project has 
been approved by Cranfield University and endorsed by the Ghana Association of Bankers (GAB), 
Association of Ghana Industries (AGI) and Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC).  
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tahiru Azaaviele Liedong (Correspondent) 
Doctoral Researcher in Strategy and Finance 
School of Management 
Cranfield University 
Cranfield, England, MK43 0AL 
Telephone: +44 (0) 1234 751122 
Email: Tahiruazaaviele.liedong@cranfield.ac.uk  
Dr Tazeeb Rajwani 
Senior Lecturer in Strategic Management 
School of Management 
Cranfield University 
Cranfield, England, MK43 0AL 
Telephone: +44 (0) 1234 751122 
Email: Tazeeb.rajwani@cranfield.ac.uk 
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SECTION 1: CORPORATE PROFILE 
1. Name of Company 
2. Year of Incorporation in Ghana 
3. Primary Industry 
4. Number of Employees 
5. How long have you been employed at this company? 
6. The revenues of your company are derived from how many products/services?  
7. Who are the owners of your company?    Foreigners ☐     Locals ☐    Joint (50%-50%) ☐  
8. Does your company have a corporate/public affairs or relations department?    Yes ☐      No ☐ 
 
NOTE: The Subsequent Questions Make Reference to the Past Three Years. Please 
respond with the following Years in Perspective: 2011, 2012, and 2013 
 
SECTION 2: INFORMAL AND SOCIAL TIES   
 
 
 
Commercial banks  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Bank of Ghana 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Credit bureaus 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Mutual Funds 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Pension Funds 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
 
 
 
CORPORATE NON-MARKET STRATEGY, 
INSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS AND ACCESS 
TO FINANCE IN GHANA   
SURVEY FORM 
 
Tahiru Azaaviele Liedong 
School of Management 
Cranfield University 
Cranfield, England, MK43 0AL 
Telephone: +44 (0) 1234 751122 
Fax: +44 (0) 1234 751806 
 
Please circle the number best describing the extent to which you and 
your company have developed informal personal ties and connections 
to managers and executives of the following organisations/institutions 
during the past three years V
er
y
 l
it
tl
e 
V
er
y
 m
u
ch
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SECTION 3: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
 
Financial information disclosed in accordance with accounting and financial 
standards 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Financial reports are prepared and disclosed in a timely manner 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Annual audit conducted by an independent, competent, and qualified auditor 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Remuneration policy for Board members and senior executives is not disclosed  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Related party transactions are not disclosed 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Conflict of interest issues are disclosed to relevant stakeholders 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Expenses and losses recognized and recorded immediately they occur 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Revenues deferred until they are verified 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
External and business risk assessments are disclosed 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Bribery and anti-corruption policy is disclosed to relevant stakeholders 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
Within the last three years, have your company’s books and accounts been audited by any of 
the following firms? 
Deloitte                                                     Yes ☐ No ☐ 
KPMG   Yes ☐ No ☐ 
Ernst and Young                           Yes ☐ No ☐ 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Yes ☐ No ☐ 
 
 
 
Pension Funds 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Mutual Funds 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Endowment Funds 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Charities and Foundations 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Private Equity Firms 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Insurance Firms 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
 
 
Please circle the number best describing the extent to which your 
company is transparent with respect to its dealings and operations in 
Ghana S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 d
is
a
g
re
e 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 a
g
re
e 
Please circle the number best describing the extent to which the 
following institutions have held stock/shares in your company during 
the past three years N
o
t 
a
t 
a
ll
 
V
er
y
 H
ig
h
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A] How many people serve on the Board of Directors of your company? _______________ 
B] How many Board Members do not hold executive positions in the company? ______________ 
C] In your company, are the offices of the Board Chairperson and CEO/Managing Director occupied 
by one person?    Yes ☐      No ☐ 
SECTION 4: DEBT PROFILE (LOANS FROM BANKS OPERATING IN GHANA) 
What is the average interest rate (%) on the loans of your company over the past three years? ______ 
How many banks have your company established credit relationships with or borrowed from over the 
past three years? ______________  
What is the average duration (months) of your company’s loans over the past three years?  
 
 
 
 
Value of the collateral pledged for loans in relation to total assets 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Level of indebtedness to financial institutions in relation to total assets 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Level of interest paid on loans 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Use of credit lines (revolving loans) 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
 
 
 
Ghana Commercial Bank (GCB) 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
National Investment Bank (NIB) 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
 
 
 
 
Using the past three years as a reference, please circle the number 
best describing your company with respect to the following V
er
y
 l
o
w
 
V
er
y
 h
ig
h
 
N
o
t 
a
t 
a
ll
 
V
er
y
 m
u
ch
 
Using the past three years as a reference, please circle the number 
best describing the extent to which your company has borrowed 
money from the following banks 
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SECTION 5: BANK RELATIONSHIPS  
A] Are there any current or former employees of commercial banks or other financial 
institutions in Ghana serving on your company’s Board of Directors?   Yes ☐      No ☐ 
B] If your answer to [A] is yes, please indicate how many board members have financial 
sector experience ________________ 
C] Please indicate the cumulative years of experience of all board members with financial 
experience ________________ 
 
  
 
Banks requesting or utilising support of your company to affect a political, 
policy or social issue (E.g. signing a petition) 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Banks utilizing the contacts and network of your company’s Board of 
Directors or executives to mobilize grassroots support for a policy issue 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Banks sponsoring or supporting your company to publish reports or hold press 
conferences on policy issues  
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Banks soliciting referrals, introductions and recommendations to elected 
officials or regulators from your company’s Board of Directors or executives 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
 
SECTION 6: ACCESS TO FINANCE 
 
 
Access to credit is sufficient and adequate for our business 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
We are discouraged to apply for loans because we fear our applications will be 
rejected 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
We are given the full loan amounts we apply for 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Access to credit is insufficient and inhibits our business 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
 
 
 
Please indicate the frequency with which commercial banks have related 
with your company in the following ways over the past three years  N
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Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
following statements about your company 
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SECTION 7: INVESTMENT CLIMATE CONDITIONS 
 
 
Custom and trade regulations 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Labour regulations 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Licensing and permit requirements and procedures 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Court/legal/judicial system 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Tax administration 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Bribery, extortions, and informal payments (corruption) 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Bureaucracy or slow public sector machinery 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Import and export restrictions 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Currency controls 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Price controls 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Expropriation (e.g. cancellation or postponement of contracts) 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
 
SECTION 8: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 
Our company does not participate in activities which aim to protect and 
improve the quality of the natural environment 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Our company makes investment to create a better life for future generations 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Our company implements special programs to minimize its negative impact on 
the natural environment. 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Our company targets sustainable growth which considers future generations. 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Our company supports nongovernmental organizations working in 
problematic areas. 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Our company contributes to campaigns and projects that promote the well-
being of the society 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Our company encourages its employees to participate in voluntarily activities 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Our company emphasizes the importance of its social responsibilities to the 
society 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Our company policies encourage the employees to develop their skills and 
careers 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
Using the past three years as a reference, please circle the number 
best describing the extent to which the following present an obstacle 
to the operations of your company in Ghana N
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 o
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Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
following statements about your company 
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The management of our company is not concerned with employees’ needs and 
wants. 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Our company implements flexible policies to provide a good work & life 
balance for its employees 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Managerial decisions regarding the employees are usually unfair. 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Our company supports employees who want to acquire 
additional education 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Our company respects consumer rights beyond the legal requirements. 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Our company provides full and accurate information about its products to its 
customers. 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Customer satisfaction is highly important for our company 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Our company does not pay its taxes on a regular and continuing basis 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Our company complies with legal regulations completely and promptly 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
 
 
SECTION 9: BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS 
 
 
 
 
Investing heavily in building relationships with government officials 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Spending a lot of time dealing with government affairs 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Making efforts to maintain good relationships with influential government 
officials 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
following statements about your company 
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To what extent do you agree with the following with respect to 
your company during the past three years? 
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SECTION 10: FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
 
Growth in market share 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Growth in net income 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Growth in sales 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Growth in productivity 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Return on assets 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Return on sales 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Return on equity 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
--The End-- 
Thank you very much for your time and effort. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please evaluate your company’s performance compared to your 
major competitors within the past three years 
M
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r 
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Appendix B: Survey Endorsement Request Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REQUEST FOR SURVEY RESEARCH ENDORSEMENT  
We write to solicit your support and endorsement of our research project titled “Corporate Non-
market Strategy, Institutional Conditions and Access to Finance in Ghana”. Approved by Cranfield 
University, this research is part of the Doctoral project of Mr Tahiru Azaaviele Liedong, a proud 
Ghanaian with an unrelenting determination to contribute to Ghana’s economic development.  
This research project aims to examine how corporate participation in policy, political and civic 
processes impacts the exposure of firms to investment climate constraints. The project will also 
investigate the impact of corporate political engagement on corporate governance, access to finance 
and cost of debt of firms operating in Ghana. We intend to use surveys to collect data from registered 
firms across the country between August 2014 and December 2014.  
The findings of this project will be significant for the various stakeholders of private sector 
development in Ghana. Firms will understand the strategic value of civic and political participation 
while business associations, government and its development partners will benefit from the private 
sector policy recommendations that this project will proffer. Indeed, this project stands to make a 
substantial contribution to the development of Ghana, specifically in the areas of private sector 
development, corporate governance and investment promotion. 
We would be grateful to have your endorsement of our survey. We believe that having you as a 
partner will not only mean that we acknowledge your relevance and contributions to the subject of our 
project, but will also help to facilitate the consolidation of our various efforts to promote private 
sector development in Ghana. To this end, a written approval and support for our survey will suffice 
(letter or email). We will share our findings and recommendations with your good office. 
Enclosed are the short biographies of the researchers. Thank you in advance for your support. 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Mr. Tahiru Azaaviele Liedong (Correspondent)  Dr Tazeeb Rajwani 
Doctoral Researcher     Senior Lecturer, Strategic Management 
Cranfield School of Management   Cranfield School of Management 
Cranfield, UK, MK43 0AL    Cranfield, UK, MK43 0AL 
Telephone: +44 (0) 1234 751122   Telephone: +44 (0) 1234 751122 
Email: Tahiruazaaviele.liedong@cranfield.ac.uk  Email: Tazeeb.rajwani@cranfield.ac.uk  
Executive Director, 
Association of Ghana Industries 
2
nd
 Floor Addison House 
Trade Fair Centre, Accra 
Ghana 
 
27
th
 June, 2014 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
  
 
College Road, 
Cranfield, Bedfordshire 
MK43 0AL England 
Tel: +44 (0) 1234 750111 
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Appendix C: Received Endorsement Sample 
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Appendix D: Systematic Review Paper Selection Process 
Title 
Screening 
 Started with 2,454 articles after removing all duplicates 
 
 1,523 titles related to entirely different research areas such as public-private 
partnerships, NGOs, Development, Capital Control, etc. Examples of titles 
include: “Reasons for implementing public private partnership projects”, 
“Stakeholder management for public private partnerships”, “Investments in 
rent-seeking”, “Changes in Korean Corporate Governance: A Response to 
Crisis”, “The influence of UK NGOs on the common agricultural policy” 
 668 titles related to the research area but did not relate or refer to the review 
question. These titles related to the types and determinants of political strategies, 
and to political organization for lobbying. Some examples of such titles include: 
“Were lobbyists on income tax accounting influenced by income strategies?”, 
“Who Gave Soft Money? The Effect of Interest Group Resources on Political 
Contributions”, “Competition and political organization: Together or alone in 
lobbying for trade policy?”, “Firm-level determinants of political influence”, 
“Constituency building as the foundation for corporate political strategy”, “Are 
firms' lobbying strategies universal? Comparison of lobbying by French and UK 
firms” 
  2 articles were eliminated because they related to state/municipal lobbying and 
not corporate level political activity. Example: “Fiscal Federalism, State 
Lobbying and Discretionary Finance: Evidence from India” 
 In total, 2,193 papers were eliminated because they didn’t address the review 
question 
Abstract 
Screening 
 Started with 261 articles after title screening 
 58 articles were eliminated because they related to different research areas 
 89 were eliminated because they related to the research area but did not address 
the research question. Examples include: “Latino Political Connectedness and 
Electoral Participation”, “Political Connections: The Missing Dimension in 
Leadership”, “The Contingent Value of Corporate Political Ties” 
 A total of 147 articles were eliminated, retaining 114 articles.  
Full text 
Screening 
 Started with 141 articles (114 from databases, 25 from cross-referencing, and 2 
from recommendations by supervisor) 
 67 articles from the databases and 5 from cross-referencing were eliminated 
because they were not related to the research question. These papers focused on 
state enterprises, political strategies and antecedents of CPA. Others were 
conceptual, or did not address a specific political strategy. Examples of titles 
include: “High-level politically connected firms, corruption, and analyst 
forecast accuracy around the world”, “Cross-border political donations and 
Pareto-efficient tariffs”, Firm Level Performance Implications of Nonmarket 
Actions 
 A total of 72 articles were excluded at this stage, retaining 69 articles.  
Quality 
Screening 
 Quality screening was conducted for 69 articles 
 13 articles ( 2 from cross-referencing and 11 from the databases) were 
eliminated due to issues with methodology and trustworthiness 
 The final sample contained 56 articles (18 from cross-referencing, 2 from 
recommendations, and 36 from the databases) 
 
 
